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[Abstract] The present book provides insights into the processes and motivations
invol-ved in group formation and joining, as well as into group cohesiveness and
dis-integration, and the processes whereby individual members disengage or are unable to
do so. Various forms of interaction between the group and the social environment will also
have great impact on the fate of the group and its members. These are all processes and
mechanisms that can be influ-enced through prevention and intervention measures – and
more effectively so if action is based on knowledge of both the general phenomenon as well
as of the local situation.
The text provides a detailed description of several intervention methods and programmes
that have been developed to address problems of violent and/or racist youth groups and
violence, and that have been demonstrated to have some success in that respect. The main
target groups are youth workers, social workers, teachers, police officers, municipal
administrators, policy mak-ers and other practitioners who are in positions where they have
to handle emerging problems of racist and violent youth groups, as well as stu-dents to these
professions.
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Preface 
Racist groups and skinhead gangs usually recruit among very young people. 
In most cases, such adolescents do not join racist groups because they are 
racists initially. Racist ideology is usually adopted as a consequence rather 
than being a cause for joining the group. These tight-knit and secluded 
groups are attractive to some youths because they fulfil several of their so-
cial and psychological needs in terms of providing identity, community, pro-
tection, and excitement – quite normal needs that they have not got fulfilled 
in ordinary contexts. However, joining such a group has severe conse-
quences in terms of being socialized into an extremist worldview and a vio-
lent and criminal style of behaviour. In its turn, this may lead to victimisa-
tion of others as well as to their own social marginalisation. 
Fortunately, most of those who have joined the racist scene do disengage 
sooner or later. Our goal should be that they quit sooner rather than later – 
before they hurt others; before they have internalised a racist worldview and 
a violent pattern of behaviour; and before they have ruined their own future 
by getting a criminal record and a Nazi stigma. How can this be accom-
plished? 
The present text provides insights into the processes and motivations in-
volved in group formation and joining, as well as into group cohesiveness 
and disintegration, and the processes whereby individual members disengage 
or are unable to do so. Various forms of interaction between the group and 
the social environment will also have great impact on the fate of the group 
and its members. These are all processes and mechanisms that can be influ-
enced through prevention and intervention measures – and more effectively 
so if action is based on knowledge of both the general phenomenon as well 
as of the local situation. 
It also provides a detailed description of several intervention methods and 
programmes that have been developed to address problems of violent and/or 
racist youth groups and violence, and that have been demonstrated to have 
some success in that respect.  
The main target groups are youth workers, social workers, teachers, po-
lice officers, municipal administrators, policy makers and other practitioners 
who are in positions where they have to handle emerging problems of racist 
and violent youth groups, as well as students to these professions. 

About the Authors 
Tore Bjørgo, Dr., is a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs (NUPI), and (from mid-2004) professor of police sci-
ence at the Norwegian Police University College. He is a social anthropolo-
gist by training, and received his doctoral degree from the Faculty of Social 
Science at the University of Leiden (1997). His most recent main works are 
Generalized Hatred, Polarized Communities: On Conflicts between Youth 
Groups in a Norwegian City (in Norwegian, with Yngve Carlsson, Oslo: 
NIBR Pluss 4/2001), Violence, Racism and Youth Gangs: Prevention and 
Intervention (in Norwegian, Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1999, with Yngve 
Carlsson), and Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, 
Perpetrators, and Responses (Oslo: Tano-Aschehoug, 1997). He has also 
(co)authored books on political communication, and terrorism (in Norwe-
gian), and has (co)edited the volumes Racist Violence in Europe (Macmillan, 
1993), Terror from the Extreme Right (Frank Cass, 1995), and Nation and 
Race: The Developing Euro-American Racist Subculture (Northeastern Uni-
versity Press, 1998). He has served as an advisor on how to intervene with 
racist and violent youth gangs to local, national, and international policy 
makers, agencies and NGOs. He is the initiator of Project Exit, a program to 
facilitate disengagement from racist and violent youth groups that has been 
adopted in several European countries. 
 
Yngve Carlsson is a sociologist and senior research fellow at the Norwegian 
Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR). He defines himself 
mainly as an applied researcher, and has been engaged in several evaluations 
of local projects in Norway on local planning, preventive health work, pre-
ventive youth work, and interventions with racist groups. He has frequently 
been engaged as an advisor in practical problem solving on the community 
level. From 1992 until 1995 he served as an advisor for the Brumunddal ac-
tion plan against racism – probably the most comprehensive local project on 
this topic in Scandinavia. He now serves as an advisor on a governmental 
program to improve the general conditions for children and youths in ten 
selected communities in Norway. He is member of the national advisory 
team to intervene with racist and violent youth gangs. His works on racist 
youth groups are Generalized Hatred, Polarized Communities: On Conflicts 
between Youth Groups in a Norwegian City (in Norwegian, with Tore 
Bjørgo, Oslo: NIBR Pluss 4/2001), Violence, Racism and Youth Gangs: Pre-
vention and Intervention (in Norwegian: Tano Aschehoug, 1999 with Tore 
Bjørgo); Racism in an affluent area in Oslo (in Norwegian NIBR-report 
1999:9); An Industrial community and racism (NIBR-report 1997:17); and 
The Brumunddal Action Plan – did it produce results? (NIBR-report 
1995:13).  
 

1. Introduction 
All over Europe, neo-Nazi groups, skinheads, and xenophobic gangs of 
youths commit acts of racial violence, and harass ethnic minorities and other 
people they consider their enemies. The public frequently responds with 
shock and disgust, and rightfully so. Strong and public reactions against ra-
cism may certainly be of great value in itself. Demonstrations and infor-
mation campaigns may be good for the public morale by reinforcing positive 
attitudes towards minorities and against racism. However, such responses 
have little effect on the youths participating in racist groups. They seem to 
reinterpret such manifestations of antiracism in ways that merely reinforce 
their world-view, identity, and group cohesiveness. If we want to influence 
such groups, we should try to base interventions on knowledge about the 
group processes involved.  
Unfortunately, there is no single ‘magic bullet’ that alone can solve the 
problem of racist violence and racist groups. Policies and measures are likely 
to be more effective if they are comprehensive and co-ordinated rather than 
isolated approaches working in opposite directions. This requires collabora-
tion at the local level between the police, social agencies, schools, youth 
workers, and non-governmental organisations. On the general level, inter-
ventions against racial violence should include the following:  
 
– suppressive measures (improving laws against racism, police action, 
more effective implementation) 
– victim support (prevent victimisation, taking care of victims, assistance to 
report) 
– improving public awareness on xenophobia and racist violence (political 
manifestations, dissemination of information, campaigns, demonstrations, 
public declarations, etc.)  
– addressing structural causes (marginalisation, discrimination, unemploy-
ment, etc.) 
– reducing the size and activities of racist groups (reducing recruitment, 
increasing disengagement, splitting groups). 
 
This article will focus on the last dimension, but that does certainly not mean 
that this should exclude the other forms of interventions.  
The group dimensions of violence 
Several persons together commit most cases of racist violence. The nature of 
these groups varies considerably. Some groups are just loose cliques of 
friends who happen to get in conflict with some foreigners. Other groups 
have more the character of delinquent gangs, often with a xenophobic orien-
tation, but without any ideology or links to extremist organisations. Some 
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groups are bands of skinheads with a nationalist or Nazi orientation or style. 
And still other groups are parts of neo-Nazi organisations or networks.  
Although many of the less organised xenophobic youth groups do not 
have direct ties to the neo-Nazi or right-wing extremist scene, these youth 
groups nevertheless represent an important pool of recruits to neo-Nazi 
groups and other far-right movements. And some of these xenophobic youth 
gangs may transform into more ideological groups because of the responses 
they get to their acts of racist violence. Thus, it is important to address how 
to prevent an escalation in racism and violence, and how the various forms 
of racist youth groups can be reduced in numbers and strength. 
In understanding racist violence and the behaviour of participants in rac-
ist youth groups, it is sometimes useful to make an analytic distinction be-
tween racism as motivation, and racism as expression. To some of these 
youths, it is clearly both. They commit racist acts that are motivated by ra-
cism, xenophobia, or Nazi ideology. However, to many of the other partici-
pants in racist youth groups, racism is their form of expression whereas there 
are quite other considerations than ideology that motivate their Nazi and rac-
ist behaviour. This could be to show off to friends, to live up to the expec-
tations of the group, to prove their loyalty or manhood, or getting media at-
tention. For the majority of racist perpetrators, it is probably a mixture of 
such non-political motives with a loose bundle of undigested xenophobic 
feelings and racist slogans that determines their behaviour. To the victims of 
their racist expressions, however, it does not matter much what motivated 
the fist that struck them – it hurts the same. Such knowledge may neverthe-
less be highly relevant to agencies involved in developing more targeted and 
effective methods of prevention and intervention against racism and vio-
lence. In relation to those characterised by racism as expression rather than 
motivation, it is likely to have a direct impact on their racist behaviour if 
their ties with the racist group can be broken. 
In the following, we will focus on why it is important to reduce the size 
of the neo-Nazi and racist youth scene, and what are the critical processes 
we should try to influence in order to achieve that. 
It makes a lot of difference if there are close to 3,000 neo-Nazis activists, 
as is the case in a country like Sweden, or merely 100–150, as in Norway. 
With a large number of participants, the Nazi scene in Sweden has reached a 
critical mass, and become a movement. They also have a large number of 
sympathisers – several thousands – who may serve as a pool of recruits. 
These sympathisers also constitute a big and profitable ‘home market’ for 
White Power music, magazines, and other ‘nationalist’ products. There is a 
large pool of talent among the participants of the scene – including musici-
ans, artists, writers, computer specialists, academics, university students, and 
others with a wide range of skills. This provides opportunities for specialisa-
tion among a variety of interests and tasks within the movement. Through 
the last decade, an elaborate organisational, economical and media infra-
structure has been built up by the Swedish neo-Nazis. To some young peo-
ple, it is socially attractive to join the scene. Many stay on in the movement 
for many years, providing experience and stability. Although they mainly 
recruit among teenagers, the average age in the neo-Nazi scene is relatively 
high. It can no longer be described mainly as a youth scene. Many activists 
2. Why do Young People Join Racist Groups – and Why do They Leave? 
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are in their twenties and thirties, and have been involved for ten years or 
more. Due to its size and numbers, the movement (or local group) is not very 
vulnerable if leaders are put in prison – there are plenty of alternative leaders 
to take over. The movement is also sufficiently strong and intimidating to 
provide some protection against outside enemies.  
In Norway, the situation is different. There are merely 100–150 active 
participants concentrated in five to ten locations. Members are young and 
have relatively short careers in the movement – only a few continue to be 
active after they turn 20. Thus, the average age is lower than in Sweden. Few 
have more than basic education, and the pool of talent and skills is very limi-
ted. As a result, organisation is weak, magazines and music productions have 
a low quality, and the few local groups that exist are small. There is a very 
limited infrastructure in terms of music bands, magazines and other media 
enterprises. To outsiders, the Nazi scene looks like a group of losers, and it is 
hardly very attractive to join. The local groups are also vulnerable to arrests 
or defection of leaders and core members – there are few to take over. As a 
result, the Nazi scene in Norway lacks the critical mass it needs to flourish in 
the ways it does in countries like Sweden and Germany. However, even if 
the scene has a limited size at the national level, some of the local groups 
have a sufficient size and strength to have ‘street credibility’ – they are able 
to intimidate people and dominate the streets in their community. In addi-
tion, such local groups may reinforce their strength by being connected with 
other groups nationally or internationally. 
So size matters at all these levels. And age matters as well. How can we 
then influence the size and career patterns of the neo-Nazi and racist youth 
scene? 
One approach is to focus on the population balance of the group in a 
demographic sense. The relevant parameters here are the number of people 
joining the scene, the number of people leaving the scene, and the length of 
time they remain in the movement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changing the population balance of racist groups 
Entry Exit 
Growing group 
Shrinking group 
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If there are more people that join the group than those who leave, the group 
is growing. And opposite, if there are more people who quit than the number 
of new recruits, the group is in decline and may disappear unless they are 
able to turn the trend. However, within a larger Nazi scene, it is possible to 
desert a sinking group and join a more successful one. 
New extreme groups emerge constantly. However, most of them fall 
apart after a few months or years – only in rare cases are they able to survive 
for a decade or more. These few ‘successful’ groups are more likely to keep 
most of their members over an extended time, and replenish their ranks with 
new recruits. Other groups suffer from steady defection and turnover in 
membership without being able to recruit a sufficient number of newcomers 
to keep the group strong enough to survive. 
Most of those who have joined the racist scene do disengage sooner or 
later. Our goal should be that they quit sooner rather than later – before they 
hurt others; before they have internalised a racist world-view and a violent 
pattern of behaviour; and before they have ruined their own future by getting 
a criminal record and a Nazi stigma. The longer they stay the more difficult 
it is to get out. And the more long-term and experienced activists, the stron-
ger will the Nazi scene become. And obviously, it is easier to influence a 
young teen-ager to quit than to get an adult veteran of the movement to do 
so. 
So how can we influence the processes of recruitments to and disengage-
ment from extremist groups? At least, we need to have some answers to the 
following questions:  
 
– Why do young people join racist groups? What are their motives and cir-
cumstances for joining? 
– What happens to them once they have become part of the scene?  
– Why do most of them eventually disengage? What are the circumstances 
and motivations?  
– And what factors and obstacles prevent the rest of them from doing so? 
 
These processes and how they might be influenced, will be addressed in 
some more details in the following chapters. 
 
 
Part I: 
 
Group Processes and Dynamics 

2. Why do Young People Join Racist 
Groups – and why do They Leave? 
Introduction 
Many crimes – violent crimes in particular – are typically group crimes. This 
may mean that the act of violence is committed by several members of the 
group together, or by an individual in order to make an impression on the 
group. Violent behaviour is often the outcome of internal group dynamics or 
pressure from the group towards individual members. The individuals within 
the group often feel a strong need to live up to the (real or perceived) expec-
tations of the group. The group may also use violence to create or maintain a 
particular image of itself in relation to its social surroundings, or otherwise 
protect group interests, e.g. in relation to threats from rival groups. Being a 
member of a group where violence and other crimes are considered to be not 
only acceptable but also even commendable may also greatly reduce the in-
dividual’s inhibitions against committing such crimes.  
This means that if individual members disengage from such violent or 
crime-oriented groups, their propensity to commit is likely to drop. Simi-
larly, if such groups are dissolved, or group cohesion is reduced, the num-
bers of crimes committed by (former) group members are also likely to de-
crease.  
It is not the purpose to test these hypotheses here, as they have been con-
firmed by several other studies.1 On a basis of a study of racist and violent 
youth groups,2 this chapter will rather focus on the processes which facilitate 
group disengagement and reduce group coherence, preferably to the point of 
dissolving the violent group. However, to understand these processes, it is 
necessary to comprehend why some young people are attracted to such ex-
treme groups, how they get socialised into group values and behaviour, and 
how group membership affects their relationships to their former social net-
work and mainstream society in general. What kind of experiences and cir-
cumstances motivates individuals to quit, and what obstacles are there to 
leaving the group? How can these obstacles be overcome or circumvented, 
and what exit strategies are available? What can society (such as family, 
friends, police and other authorities) do to facilitate such disengagement? 
Thus, we will focus most of my attention on groups and organisations, 
which cater primarily to young people, such as racist youth gangs and sub-
cultures, nationalist youth organisations, and militant neo-Nazi groups. We 
                                                     
1  See e.g. Malcolm W. Klein, The American Street Gang: Its Nature, Prevalence, and Con-
trol. (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 12, 44–49, 145–148. 
2  Tore Bjørgo, Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators, and 
Responses, (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1997, originally a doctoral dissertation at the Univer-
sity of Leiden), in particular Chapter 6. A shorter version (a variant of the present paper) 
was published as ‘Entry, Bridge-burning and Exit Options: What happens to young people 
who join racist groups – and want to leave?’, in Jeffrey Kaplan and Tore Bjørgo (eds.), 
Nation and Race: The Developing Euro-American Racist Subculture (Boston: North-
eastern University Press, 1998). 
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are less concerned here with the nationalist and anti-immigration organisa-
tions and parties, which are mainly run by older people, although many of 
the findings are also relevant to these groups. 
In a forthcoming research project, we will expand this perspective to a 
comparative study of joining and leaving various types of extreme groups. In 
the concluding part of the present chapter, we will present in a tabular form 
which similarities and differences we expect to find when we start to collect 
systematic data on a number of different types of extreme groups. 
Finding accurate labels for these ‘groups’, ‘networks’ and ‘sub-cultures’ 
is sometimes problematic because the organisational set-up is often vague 
and informal. To characterise individuals who have joined such groups as 
‘activists’ or ‘members’ may be somewhat misleading, since many ‘mem-
bers’ of these groups and scenes do not have formal memberships, and many 
have joined for purposes other than political activism. 
It is useful to make a distinction between bounded and unbounded 
groups. Racist subcultures, scenes or milieus are generally unbounded in the 
sense that the boundaries are relatively fuzzy, and that it is not clearly de-
fined who is inside and who is outside. There are normally a number of peo-
ple at the margins of the scene, who sympathise or share some elements of 
opinions or style, who mingle socially with activists, and who drift in or out 
of the scene. Access to the inner circles, however, is restricted to individuals 
considered reliable and worthy of trust. Thus, there are status hierarchies 
within unbounded scenes, but the criteria for status and access are not clearly 
defined.3 Inner circles may be seen as consisting of one or several bounded 
groups into which individuals can be accepted only after some sort of ap-
proval or sponsorship by persons with a higher standing in the group. Being 
accepted into such a bounded group involves trust, obligations, commitment, 
and – very significantly – being initiated into some of the group’s secrets. 
Thus, inclusion in a bounded and closed group means the individual can no 
longer leave the group at will without being considered a security risk or 
even a traitor. 
This study has been mainly, but not exclusively, based on interview data. 
The most important set of sources was a series of direct interviews we had 
with about 25 individuals – some who were racist activists in the past but 
have left the group in one way or another, others who are still activists but 
seriously thinking of quitting.4 In addition to this primary group, we also 
have second-hand information about a much larger number of former activ-
ists. Sources vary with regard to the level of detail and reliability, ranging 
from published autobiographies5 and newspaper interviews, to former activ-
                                                     
3  Similar patterns of bounded and unbounded groups have been observed regarding various 
‘new religious movements’, e.g. by Thomas Pilarzyk (see note 8). 
4  Some of these interviews have been relatively brief (1–2 hours), others have consisted of 
a series of interviews over a long period (ranging from six months to seven years), in sev-
eral cases totalling fifteen to thirty hours of conversation. My interviews with (potential) 
leave-takers were part of larger series of interviews with present and former nationalist 
and neo-Nazi activists, and with persons involved with them in various capacities (politi-
cal opponents, police officers, youth workers, victims of violence and harassment, acade-
mic researchers, journalists, and others). The interviews took place in Norway, Denmark 
and Sweden, and were mainly conducted in three periods: 1988–89, 1991–92, and 1995–
96. 
5  (Auto)biographies by or about racist activists which focus on why and how the individu-
als in question join and leave the racist group or scene may constitute useful empirical 
data. Taken alone, they remain idiosyncratic case stories, but by comparing the experien-
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ists telling about what happened to other former members of their group. 
Several parents whose children had joined racist groups have also provided 
valuable insight. This type of second-hand data provides a basis for judging 
to what extent findings resulting from primary sources can be generalised. 
Research on disengagement from extremist groups  
There have been a number of studies which have addressed various aspects 
of how individuals join and leave different types of clandestine, secluded 
and stigmatised groups, but only a few of these have specifically discussed 
racist groups. However, many of the factors and processes involved in leav-
ing terrorist organisations, religious cults and criminal youth gangs are simi-
lar. Analytical approaches and findings from such studies can be transferred 
and applied to the study of racist groups. This literature is discussed in more 
detail in Bjørgo (1997), Chapter 6. 
Entry 
Extreme groups fulfil certain fundamental social and psychological needs to 
many young people. However, joining such a group may have consequences 
they did not anticipate. They frequently find that it is much easier to get into 
such an extreme group than getting out.  
When asking what attracts young people to racist, nationalist or neo-Nazi 
groups, one must first realise that these groups appeal to different types of 
persons who may join for very different reasons, or combinations of reasons. 
While this study concentrates on the dynamics of leaving racist groups, some 
brief consideration should be given to how and why young people join racist 
groups in the first place.  
 
1. Ideology and politics: In most cases, young people do not join racist 
groups because they are racists, but they gradually adopt racist views be-
cause they have become part of a racist group. Some do take contact with 
racist groups for political reasons, though. This may have been occasioned 
by a general feeling of alienation from mainstream political culture or may 
be the result of a sudden ‘conversion experience’. 
 
2. Provocation and anger: Others are less concerned about ideological con-
tent but respond more to what they experience as provocative and outrageous 
behaviour by immigrants or by leftist anti-racists, or that they get less access 
to social services and other scarce goods than those offered to immigrants 
and asylum-seekers. 
 
                                                     
ces of these individuals to similar or different cases, these stories may contribute to more 
building general insight. See e.g. Ray Hill with Andrew Bell, The Other Face of Terror: 
Inside Europe’s Neo-Nazi Network (London: Grafton Books, 1988); Ingo Hasselbach und 
Winfried Bonengel, Die Abrechning. Ein NeoNazi steigt aus (Berlin und Weimar: Auf-
bau-Verlag, 1993); Ingo Hasselbach with Tom Reiss, Führer-Ex: Memoirs of a Former 
Neo-Nazi (London: Chatto and Windus, 1996); Kevin Flynn and Gary Gerhardt, The Si-
lent Brotherhood: Inside America’s Racist Underground (New York: The Free Press, 
1989). 
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3. Protection: Young people may join militant racist groups to get protection 
against various enemies or perceived threats. Racist youth groups sometimes 
actively seek out individuals who are in a need for protection and offer them 
security in the group. A former Swedish skinhead (18) recounts his experi-
ence:  
 
When I was 14, I had been bullied a lot by classmates and others. By coinci-
dence, I got to know an older guy who was a skinhead. He was really cool, so I 
decided to become a skinhead myself, cutting off my hair, and donning a black 
Bomber jacket and Doc Martens boots. The next morning, I turned up at school 
in my new outfit. In the gate, I met one of my worst tormentors. When he saw 
me, he was stunned, pressing his back against the wall, with fear shining out of 
his eyes. I was stunned as well – by the powerful effect my new image had on 
him and others. Being that intimidating – boy, that was a great feeling!6 
 
4. Drifting: Many young people may be described as ‘tasters’ or ‘drifters’ 
who join and leave a series of movements, organisations and subcultures. 
Within the span of a few years, some teenagers make careers which include 
a number of very disparate groups and activities – often apparently at odds 
with each other, such as: religious groups, sports clubs, petty-criminal youth 
gangs, drug experiments, mainstream politics, left-wing militant groups, Sa-
tanism, and neo-Nazism. They are often motivated by curiosity and a search 
for excitement more than real commitment. However, it frequently turns out 
to be much more difficult to move on from a neo-Nazi or racist group than is 
the case with most other groups young people may drift into. 
 
5. Thrill seeking: Some of those who involve themselves with extreme po-
litical groups, represent a personality type with a particularly strong psycho-
logical need for excitement, for testing their own limits and for exposing 
themselves to potentially dangerous situations. A considerable proportion of 
people with these dispositions go into more destructive activities, such as 
crime, drug use – or political extremism and violence.  
 
6. Violence, weapons, and uniforms: Some of those joining militant racist 
and Nazi groups, are strongly – even primarily – attracted by the violent and 
militaristic aspects of these groups. Brotherhoods of arms, masculinity cults 
and the mystique of weapons and uniforms appeal strongly to certain types 
of young men. Militant nationalist and neo-Nazi groups provide a social con-
text for cultivating such interests, e.g. by organising clandestine weapons 
training in the forests. 
 
7. Youth rebels go to the right: Traditional leftist ideologies and role models 
of revolution and rebellion hold little appeal to many young rebels of the 
1990s. As one young nationalist activist put it, ‘if you really want to provoke 
society these days, you have to become either a National Socialist or a 
Satanist!’7 
 
                                                     
6  Interview (19 June 1996) with the ex-skinhead P.K. (18). 
7  Interview with former activist in the Norwegian Valkyria group (1 September 1995). 
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8. The search for substitute families and father-figures: Many of those join-
ing extremist groups have a troubled relationship with their families, and 
with their fathers in particular. Some parents are obviously too busy with 
their own careers to show their children sufficient attention, concern and ap-
preciation. Provocative and rebellious behaviour is often the child’s way of 
getting attention and at least some response – a negative one if a positive 
response is not forthcoming. Older activists in racist groups often serve as 
substitute father-figures or masculine role models for such young boys in 
particular. 
 
9. The search for friends and community: A considerable proportion of those 
joining the racist scene are individuals who have no friends and are primarily 
looking for friendship and acceptance. Having failed to be accepted into 
other groups, they enter the first door open to them. They often find that the 
racist group is quite forthcoming and accepting, and in some respects even 
more tolerant than many ‘straight’ youth groups are. However, to be accep-
ted into the inner circles is much more difficult. Some individuals of this 
type may go to great lengths to win acceptance, and – as easy victims of 
group pressure – they may even carry out acts of violence and other crimes 
in order to be accepted as a full member or to enhance their status within the 
group. 
 
10. The search for status and identity is perhaps the most important factor 
involved when youths join racist groups and youth gangs in general. Indi-
viduals who have failed to establish a positive identity and status in relation 
to school, work, sports or other social activities and settings sometimes try to 
win respect by joining groups with a dangerous and intimidating image. By 
donning the ‘uniform’ of the local skinhead group or a neo-Nazi movement, 
other kids who in the past used to bully them now yield to them. Although 
often mistaking fear for respect, by joining a racist group they perceive a 
clear difference in the ways others relate to them. 
 
A similar process can be observed at group level. Local youth gangs who in 
the past were feared and despised for their arbitrary violence, vandalism and 
criminality may find that if they turn their violence and aggression towards 
unpopular foreigners, some segments of the local community may applaud, 
the national news media give their acts extensive coverage, and racist or-
ganisations may hail them as true patriots and nationalist fighters. 
In more general terms, Wilhelm Heitmeyer8 describes the process of in-
dividualisation in the modern social and economic system. Social status and 
identity are no longer ‘givens’ but have to be achieved through personal ef-
fort with a great risk of failure – particularly in times of social and economic 
crisis, and unemployment. The trend among many young people to define 
their identity in terms of such ‘natural characteristics’ as race and nationality 
                                                     
8  Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Rechtsextremistische Orientierungen bei Jugendlichen: Empirische 
Ergebnisse und Erklrungsmuster einer Untersuchung zur politischen Sozialisation (Wein-
heim and Munich: Juventa Verlag, 1988, 1992); W. Heitmeyer, ‘Hostility and Violence 
Towards Foreigners in Germany’, in Bjørgo and Witte, (1993). 
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– which are ascribed rather than achieved statuses – may be seen as an at-
tempt to solve this dilemma. 
The most common way youths get in direct contact with a racist group is 
probably by being introduced through friends or older siblings who are al-
ready members themselves. Girls frequently get involved as girlfriends. 
Many youths come in contact through media focus on specific racist groups.9 
Racist groups are also developing their own media in increasingly skilled 
ways. Magazines, local radio broadcasts, electronic Bulletin Board Systems 
and Internet WWW pages, White Power rock on CD, videos and concerts 
are reaching an increasing number of young people who may thereby get in 
touch with the movement. 
Community-building and bridge-burning 
Once a young person has established contact with a radical nationalist, racist 
or neo-Nazi group, what happens to him or her? To some newcomers, very 
little. They hang around for a while, find that it was not quite what they ex-
pected, become disappointed that they are not immediately admitted to the 
inner core of the group where the more secretive and alluring activities are 
going on, and leave to search for something more exciting. Few noticed that 
they came or that they left. The shorter the time they have been inside, and 
the less they have been involved, the easier it is to get out.10 
Others have very different experiences, and undergo two parallel and mu-
tually reinforcing processes: Inclusion and socialisation into a new reclusive 
and stigmatised community, and severance of ties to the ‘normal’ commu-
nity outside. As these dual processes progress, it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult – sometimes almost impossible – to leave the group.  
There is considerable variation in the ways newcomers are received. 
Some groups welcome new recruits with open arms, trying to bring as many 
as possible into social and political activities as soon as possible.11 However, 
most groups are more careful, mainly due to fear of infiltration by political 
opponents or the police. New members are only allowed into some of the 
social activities and ‘open’ forms of activism. Only gradually are those who 
prove their trustworthiness and dedication introduced to more sensitive ac-
tivities. Some of the more elitist NS groups do not even accept new mem-
bers, at least not in principle. They rather tell people who want to join that 
they should establish their own group and prove their dedication and seri-
ousness through political activism. Then they may be included into the net-
work at a later stage. This reclusion may add to the network’s attractive-
ness.12 
                                                     
 9  For a more thorough discussion, see T. Bjørgo, ‘Role of the Media in Racist Violence’, in 
Bjørgo and Witte (1993). 
10  A similar observation has been made concerning individuals who join a Hare Krishna 
commune. Fifty percent left within the first month, but only ten per cent left after having 
lived there for more than a month. Cf. Thomas Pilarzyk (1983), pp. 61–62. 
11  The Norwegian Nasjonalt Folkeparti (NF) was, for instance, sternly criticised by some 
more ideologically oriented National Socialists for uncritically taking in kids from the 
streets and giving them organizational tasks. This was what caused NF’s downfall, they 
claim (from interview with a former member). 
12  Heléne Lööw, ‘Racist Violence and Criminal Behaviour in Sweden: Myth and Realities’, 
in T. Bjørgo (ed.), Terror from the Extreme Right (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 122. 
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Newcomers in the group have described how they have gone through a 
process of socialisation. They learn from the others how to behave in order 
to find their place in the ‘family’. One important aspect of this is to install 
into new members a sense of security consciousness about things to keep 
their mouths shut about, to be careful about what they talk about on the 
phone or send by mail, and where they can go and not go safely in town. 
There is an element of realism behind these concerns, as there have been 
several confirmed cases of infiltration in the past, and there is no doubt that 
both the police and radical anti-racists often try to keep an eye on the group, 
its members and its activities. However, an equally important effect of this 
security consciousness is to create a sense of paranoia among members, a 
pervasive feeling of belonging to a small group surrounded by enemies. This 
may serve to strengthen group cohesion and loyalty, and add to the mystique 
and excitement of belonging to a ‘dangerous’ and more or less clandestine 
group. At the same time, however, the suspicion that the enemies may have 
infiltrated the group reinforces this atmosphere of distrust and paranoia. New 
members are not trusted, and even long-term members may occasionally be 
suspected of being traitors. The fear of being considered untrustworthy or 
even accused of being an infiltrator is a powerful factor promoting confor-
mity and submission to group values among newcomers. This gives leaders 
and core members a means of exercising power and disciplinary sanctions in 
relation to less senior members as well as non-conforming individuals within 
the group.13 
The group thus tries to keep out not only potential infiltrators and other 
untrustworthy elements, but also individuals who are not willing to dedicate 
themselves totally to the group. So-called ‘hobby Nazis’ – who want to join 
the group because it looks cool and who imagine themselves full members 
just because they have bought themselves a bomber jacket and a pair of Doc 
Martens boots – are held in contempt and are likely to leave or be left out 
rather soon. 
It takes time for newcomers to become accepted as full members. It is 
widely assumed among prospective recruits that they have to carry out an act 
of violence or commit another crime in order to qualify for full membership. 
Several cases where youths have acted on this assumption have been docu-
mented in court, the youths stating explicitly that their motive for carrying 
out the crime was to become accepted into a racist group or network. How-
ever, there are reasons to doubt that this is a general prerequisite for becom-
ing accepted as a full member in most racist groups. In some other violence-
oriented groups, such as certain terrorist organisations and street gangs, it is 
ensured that new recruits ‘get blood on their hands’ by taking actively part in 
serious crimes before they are considered trustworthy members. In that way 
potential infiltrators are weeded out, and the possibility of defecting from the 
group is made much more complicated. 
Achieving a position of high standing in the group depends a lot on time 
and seniority. After half a year the group can in most cases see if a recruit 
                                                     
13  For a more general discussion of these processes of paranoia, group pressure and confor-
mity in relation to terrorist and other clandestine organisations, see T. Bjørgo and D. 
Heradstveit (1992), pp. 92–104 and 155–166. Paranoia is also discussed by Katrine Fang-
en (1995), p. 82, and Heléne Lööw (1993). 
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will stay the course, and after one or two years the probability of dropping 
out is low. Those who have shown the stamina and ability to hang on for so 
many years are seen as deserving respect because they have had to go 
through so much. 
Nationalist and NS activists often describe their relationship to the group 
in terms of belonging to a family. To some, this is the first ‘real’ family they 
ever felt they had, and to others it is their new family after their old family 
turned them away. The family metaphor is often taken almost literally, by 
sharing households with ‘racial [or national] brothers and sisters’.  
Those who have become members of a well-functioning group (some 
groups never take off, and will disintegrate after a while) become part of an 
intensive social community which occupies much of their time and energy, 
and fulfils many (or even all) of their social needs. Social activities often 
centres around drinking beer together, listening to White Rock music (or 
even playing themselves), physical exercise (especially martial arts), going 
on trips to visit other groups, concerts, political meetings and demonstra-
tions, producing fanzines or other political material, or just hanging out. 
Some of the more militant activists may also be involved in more secretive 
activities such as collecting intelligence about political enemies (Anti-
antifa), weapons training and preparing for violent actions. In the larger 
groups, roles, tasks and interests tend to diversify. Some are skilled with 
computers and the Internet, others are interested in ideology or writing, some 
are interested in skinhead style, music and culture, others again devote them-
selves to more militant activities.14 
Sooner or later, most new members will experience violent confronta-
tions with enemies such as anti-racists, ‘foreigners’ or the police. Such con-
frontations are significant events to those who participate, whether the battle 
ends by victory, defeat or arrest. Regardless of the outcome, these events 
tend to give the participants an experience of common destiny. Victories are 
sources of shared pride. Defeats give rise to hatred and bitterness against the 
common enemy. Even experiencing bitter defeat, tend to strengthen group 
cohesion. Although violence and harassment from militant anti-racists may 
serve to raise the costs of joining a racist group, and may sometimes scare 
recruits into pulling out, the effect is often the opposite, as described by so-
ciologist Katrine Fangen: 
 
That young [recruits] are thoroughly beaten up at an early stage has a symbolic 
meaning to the group as well. If after such an experience the youths are still 
hanging on, they can be considered loyal members. To be beaten up is the ‘bap-
tism of fire’ everyone has to go through sooner or later. To the extent that the 
group has initiation rites, this is certainly the most conspicuous one.15 
 
To newcomers, the experience of being beaten by the police or arrested 
along with other group members also tends to redefine their entire relation-
ship to the society. If such newcomers were marginal to the group until then, 
they may suddenly start to speak about ‘we’ – a change of identity, which 
does not pass unnoticed by the others. Another important consequence of 
                                                     
14  Fangen (1995), pp. 5, 83–88. 
15  Fangen, 1995, p..102 (my translation). 
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taking part in these violent confrontations, is that these experiences tends to 
change profoundly how they relate to violence – both in terms of the legiti-
macy of using violence, and by getting familiar with the practice of it. A 
young female activist observed: 
It is remarkable how fast I have shifted my boundaries regarding vio-
lence. I used to be against violence. Now it does not cost me a penny to beat-
ing and take out all my aggression against someone who represents what I 
hate. For every confrontation against the police or against political oppo-
nents, the more hardened I become, and the more I can endure the next time. 
From being stunned and scared by seeing and experiencing violence, I have 
come to enjoy it.16 
Becoming socialised into a new community, with a world-view and value 
system completely at odds with mainstream society, and building bonds of 
loyalty to the new ‘family’, represent one fundamental process individuals 
go through when they join a racist group. An equally important process takes 
place more or less simultaneously: the severing of ties to ‘normal’ society, as 
well as to family and friends. Society for its part stigmatises them as despi-
cable Nazis and racists. This experience is described by a seventeen year old 
activist: 
 
As soon as it was known to others that I was with the nationalist group, I was 
branded. It did not take long before everyone knew that I had become a ‘neo-
Nazi’. Old friends suddenly shied away from me. Some found it awkward to 
meet me in the street. Others I have only contact with at a superficial level. In the 
group, it is a collective experience that almost everybody turns their backs on us. 
One of the things that keeps us together is this shared feeling of isolation. I do 
not understand parents who cut off their children because they become national-
ists. Then they cut off all connections and possibilities as well! It is a real prob-
lem that we do not get any kinds of correction from our surroundings. In the past, 
when I had an opinion, I could discuss it with people who disagreed with me. 
Now I can only discuss with people who already agree with me completely. 
What if I am wrong? 
I have read the novel Lord of the Flies, about a group of immature young 
boys, without any experience of life, left alone on a desolate island. Things go 
completely wrong, ending up in total barbarism. We are like them – isolated and 
with no one to correct us. I feel that things are going too far, and I am scared 
about where it will all end.17 
Reasons for considering leaving the group 
At some stage, most activists consider leaving the group and starting to live 
a ‘normal’ life. What kinds of experiences and factors contribute to this deci-
sion? Below, I try to systematise some of the more common factors. Those 
who quit the group are usually affected by a combination of several factors. 
Obviously, the more reasons, the stronger is the urge to quit. It is useful to 
make a distinction between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. ‘Push’ relates to nega-
tive social forces and circumstances which make it unattractive and unpleas-
                                                     
16  Interview with activist, 19 September 1995. 
17  Interview with a young Norwegian nationalist 18 August 1995. 
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ant to remain in a particular social environment, whereas ‘pull’ refers to fac-
tors attracting the person to a more rewarding alternative.  
 
Push-factors: 
 
1. Negative social sanctions may make some of those who join racist groups 
to reconsider their affiliation. These may range from parental scolding and 
social isolation to criminal prosecution and harassment or violence by mili-
tant anti-racists. Such sanctions are normally more effective in relation to 
new recruits who have not yet established strong ties of loyalty and broken 
all ties to the ‘normal’ community. In some cases, youths who had thrown 
bombs and Molotovs at asylum centres felt regret, only after the gravity of 
their acts was pointed out to them by the police and the media. In other 
cases, youngsters withdrew from the militant group when the consequences 
of continued affiliation were made clear to them in no uncertain terms. How-
ever, some of these negative sanctions, such as branding them ‘racists’ and 
‘Nazis’, may have the unintended effect of pushing new recruits further into 
the stigmatised group, thereby diminishing their exit options and strengthen-
ing their loyalty to the group. This is especially the case when negative sanc-
tions are not combined with positive incentives to establish alternative iden-
tities. 
 
2. Some activists lose faith in the ideology and politics of the group or move-
ment. They experience self-doubt where they feel that what they had believ-
ed in and fought for was wrong, both morally and politically. However, it is 
probably more common that beliefs change after leaving the group, and as a 
consequence, rather than before, and as a cause of leaving the group.18 
A common feeling among some activists is that ‘things are going too 
far’, especially in terms of violence. They may feel that there are too many 
violence-prone and extremist people joining the group, doing wild things 
they themselves cannot accept or do not want to get associated with. Some 
also fear that the violent conflict with militant anti-racists is escalating and 
getting out of hand, and that people on both sides may get killed.19 Some of 
the more ideologically inclined may consider joining a more moderate or 
less action-oriented group. This was the case with some of the activists in 
Norsk Front (Norwegian Front) and its successor group, Nasjonalt 
Folkeparti, who – after some other NF activists had been involved in several 
bombings in 1979 and 1985 – pulled out and established the National Social-
ist organisation Zorn 88, which was extreme in terms of ideology but moder-
ate in terms of violence.20 Others left the movement altogether. For many of 
them, things had gone much too far. 
 
3. Some grow disillusioned with the inner workings and activities of the 
group. One common objection is that the group is too much involved in 
drinking beer and having fun rather than focusing on serious political work. 
                                                     
18  This is a common observation in studies of defectors from religious groups, but has also 
been noted by Aho (1994) p. 125, with respect to racist groups. 
19  Cf. Decker and Lauritsen (1996, pp. 109–110, 117,121–122). 
20  Based on several interviews with Zorn 88 spokesman Erik Rune Hansen. 
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This disillusionment is often experienced by those who primarily are inter-
ested in discussing ideology, producing and disseminating political propa-
ganda, and building effective political organisations or even clandestine ter-
rorist cells. They tend to become frustrated by belonging to a rowdy skin-
head group where members get involved in drunken brawls with each others, 
or in senseless fights with immigrants and antiracists. Another source of dis-
illusionment is the lack of loyalty among the members of the group, even if 
they are loyal to the group as such. Although comradeship is a central value 
to the group, many find that even those they held to be close friends stab 
them in the back, betray or cheat them. Pressure from outside and the fear of 
infiltration produce a strong sense of paranoia within the group, and this may 
often cause people to accuse one another of being infiltrators or potential 
traitors. Disseminating scandalous rumours and stories about other members 
is also a common practice in many groups.21 Some new members are also 
dismayed by the ways veteran activists try to manipulate and control the 
younger ones, being protective and helpful in order to place newcomers in a 
position of dependence, involving them in illegal activities and trying to cut 
off their exit options. 
 
It’s a give and take to spend time with the leading people in the movement, it is 
not for free. I get a certain amount of confidence and friendship from them, but 
then they expect something from me, a ‘talented and promising activist’. They 
give me small hints and thinly veiled threats that ‘since we have invested so 
much in you, we would be very disappointed if you defect and let us down...’ 
When I began to realise what they expect from me, it was not pleasant at all. 
They want to control all aspects of my life, such as how and with whom I spend 
my time. Now and then they send me signals that they know everything about 
me, about my relatives, where they live and so on. I feel they try to dig their 
claws into me and use every trick to tie me to the movement. When I started to 
realise how they manipulated, I lost my illusions in relation to everyone, getting 
suspicious when people are nice: What do they want from me? The longer I stay, 
the more difficult it will become to establish a new life outside the group. They 
know, and I know, that if they can keep their hold on me long enough, they have 
got me.22 
 
4. Even long-term activists are vulnerable to the risks of losing confidence, 
status and position in the group. Although most youth groups do not have 
formal leadership hierarchies, they are nevertheless highly status-oriented. 
This makes members highly vulnerable to various accusations and rumours. 
The pervasive paranoia and fear of infiltrators also expose people to accusa-
tions of being traitors or informers. Other forms of alleged unacceptable be-
haviour may also threaten the individual’s status and standing. In one case, 
for instance, a nationalist activist was accused in a skinhead fanzine of being 
a homosexual, whereas a female activist was accused of having sex with 
non-white immigrants.23 Leading persons may sometimes be openly criti-
                                                     
21  For a revealing discussion of internal conflicts and the lack of inter-personal loyalty in 
Norwegian nationalist groups, see Katrine Fangen (1995), p. 89. 
22  Interview held on 14 Nov. 1995 with an activist who broke with the group a few months 
later. 
23  Boot Boys No. 10, Oct. 1991. 
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cised for running away and leaving young and inexperienced activists behind 
to be beaten up by attacking anti-racist militants, thereby not living up to the 
high expectations other members have of them. Others may be criticised for 
being alcoholics and incapable of running serious political activities, for be-
ing loose-mouthed with journalists, or for being self-promoters rather than 
real leaders. In such situations, when a person’s standing and reputation in 
the group is low, the option of quitting is more tempting than in a period 
when he or she is respected and well-regarded by the mates. In extreme 
cases, members may even be formally (or even violently) expelled from the 
group. This happened with the former leader of Danmarks National-
Socialistiske Bevægelse, Povl Heinrich Riis-Knudsen, who was also at one 
point the head of WUNS, the World Union of National Socialists. It was 
publicly exposed that he had an illicit affair with a Palestinian woman (‘a 
white Arab’, according to himself) – a major scandal in the NS world, and 
probably the end of his activist career.24 
 
5. A common feeling among many ‘front-line’ activists is that after a while 
they become exhausted and can no longer take the pressure. Life in a skin-
head gang or a militant nationalist youth group can be very exciting. The 
struggle against various enemies, whether they be militant anti-racists, im-
migrant youth gangs or the police, may entail violent clashes, clandestine 
activities and an almost constant feeling of high tension and uncertainty. The 
attraction of these adrenaline highs makes ‘normal’ life outside seem almost 
unbearably dull. However, few people can continue to live this kind of life 
year after year without becoming emotionally and physically burnt-out. The 
negative aspects of being stigmatised, socially isolated, always exposed to 
violent attacks from opponents, and consumed by intense hatred to various 
enemies also tend to take their toll as time pass by. A young nationalist who 
had been an activist for a year and a half put it this way: 
 
Since I was very young, I always tried out various forms of exciting and action-
filled activities and groups. Being a part of the nationalist milieu gives me in-
credibly powerful experiences – although I am sure the [militant anti-racists] feel 
much the same. This excitement of hunting each other, the unpredictability – it’s 
kind of addictive. Nothing can get you high in a better way than adrenaline! I 
cannot live without having action all the time. If things calm down for a period I 
get restless. This excitement kick is the same on both sides, I think. But unlike 
the anti-racists, we nationalists cannot go where we want in town without risking 
assault. We are considerably fewer than them, so we always have to be on guard. 
They restrict my life every day! Every time I experience that I cannot go where I 
want and do what I want, more and more aggression builds up within me. I try 
not to hate people – love and hatred are such powerful feelings, and my enemies 
do not deserve to occupy so much of my emotional life. But when they infringe 
on my life and dignity every day, I cannot help hating. 
Everyone who is part of this game, whether they are nationalists or anti-
racists, becomes intensely emotionally involved. It may begin with being inter-
                                                     
24  See a nasty article in Riis-Knudsen’s old journal National-Socialisten (Vol. 10, No. 3, 
1993), titled ‘Familiepolitik på ar(ab)isk’, where his previous followers give their judge-
ment on the character of their former leader. 
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ested in politics, but after a while the feeling that your personal dignity is vio-
lated takes over, creating fury and hatred. It’s consuming you. 
Now I feel torn and exhausted. I don’t know if I can continue this life much 
longer, or whether I want to get out of the group or not.25 
 
Living under legal pressure and police surveillance may also be exhausting 
in the long run. Many activists have committed crimes for which they face or 
fear legal prosecution. In countries where the authorities may ban extremist 
organisations, the fear of becoming stigmatised by being linked to an illegal 
association may add to the pressure. 
 
Pull Factors: 
 
7. The negative aspects of life as an activist in a stigmatised, extremist group 
often create a longing for the freedoms of a ‘normal’ life. However, most 
activists are rather ambivalent about this. On the one hand, it is a very attrac-
tive idea to be able to live a relaxed life, minding their own business without 
always having to be on guard against enemies and traitors, without fear of 
violence, without being stigmatised and isolated, and without all the restric-
tions of a more or less underground existence. On the other hand, ‘normal 
life’ may also appear dull, flat and empty, and therefore almost frightening. 
Many doubt that they would be able to endure it without backsliding. 
 
8. At some point, activists in militant nationalist or racist youth groups feel 
that they are getting too old for what they are doing.26 They no longer have 
the same need for excitement. They may have less energy, and want to calm 
things down. When they become more mature, chasing and being chased by 
‘communists’ and immigrant youth gangs no longer appears meaningful. 
Rebellious teenage members, who may even see them as representatives of 
their parents’ generation, may also challenge their authority and prestige. 
After passing the age of 30, veteran skinheads tend to feel more and more 
out of place in the group. As Katrine Fangen aptly puts it, ‘life in the nation-
alist group represents a kind of prolonged youth phase, a postponement of 
adult life’.27 Unless they are able to redefine their roles in relation to the 
group, e.g. by acquiring some kind of managerial position or becoming a 
‘withdrawn elder’, they will sooner or later leave or become marginalised. 
Some may join an ‘adult’ nationalist organisation.28 Others try to adapt to a 
more normal lifestyle and leave their period of nationalist activism behind. 
This transition can be extremely difficult, especially for the older ones. 
However, most skinheads begin to think about their future and possible pro-
fessional careers at a much earlier stage, usually about at the time when they 
turn 20. 
 
                                                     
25  Based on several interviews with a Norwegian activist, Summer and Autumn 1995. 
26  ‘Aging out’ is also one of the most important factors in bringing criminal careers to an 
end; cf. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1986); Barnett, Blumstein and Farrington (1987). 
27  K. Fangen (1995) p. 107. 
28  However, in some countries such as Sweden, there is more continuity and contact be-
tween youth nationalist activists and adult activists and groups than is the case in, for in-
stance, Norway, where there is little co-operation and understanding between the various 
generations of nationalists. 
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9. Young activists are acutely aware that being publicly known as neo-Nazis, 
racists or radical nationalists may jeopardise their career prospects and per-
sonal futures. Few European countries have Berufsverbot against political 
extremists in a formal or legal sense (Germany is a notable exception), but it 
is nevertheless a fact of life that certain types of political extremists do not 
get certain jobs, or may even be fired.29 Many nationalist and right-wing 
radicals would like to join the police force or pursue a military career. How-
ever, they are generally screened out from these forces through procedures 
of being judged ‘unfit’ or through security clearances, as most of them even-
tually become registered in the files of the Security Police. In Norway, sev-
eral teachers have lost their jobs – sometimes after lengthy trials – because 
they have expressed opinions, which are considered to be incompatible with 
their positions as teachers of young people. Even bus drivers, shopkeepers 
and factory workers have been dismissed from their work due to pressure 
from colleagues, customers or antiracist activists. In some cases, students 
have been more or less forced to quit their studies because of their political 
activism. There is a correlation between being unemployed and being a rac-
ist activist, but the direction of causation is often the opposite of what is gen-
erally assumed. Thus, for a youth who has ambitions of obtaining a higher 
education and an interesting and relevant job, it is not expedient to continue 
as a racist or neo-Nazi activist. 
 
10. One of the strongest motives for leaving a militant racist or nationalist 
youth group is to establish a family with new responsibilities for spouse and 
children. Getting a girlfriend (or boyfriend) outside the group is a frequent 
cause of quitting. Such situations obviously involve establishing new bonds 
of loyalty and setting different priorities. In relation to groups which have 
some kind of gang structure (such as some skinhead or rocker groups) or in 
other ways demand the full loyalty of the individual member, this may lead 
to a fundamental conflict of loyalty which can only be solved by either leav-
ing the group or leaving the family or girl (/boy) friend. Loyalty to spouse 
and children will often take priority over loyalty to group and mates. 
Factors inhibiting disengagement 
Although an activist may have several strong reasons for leaving the group, 
there may still be sufficiently strong factors linked to the processes of bridge 
burning and community building which work to discourage them from tak-
ing such a step.  
 
1. There are several positive characteristics of the group, which may be con-
sidered too valuable to leave behind. High investments have been made in 
terms of friendship and social support. The racist group provides commu-
nity, a substitute ‘family’, identity, security against external threats and ene-
mies, excitement and adventure. Even if a person has completely lost faith in 
the group’s ideology and politics, ties of friendship and loyalty may for some 
individuals constitute more than sufficient reasons for staying with the 
group. 
                                                     
29  Cf. Heléne Lööw (1991c), p. 50. 
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2. Potential defectors may also fear negative sanctions from the group – 
sometimes with good reason. New recruits, who have been only on the pe-
riphery of the scene and not initiated into any of the group’s secrets, may 
normally leave without any consequences whatsoever – at least if they do 
not switch to the anti-racists or run to the media with what they might know.  
It is quite different for long-time activists who have been part of the core 
group. Such persons know things about the group and fellow members, 
which may cause serious problems with the police as well as with militant 
anti-racists or the media if this information got out. At best, the peer group 
will be deeply disappointed when a fellow activist does not want to associate 
him/herself with the ‘family’ anymore. His or her whereabouts will certainly 
be monitored closely. If the person in question refrains from doing anything, 
which may damage the group, he or she may – with some luck – not get into 
trouble with the former group. However, if s/he goes to the media, the po-
lice, or political opponents to reveal secrets or to distance him/herself from 
past political affiliations and acts, reactions may be harsh. Leading activists 
who defect will normally receive death threats, and some have been beaten 
up severely. However, although threats to kill defectors are common, only 
rarely have death threat been carried through.30 Less lethal sanctions, such as 
harassment, verbal threats and expression of contempt, represent more realis-
tic threats to defectors than outright violence. In one case, a very young ac-
tivist who had founded and headed a nationalist youth group before his par-
ents managed to get him out, one evening had close to 30 of his former 
friends besieging the family’s house. When the boy – who by then was de-
termined to stay away from extremist politics – called the police to get help, 
they refused to come because he was known to them as a racist trouble-
maker.31 
 
3. Loss of protection against former enemies: One of the ironies involved in 
quitting a racist or neo-Nazi group which has been involved in an ongoing 
violent struggle with militant anti-racists or violent immigrant youth gangs is 
that former enemies do not necessarily believe that the disengagement is 
genuine, or may not even care. Sometimes, names and personal data remain 
stored in anti-fascist data banks, or are even published – frequently contain-
ing exaggerated or false information about their alleged Nazi activities. Mili-
tant opponents may therefore continue to assault and harass a person even 
after he or she has quit the racist group. For such persons, the act of leaving 
the racist group may also mean losing the relative protection they could en-
joy by being part of a violent gang or organisation. Fear of being left in such 
a precarious situation may serve to dissuade potential defectors from quit-
ting, and the actual experience of it may prompt others to return to the fold. 
 
4. Nowhere to go: One of the main reasons why (potential) leave-takers may 
end up in such precarious situations is that former social relations with 
friends and family were broken or impaired when s/he joined the racist 
                                                     
30  A couple of cases of killing defectors are known from Germany. See Der Spiegel 
20:1996; and Hasselbach, Fuhrer-Ex, (1996), p. 320. For a near-fatal US case, see Mark 
S. Hamm, American Skinheads (Westport: Praeger, 1993), p. 57, also recounted in 
Christiansen, Skinhead Street Gangs, pp. 221–222. 
31  Interview with former leader of the Viking group in Oslo, 7 September 1995. 
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group. If the person in question tries to withdraw from the group without 
making a sharp and (in the eyes of the racist group) provocative breach, the 
defector will often be met with suspicion, without the moral support and pro-
tection s/he needs and risks ending up in a social vacuum.  
 
5. Fear that career prospects are ruined: Persons who have been publicly 
known for neo-Nazi or racist activism, may – with some justification – feel 
that their prospects of getting a good and interesting job are seriously im-
paired, even if they are no longer politically active. They fear that their past 
will always haunt them.  
Exit Options 
Thus, members of racist groups who for various reasons consider quitting 
will often decide to stay because they find the alternatives even less attrac-
tive. The following overview will discuss various strategies former activists 
have used or may use to get out of racist groups, and outline and evaluate the 
pros and cons of the main options open to persons considering to leave. 
 
1. The most obvious and spectacular strategy is to make a straight and public 
break with the racist movement, renouncing the attitudes and the ideologies 
it represents. Some switch sides completely by getting actively involved in 
anti-racist activities of some sort. Such ex-members may expose the dark 
secrets of the group, such as plans of violence, membership and other dam-
aging information, or they may assume the role of a character who – with 
authority based on dearly-bought personal experience – warns young people 
about the dangers of getting involved with such extremist groups. In both 
cases, this strategy may involve a full confrontation with the group from 
which the person disaffiliated, as well as with former friends, and a total up-
heaval of values and life-style. Such a dramatic breach will therefore in most 
cases entail psychological strains as well as serious security risks. If the per-
son in question goes to the media with the story, it may also be bad publicity 
for the group, and possibly damage the group’s standing and trust in relation 
to affiliated organisations, especially abroad. In addition, former friends in 
the group will also often feel the defection as a personal betrayal. In their 
anger they will often make death threats towards the defector, and take at 
least some steps to punish the person in question. 
This high-profile form of defection is the exit strategy normally associ-
ated with a few leading activists who before their defection were already 
well known. Such individuals have fewer alternative exit options available 
than the more anonymous activists, who can pull out with less fuss and less 
risk of being hampered by their extremist past. To well-known activists, a 
clean and public breach with their past offers them an opportunity to – al-
most literally – begin a new life. This strategy also offers the bonus of gain-
ing social and political support from new groups and individuals, such as 
family and old friends.  
Several of these high-profile defectors make use of the media to proclaim 
their dissociation from their former group and ideology for two particular 
reasons: By making a public statement, they hope to persuade those anti-
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racists and others who doubt that their dissociation is genuine. Another rea-
son is that when a former activist has quit the group without any ado, former 
peers will often try to persuade him to return – and he may even feel 
tempted. By making a public statement of dissociation, and expressing criti-
cal views about the movement, the defector is effectively burning his bridges 
back to the former group. 
Rank-and-file members of racist groups, individuals who are not publicly 
known, sometimes choose one slightly different variety of this strategy. 
They may switch over to their former radical anti-racist opponents without 
any media publicity or public statements. Sometimes they may play the role 
of a mole for an intermediate period, providing the anti-racists with valuable 
intelligence and in the process building their own credibility. When they 
make the final breach, and their defection becomes known to their previous 
peers in the racist group, they already enjoy protection under the umbrella of 
the anti-racist militants. This type of crossover may also go in the opposite 
direction, from anti-racist to racist youth sub-cultures. It is quite common 
among skinheads, who may switch between being ‘Nazi skins’ and anti-
racist SHARP skins (Skinheads Against Racial Prejudice). Some individuals 
may even oscillate several times through their careers between the two ex-
tremes – although at the cost of getting a rather shaky credibility in both 
camps. Such apparently extreme transformations are not necessarily as fun-
damental as they may seem, since many skinheads are more concerned about 
lifestyle, images and action than with politics and ideology. In terms of life 
styles and modes of behaviour, it is no wide gap between some racist and 
anti-racist subcultures. 
One way to begin a new life is to join a religious group or world-view, 
which is not too closely associated politics. Although peers are likely to ex-
press contempt for someone who turns to religion, this form of conversion is 
less likely to be perceived as provocative and a security risk than would be 
the case if the person switched over to the ‘enemies’ in the politically op-
posed camp. There are several known cases of Swedish racist activists who 
have converted from an extreme political to religious belief system.32 
 
2. A number of activists break more or less publicly with the racist groups 
they belonged to by referring to family obligations, fear of ruined career 
prospects, dissatisfaction with the direction the group is moving, etc. – but 
without making a complete break with the ideology and politics of the 
movement as such. The break is public in the sense that they make clear to 
the group that they no longer want to be associated with it. This is sometimes 
also conveyed to the general public through interviews in the media, particu-
larly if the person in question has been a well-known leader of the racist 
movement.  
However, the outcome of this exit strategy is often that the person in 
question ends up in a highly precarious situation: They may still be exposed 
to harassment and social ostracism both from their former group and from 
former enemies, but without gaining any support and protection from a new 
social network. Work mates, prospective employers, friends from the pre-
racist period, anti-racists, and even family members tend to consider such 
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‘half-hearted defectors’ with suspicion, as a person who may still harbour 
racist views. Attempts to establish new social networks, e.g. by joining vari-
ous clubs or associations, may be perceived as ‘Nazi infiltration’. Their past 
also tends to haunt them, hampering both their social and professional pros-
pects – especially if their racist activism was publicly known. Such defectors 
therefore run the risk of ending up in a social vacuum, with a strong feeling 
of social isolation and loneliness. After a while, many of them long for the 
old group, with its sense of community and comradeship. Quite commonly, 
they have kept in touch with some of their old pals and not burned all 
bridges back to the group. However, defectors who feel rejected by society 
also run the risk of being rejected by their old group if they try to get re-
admitted. If they do get accepted back into the group, the status, position and 
confidence they may have enjoyed before their defection is now likely to be 
strongly diminished. In spite of this, there seems to be a considerable propor-
tion of backsliding among this kind of ex-member – probably because it is 
the least rewarding of all exit strategies available. 
However, this ‘half-way’ form of dissociation is often only a stage in a 
process, which might eventually end up with a full breach. One notable case 
was Milton John Kleim, known as the leading Nazi strategist on the Internet 
(see Chapter 4 by Back et al.). In June 1996, Kleim had become disillu-
sioned with the white nationalist movement, and distanced himself from it in 
public statements on the Net—although still declaring himself as a National 
Socialist and proud Aryan. During the following months, however, he re-
leased several more statements where he gradually distanced himself com-
pletely from any racist ideology and movement, and wowed to fight them 
with all his means. His case illustrates that attitudes tend to change after a 
change of group affiliation rather than vice versa, and that it may take time 
to readjust to a new reality. 
One variety of this strategy is to break with the stigmatised extremist 
group by opting for a more moderate and ‘softer’ version of (some of) the 
same views. For instance, neo-Nazis may distance themselves from Nazism 
by joining – or even establishing – a less stigmatised non-Nazi nationalist or 
rightwing party. 
 
3. Group members who are not publicly known as racist activists have good 
prospects of a successful reintegration into mainstream society by taking a 
low-key approach, withdrawing gradually without ever making an open or 
public break. During a lengthy period they gradually make themselves mar-
ginal to the group, taking less and less part in political or social activities, 
lose interest in the group and make the group lose interest in them. By stay-
ing away from all kinds of media publicity and not involving themselves 
with anti-racist groups, this form of defection is unlikely either to provoke 
reprisals from the movement or to cause them any negative sanctions from 
mainstream society. Few will know that they were ever part of a racist 
movement, and hopefully, those who do know will keep it to themselves.  
There is, however, a major problem associated with this form of defec-
tion strategy: the racist skeleton in the closet. Throughout the rest of their 
lives, there is always a risk that the past may return to haunt them. Paradoxi-
cally, for a person who has been involved with a stigmatised group, the bet-
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ter he or she is integrated into mainstream society and the greater the success 
her or she achieves professionally, the higher is the risk – and the greater is 
the fall – if the secret past is exposed. A person who lives a normal life, as a 
blue-collar worker may not be much hurt professionally or even socially if 
someone discloses that ten years ago, he was a member of a neo-Nazi group. 
There is also little risk that anyone would have any interest in making such a 
public exposure. 
It is quite different if the person in question makes a career in public life, 
getting into high positions where image, trust and confidence are essential 
qualities. With public visibility, there may well be someone who harbors a 
personal grudge or has vested political interest in revealing dark secrets 
about this character’s past, particularly if the person becomes controversial – 
what might be called the ‘Kurt Waldheim syndrome’. These stories tend to 
make excellent media headlines.33 
That such successful persons have kept silent about their extremist past is 
often used against them in the public discourse, even if no one claims that 
they still harbor extremist views. Sometimes, there is also speculation about 
such ‘closet Nazis infiltrating the corridors of power’ – which may in certain 
cases actually be the case.34 Although it may obviously be damaging to the 
image, credibility and further career of such individuals that their extremist 
pasts are revealed, there is another effect which may be even more problem-
atic on a personal level – although it is difficult to ascertain or determine the 
concrete effects: it may be assumed that individuals who have flirted with or 
been more deeply involved with racist or Nazi group in their youth, are re-
luctant to seek careers involving public exposure. The fear that someone 
may reveal these hidden facts about their pasts and use it against them, af-
fects their self-confidence, career choices, and life prospects. 
One possible strategy ex-members may employ to pre-empt such scan-
dalous disclosures is to make their past known to a number of well-disposed 
people. If someone is threatening to expose their past, they may at least call 
on such witnesses to testify that the person in question has not kept secret 
about these unpleasant facts. 
An exit strategy based on withdrawal from the extremist group without 
ever making a clean and public break may be quite expedient in the short 
run, causing few or no negative sanctions. However, as the discussion and 
examples above have shown, the long-term effects may be quite damaging. 
In addition to these main exit strategies, there are a number of more spe-
cific methods and circumstances, which may be of help to individuals who 
want to quit a racist group. One of the most important prerequisites for a 
successful dissociation and reintegration is that there is somebody outside 
who can provide the ex-member with moral support, guidance, and some-
times even a measure of control. Especially for young people, parents are 
often those who are in the best position to play this role, although these 
                                                     
33  During the mid-1990s, there were several such exposures of prominent people with dark 
Nazi or fascist pasts in Sweden, including a top diplomat, the lead singer of the successful 
pop group ‘Ace of Base’, and the founder of the Ikea furniture chain. 
34  In its pamphlet Nasjonalistisk ABC for unge patrioter (undated, p. 10), Norges Patriotiske 
Enhetsparti argues that like the communists, young nationalists should get themselves 
well educated in order to infiltrate political institutions, positions of power, public bu-
reaucracy, labour unions and the media in order to gain more power than could be 
achieved through elections. 
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youngsters often have a conflict-ridden relationship with their parents. One 
mother recounts how she and her husband literally pursued their son wher-
ever he went in the evenings, refusing to let him be with his friends in the 
nationalist group, and if he still insisted on going, the parents would not let 
him without them being present. These persistent parents became such a nui-
sance that the others became less and less eager to have this boy as a mem-
ber.35 
In Norway, a ‘Network for Parents with Children in Extreme Groups’ 
was established in 1996 to provide a forum where parents can get social and 
moral support, share information about what is going on, bring in external 
expertise, and developing strategies to motivate and help their children to get 
out.36 This network for parents was the first element in what, one year later 
became ‘Project Exit – Leaving Violent Youth Groups’, a program estab-
lished to develop and disseminate to knowledge and methods on how to in-
duce youths to disengage from such groups. In addition to providing assis-
tance directly to parents and to youths who want to quit, a main target group 
is professionals who have to handle problems of gangs and problems of dis-
engagement. Although originally started in Norway, Project Exit is (in 1998) 
in the process of being adopted in Sweden and Finland as well. 
For boys, getting a girlfriend who is not herself involved with the move-
ment is probably the most common circumstance which allows them to quit 
without too much trouble with the peers, and which may also motivate them 
to remain outside. Through stable relationships, eventually reinforced by 
having children and building new social networks, former extremists may 
establish their new lives. However, if the relationship breaks up, chances are 
high that they will return to the group. Whereas the typical pattern for male 
activists is to leave the group when they meet a girl who does not belong to 
the movement and return when the relationship breaks up, the typical pattern 
for girls is the opposite. They generally become involved with a racist group 
when they meet a boy who is part of it, and quit the group when the relation-
ship ends. 
In some cases, a friend or another steady person firmly placed outside the 
movement may provide potential leave-takers with the support and connec-
tions needed to make the leap back to ‘normal’ society. Such persons may 
also play vital roles in giving corrections and alternative views, which may 
induce the activist to question his own views and conceptions.  
In Oslo, a preventive police unit, which has worked closely with both 
young people in the ‘original’ Viking group and their parents, has been suc-
cessful in inducing a number of young people to quit. Their work was based 
on a keen understanding of the processes and motives involved in joining 
and leaving such extremist groups, in combination with well-developed so-
cial skills. Police officers invited young recruits to learn various forms of 
exciting and action-filled ‘extreme’ sports with some elements of risk, such 
as rock climbing, trial biking, and snowboard skiing. To several of the 
youngsters, these activities provided exactly the kind of adrenaline kicks that 
                                                     
35  Interview, 9 October 1995 and 18 April 1996. 
36  The ‘Network for Parents with Children in Extreme Groups’ is attached to the organisa-
tion ‘Adults for Children’ (Voksne for Barn), which also operates a telephone hot-line for 
worried parents. 
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motivated them to join a violent nationalist group in the first place. Predicta-
bly, the leading people in the Viking group disapproved of the fact that some 
of the younger members and recruits mingling with the police, especially 
when it turned out that some even seemed to prefer the activities the police 
could offer to being with the mates in the Viking group. Several of those who 
‘fraternised’ with the police were therefore considered defectors, and were 
excluded from (or at least marginalised by) the group. So far there have been 
no violent reprisals or serious threats involved. Needless to say, this was ex-
actly what the police wanted to achieve.37 By late 1996, the ‘original’ Viking 
group in that particular part of Oslo seems to have collapsed, although other 
groups elsewhere continue to use the name. 
Another supplementary strategy is for the youth to remove him/herself 
physically from the group by moving to another part of the country, or even 
abroad. Starting school or a getting a new job may provide such an opportu-
nity. Preferably, the ex-member goes to a place where the movement is not 
represented, or at least to a place where he or she is not easily approachable 
by the former friends, who may now have turned into enemies. In most cases 
it is sufficient to keep a low profile, and avoid publicity and situations where 
one may meet old friends from the group, or activists from related groups. 
However, there are also some ex-members who have considered themselves 
at such a high risk of reprisal that they have changed their names or even 
obtained new identities from the authorities. However, there may be serious 
psychological strains involved in choosing such a strategy, with the concern 
that the past may return to haunt them, that they by chance may run into 
former co-activists, or even the fear that the group may try to track them 
down. 
At least two ‘soft’ versions of this strategy are easily available, and with 
some fringe benefits. Quite a few ex-members have escaped their groups by 
enrolling at one-year residential colleges (folkehøgskoler, ‘folk high schools’ 
run by private idealistic organisations). Others have used their compulsory 
military service as an opportunity to distance themselves geographically 
from their old mates. In both cases, college and military offer opportunities 
for new intellectual impulses as well as a chance to gain an alternative net-
work of friends. 
To some, getting a long-term prison sentence may have some of the same 
practical effects in terms of physical separation from the others in the 
movement – although the social networks available among prisoners may 
have some less positive aspects. Nevertheless, there have been several cases 
where convicted racist activists have used the time in prison to break their 
ties with the old friends, obtain new impulses, and re-orient their lives.38 One 
of the leading Swedish neo-Nazi activists in the mid-1980s, who headed the 
militant Riksaktionsgruppen (RAG) of the Nordiska Rikspartiet (NRP) and 
was sentenced to three years in prison for a firebomb attack on a leftist 
bookstore and other crimes, left the group after he was arrested: 
 
                                                     
37  Personal communication from police officers at the preventive policing unit at Manglerud 
Police Station, and with parents of several ex-members. 
38  For a discussion about the effects on terrorists of serving time in prison, see Taylor and 
Quayle (1994), pp. 38–39. 
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I had considered breaking with NRP even before I was imprisoned, but jail gave 
me the opportunity to break the tie with NRP for good. However, the two months 
I was remanded in custody was one of the most difficult periods in my life. The 
NRP had meant so incredibly much to me, it had been everything in my life. But 
then I took the full step and broke with them. It was like falling into a huge dark-
ness. 
(Interviewer:) Why did you do it? It seemed like you still held on to your be-
liefs and ideology and political views [even when in jail]? 
During the time in custody I probably did. But the beliefs and the political 
convictions changed gradually. Such things can not be transformed overnight. It 
happened during the time in prison, and after I left prison. My views changed 
gradually, and I also tried to mute my fanaticism. Today I am less interested in 
politics. I voted conservative in the last election, and I still consider myself on 
the right in politics. But I have become a democrat, and I am now warning young 
people against joining groups of the extreme right.39 
 
The fact that some of the more well-organised neo-Nazi movements and 
networks (e.g. in Sweden and Germany) have established special aid organi-
sations for imprisoned members, asking members to write letters to impris-
oned comrades, etc., may not be for purely altruistic and humanitarian rea-
sons. They are probably also aware that imprisoned activists may more eas-
ily break their ties to the movement while in jail unless the group outside 
reminds them that they are not forgotten. 
When Groups Lose their Grip on Members 
Thus far we have discussed defection only as an individual strategy. How-
ever, there are some situations, which encourage various degrees of mass 
defection from racist organisations and groups. These situations tend to re-
duce the impact of some of the factors inhibiting defection, in particular 
weakening the positive characteristics of the group, which make it attractive 
to be part of it, and by reducing the threat of negative sanctions against 
members leaving the group.  
There are several circumstances, which may produce situations where 
groups (and leaders) lose their grip on group members. One common factor 
is the emergence of dissatisfaction and conflict within the group. The 
sources of discontent may vary considerably, from disagreements over ide-
ology and the use of violent methods to rival claims to leadership, or asser-
tions of disloyalty. Albert Hirschman40 has argued that dissatisfied members 
of an organisation have two alternative options: ‘exit’ or ‘voice’. The latter is 
an attempt to address the causes of discontent by trying to reform the organi-
sation, whereas ‘exit’ often occurs after a failed attempt to exercise ‘voice’. 
Martha Crenshaw,41 applying Hirschman’s perspective on ‘exit’ to the spe-
cial circumstances of clandestine extremist organisations, proposes that dis-
                                                     
39  ‘Patrik’, interviewed by Torbjørn Esping on Sweden’s Radio, 14 April, 1993. After he 
broke with the Nazi movement, ‘Patrik’ had to change his name and identity because his 
old pals were trying to punish him for his ‘treason’. 
40  Hirschman (1979). 
41  Crenshaw (1988), p. 22 ff. In Bjørgo & Heradstveit (1993), Ch. 6, we discuss Crenshaw’s 
perspective further. 
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satisfied members have the possibilities of either joining another, rival or-
ganisation, or splitting off and creating a new group (which may be more 
militant or more moderate). However, significant segments of a group or a 
movement may also withdraw from militant groups and extremist politics 
altogether, sometimes involving a considerable number of individuals. When 
internal group discipline and loyalty is low, when leaders are weak or dis-
credited, and many activists break out to join or establish competing groups, 
sanctions against defecting members are likely to lose credibility. It is there-
fore relatively easy to join others in breaking with the group without neces-
sarily following them into a new group.42 
Another frequent cause of mass defection is that members of the group 
carry out serious acts of violence, and that leaders and co-members become 
implicated. This happened with Norsk Front (Norwegian Front, NF) and its 
successor, Nasjonalt Folkeparti (National People’s Party) after bombings in 
1979 and 1985 respectively. The same was the case with the Swedish Nord-
iska Rikspartiet (Nordic National Party, NRP) and its Riksaktionsgruppe 
(National Action group, RAG) during the same period. In the NRP/RAG 
case, the young militants felt deeply betrayed and alienated when the NRP 
leaders during the trial distanced themselves from actions they had approved 
of earlier. Most of the militant youths subsequently left the organisation.43 
Although many former NRP/RAG activists later started up or joined other 
racist groups and activities, quite a few did not – including the RAG leader 
himself. The Danish ‘Green Jackets’, a criminal youth gang, turned to racism 
during the mid-1980s. However, at the height of their ‘career’ as a group 
around 1987/88, the ‘Green Jackets’ started to fall apart. In co-ordination 
with youth workers, the police managed to jail the more ideological hard 
core of Green Jackets, thereby isolating them from the wider group of fol-
lowers. The youth workers concentrated their efforts on this outer circle, of-
fering jobs and job training, help to find apartments, leisure time activities, 
and other forms of assistance. Quite a few got girlfriends and children, and 
new loyalties thereby replaced ties to the gang. By the end of the 1980s, the 
Green Jacket group had more or less disintegrated, and was no longer con-
sidered a problem in terms of racism or extremist politics. 
However, even among groups, which seem to grow and thrive, there may 
nevertheless be a large turnover. For instance, the Norwegian nationalist 
girls’ group Valkyria was established in late autumn 1994, consisting of 12 
‘founding members’. One year later, Valkyria had grown to 30 members, 
divided into two separate groups. However, of the original twelve, only four 
were still members after that year (a turnover rate of 66 per cent), and at 
least one (probably two) of these remaining quit later. Altogether, about 60 
girls had been members or participated in group-activities at some point dur-
ing that twelve-month period. One of the two groups had a great influx of 
new recruits, but a very high turnover rate (possibly due to intensive inter-
vention efforts from police, school, and parents). The other group had a 
lower but somewhat more stable membership.44 
                                                     
42  Factors behind mass defections from religious groups are discussed by Wright (1988), pp. 
156–157. 
43  Lööw (1993), p. 74; Wright (1988), 151–2. 
44  This is based on information from one of the core ‘founding members’ of Valkyria who 
later left the movement. Police and other sources who have followed the group closely 
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Thus, a considerable turnover of members seems to be a normal feature 
of most racist youth groups, but the rate varies strongly from group to group. 
The likelihood of dissociation declines with the time the person has been 
part of the group. Mass defection from racist groups may be facilitated by 
general dissatisfaction, conflict within the group, or discredited leaders, 
which in its turn may lead to factionalism and organisational splits. ‘Forced’ 
reorganisation due to police investigation or arrests of members or leaders 
for illegal activities is also a situation likely to cause a high number of defec-
tions. In some countries, banning of organisations may lead to the same re-
sults. And when groups collapse completely, many of the members are likely 
to leave not only the group but the racist subculture as well. What these 
situations have in common is that they tend to reduce the effectiveness of 
some of the factors, which normally keep members from dropping out. 
When many of the positive characteristics which in the past made it attrac-
tive to belong to the group are gone, and when the threat of negative sanc-
tions against members leaving the group is less credible, the likelihood of 
mass defection rises considerably. What may still prevent members from 
leaving the racist group or sub-culture is, however, that they see no alterna-
tive places to go outside, and that they expect to be rejected by society. 
Conclusions 
In most cases, young people do not enter racist groups primarily for political 
reasons or motives. The main reason for joining is that such tight-knit and 
secretive groups fulfil a number of their social and psychological needs, in 
terms of providing identity, community, protection, and excitement. Racist 
ideology is usually adopted afterwards – as a consequence rather than a 
cause for joining the group. Similarly, those who quit the group usually do 
so because continued membership in the group appears as unattractive and is 
no longer fulfilling their social and psychological needs (push-factors), 
whereas life outside the group appears as more attractive (pull-factors). 
Thus, they leave the racist group for many of the same reasons as they once 
joined. Typically, their views and attitudes change more or less gradually 
after they have broken the social ties with the group, as the belief system is 
no longer supported and validated by a community of ‘significant others’. 
Thus, changes in political beliefs follow changes in group membership rather 
than preceding and causing these changes.45 
To join a racist group will for a young person in most cases involve a 
dramatic transformation of social status and identity. However, leaving the 
group may for some involve even more dramatic breaches and transforma-
tions. As we have seen, however, whether this process of defection and rein-
tegration goes smoothly or encounters obstacles depends on a number of 
factors.  
                                                     
have confirmed the general pattern, although they are not in a position to confirm the ac-
tual figures. The two Valkyria groups were split (but continued to co-operate) because the 
girls in Drammen Valkyria would not take orders from the male leader of the Viking 
group, whereas the Viking Valkyrias would. The turnover rate was an issue discussed 
among the core members, partly because they had been accurately forewarned by a more 
experienced activist when they started up that they should expect that at least 75 per cent 
of the recruits would quit. 
45  Cf. J. Aho (1994), pp. 125–128. 
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1. How far has the person progressed in his/her career as an activist or 
member? This relates to the time spent with the group, the level of trust and 
access to group secrets (i.e. core/periphery member), degree of ideological 
radicalisation, whether the person has become publicly known as an activist, 
and to what degree the person has become involved in acts of violence and 
other crimes. 
 
2. The character of the group or scene with which the individual is involved. 
A clandestine, terrorist-oriented cell is likely to be much more paranoid and 
punitive in relation to (potential) defectors than would normally be the case 
with loosely bounded skinhead scenes – where people drift in and out all the 
time. 
 
3. The degree of stigmatisation and isolation in relation to ‘normal’ society 
outside. Having been publicly exposed in the media and by anti-racists, or 
‘frozen out’ by family and former friends may serve to push a person further 
into the extremist scene. On the other hand, such isolation and stigmatisation 
may also add to the hardships of extremist activism, making the person long 
for a more ‘normal’ life. 
 
4. The availability of alternatives and support. Racist youth gangs fulfil cer-
tain needs of its members, in terms of providing identity, community, protec-
tion, and excitement. Potential defectors from racist groups are unlikely to 
take the plunge if they see no realistic, reasonably safe, and sufficiently at-
tractive escape routes and alternatives to the kind of life they are presently 
living. 
 
Antiracist mass campaigns with a focus on ideology and values – the favour-
ite measure of politicians who ‘want to do something against racism and 
right-wing extremism’46 – are not likely to have much effect in terms of pre-
venting youths from joining racist groups or of inducing anyone to quit such 
groups. Other types of measures, addressing more directly the social factors 
and needs which motivate young people to both join and leave such destruc-
tive groups, are more likely to make an impact. 
Youths who fail to be reintegrated into ‘normal’ society will not neces-
sarily remain within the racist subculture as adults. Some are likely to con-
tinue their ‘careers’ by joining related and even more destructive groups. In 
Scandinavia, there are, for example, signs of increasing convergence and 
exchange of personnel between criminal MC gangs and the White Power 
subcultures, sharing many of the same traits and values. As some youths 
grow out of the skinhead and neo-Nazi subculture, joining Hells Angels and 
Bandidos may be the next logical step in their extremist careers. 
 
                                                     
46  The Council of Europe’s ‘European Youth Campaign Against Racism, Xenophobia, Anti-
semitism and Intolerance’ and the European Union’s ‘European Year Against Racism 
1997’ are prime examples of this approach. 

3. How do Violent Youth Groups and 
Gangs Fall Apart: Processes of Trans-
formation and Disintegration 
In the previous chapter, we have described the motivations and processes 
whereby young people join violent groups, the different reasons why most of 
them want to disengage after a while, and different factors which may pre-
vent them from doing so (se also Bjørgo 1997, 1998, Bjørgo & Carlsson 
1999). Substituting this individualistic perspective with a more collective 
approach, it would be natural to ask:  
 
– Why and how are gangs and other violent youth groups established?  
– What keeps gangs and violent groups together? 
– How do gangs sometimes transform into other types of violent or crimi-
nal groups? 
– How and why do gangs disintegrate? 
 
In the following, we will focus on the latter two issues – processes of group 
transformation and disintegration.  
Gang basics 
We follow Decker and Van Winkle (1996, p. 31) in defining a gang as ‘an 
age-graded peer group that exhibits some permanence, engages in criminal 
activity, and has some symbolic representation of membership’. 
It is useful to make a distinction between a gang and a group of friends, 
often called a ‘play group’. Although most gangs start out as a groups of 
friends, gangs have passed some distinctive tipping points on their way to 
becoming a street gang. Malcolm Klein (1995, pp. 29–30) identifies the first 
one to be a commitment to a criminal orientation – although non-criminal 
activities take up most of the members’ time even in the most criminal gang. 
The second signpost is the group’s self-recognition of its gang status. At 
some point, the gang-to-be starts to think of itself as a gang – a group set 
apart from others. This will usually involve hostilities with rival gangs. As 
Malcolm Klein reminds us, it is hard to find a one-gang city; gang cohesive-
ness thrives on gang-to-gang hostilities. The third tipping point in the devel-
opment of a gang is the responses it receives from segments of the commu-
nity as the group becomes more troublesome. ‘The community serves as a 
looking glass: Members look into it and see their gang character’ (Klein 
1995, p. 30). 
Irving Spergel et al. (1994) make a useful distinction between chronic 
gang problems and emerging gang problems, which will require different 
strategies of intervention.  
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‘A community with a chronic gang problem is characterised by a persis-
tant, often acute pattern of gang violence and crime lasting for more than a 
decade. A community with an emerging gang problem is associated with a 
pattern of gang crime that is less organised and virulent and more recent’ 
(Spergel et al. 1994, p. 1). 
The processes of gang disintegration I describe in this chapter will be of 
particular relevance to emerging gangs, although these processes are also at 
work in more chronic gangs. However, even if most gangs have a limited 
shelf life, gangs tend to foster rival gangs and successor gangs in an ongoing 
process. Thus, it is important – and obviously easier – to try to stop these 
processes at an early stage, when the community has an emerging gang prob-
lem rather than a chronic one. Less established gangs are much more likely 
to fall apart by natural causes – and these processes of disintegration can be 
stimulated. 
It is a well-established finding in gang research that joining a gang tends 
to lead to an increase in the violent and other criminal activities of the new 
members (Thornberry et al. 1993, Esbensen and Huizinga 1993). Disen-
gagement from gangs tends to be followed by a drop in violent and criminal 
behaviour. Malcolm Klein (1995) has also emphasised the strong relation-
ship between the level of gang cohesiveness and the level of criminal activ-
ity of its members. Reducing gang cohesiveness will generally also reduce 
the crime level. Gang cohesiveness has to do with such factors as time spent 
together, level of in-group loyalty, willingness to back up each other when 
members get in trouble, etc. 
Thus, to reduce the level of crime and violence in a gang-ridden commu-
nity, it would obviously be a wise strategy to try to reduce recruitment to 
gangs, increase disengagement, reduce gang cohesiveness, and ultimately, to 
facilitate processes of disintegration of gangs. In this presentation, I will fo-
cus on the ‘natural’ processes of gang disintegration – with an eye to how we 
can ‘help nature’ a bit. By understanding these mechanisms, it should be 
possible to reinforce these disintegrating processes, and identify promising 
points of intervention. Although it is important to encourage individual de-
fection from gangs, making an entire gang fall apart may result in even 
greater reductions in criminal activities – providing that the homeless gang 
members do not join other gangs or establish new ones.  
Processes of gang transformation 
Street gangs are not stable structures. They have usually emerged out of 
something else – a playgroup or a clique of friends, a loose subculture, or 
perhaps even a basketball team. Gangs may go through a life course as 
members get older, acquire criminal records and experiences, get in touch 
with political movements or other subcultures, acquire enemies, get access to 
economic profits, or establish links to other groups. These are factors and 
processes that may transform gangs and other youth groups into something 
they were not before. I believe there is too little focus in gang research on 
these processes of group transformation. We should take a more systematic 
look at what comes before street gangs, and what may come after, and how 
one type of gang may transform into other types of gangs. Klein’s typology 
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of traditional, neo-traditional, compressed, collective, and speciality gangs 
provides some input to such an analysis, focussing on variables like age 
composition, numbers, sub-groups, leadership, etc. However, I believe there 
is a need for a stronger emphasis on the processes of change. American gang 
researchers also have a tendency to lose interest in a youth group once they 
have established that it is not quite a gang. However, ‘pre-gang’ and ‘post-
gang’ groups should be of particular interest, in order to study how they 
might transform into or out of a gang type of group. 
I have observed and tried to describe some of these processes in my own 
studies of racist gangs and their opponents in Scandinavia (Bjørgo 1997, 
Bjørgo & Carlsson, 1999). One finding was that many of these racist or na-
tionalist groups emerged out of what was initially non-political and often 
petty-criminal street gangs or cliques of friends. In one case, some Norwe-
gian boys from a middle-class neighbourhood in Oslo were harassed and 
beaten up by Turkish and Vietnamese youth gangs. They decided to go to-
gether with their friends to form their own gang for protection. In effect, this 
became a white ethnic gang. For support, they got in touch with the Nation-
alist milieu in Oslo, and gradually adopted their style and ideology, calling 
themselves ‘Viking’.  
In Copenhagen, another process took place when a group of unemployed 
young Danish boys from a rather poor neighbourhood, known for their 
crime, violence and rowdy behaviour, in the early 1980s started to burn 
crosses (KKK-style) and harass their immigrant neighbours to get attention 
to their demands for flats of their own and other social goods. They got an 
enormous coverage in the news media, which called them the ‘Green jack-
ets’ (Grønjakkerne), and boosted their image as a racist ‘White Power’ gang. 
This media response clearly gave them an image to live up to, and served to 
politicise some of them. The original gang of some 20 male teenagers soon 
became the core group of a wider subculture of ‘Green Jackets’, consisting 
of several White Power gangs, which occasionally joined forces to fight im-
migrant gangs and anti-racists.47 They could mobilise up to 200 for a par-
ticular battle. 
Largely as a response to the threat from the Green Jackets, the so-called 
Warriors emerged during the second half of the 1980s. This was an immi-
grant youth gang surrounded by a network of similar gangs. Together with 
their affiliated groups, the core group of 20–40 could mobilise up to 2000 
supporters, according to the police. Initially, they tried to present themselves 
as some kind of anti-racist guardians, armed with bats, knives, and guns. The 
Warriors assaulted and beat up alleged racists, both individuals and in large 
battles. They also offered protection to immigrant-owned kiosks and shops 
vulnerable to racist attacks. Although many of the gang members even dur-
ing this early phase were involved in crime, they tried real hard to present 
themselves as anti-racist ‘good-guys’. However, as the Green Jackets for 
various reasons fell apart and disappeared from the streets – largely dis-
placed by the Warriors – more serious forms of crime started to dominate the 
activities of the Warriors. They were increasingly involved in robbery, bur-
glary, car theft, and drug distribution. One speciality they adopted from the 
                                                     
47  For a more detailed description of ‘The rise and fall of the Green Jackets’, see Bjørgo 
1997, pp. 127–133. 
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Green Jackets was to assault and rob homosexuals in parks. When they as-
saulted more or less arbitrary victims in the streets, they typically claimed 
that the person had made a xenophobic remark or ‘looked upon them in a 
racist way’. By the early 1990s, some of the elder original Warrior members 
withdrew from street activities such as violence and robberies. For this, they 
used their younger brothers and cousins, who were too young to be prose-
cuted for crimes. They no longer used the name ‘Warriors’, although there is 
a clear continuity to the criminal immigrant gangs of the late 1990s in Co-
penhagen, which have now become an extremely hot issue in the political 
debate in Denmark. 
Even police officers, which knew the Warriors well, agree that protection 
and resistance against racism was the main cause for the emergence of the 
Warriors, and that this was the main issue during the first years. However, it 
was also important for the gang to win respect through intimidation. They 
armed themselves not only for protection but also as a part of their image. 
Witnesses were harassed into silence. The aura of fear they evoked and the 
way they were able to dominate the streets of Copenhagen, turned out to be a 
useful resource once they left anti-racism behind and turned to more serious 
and profit-oriented crime. 
Racism and anti-racism has been a main issue around which gangs in 
Scandinavia have formed and transformed. However, gangs may transform 
both from non-political into more politically oriented groups, or they may 
transform from a group with a political image into a predominantly criminal 
and profit-oriented gang. 
Understanding the processes whereby gangs transform into other forms, 
and change their purpose, justification, style and mode of action, should be 
of high relevance to developing policies of prevention and intervention. 
However, it would be even more useful if we could understand the processes 
of gang disintegration, and how one may influence and reinforce these proc-
esses. 
Processes of gang disintegration 
New youth gangs and extreme groups emerge constantly. However, most of 
them fall apart after a few months or years – only in rare cases are they able 
to survive as a gang for a decade or more. These few ‘successful’ gangs are 
more likely to keep most of their members over an extended time, and re-
plenish their ranks with new recruits. Other gangs suffer from steady defec-
tion and turnover in membership without being able to recruit sufficient 
newcomers to keep the gang sufficiently strong to survive. 
How and why do gangs and similar violent groups fall apart? It is useful 
to distinguish between six main processes, which may work separately or in 
combinations:  
Growing out of gang life through natural maturation and new priorities in 
life. 
 
– Defeat of the group by external use of force. 
– Loss of external enemies or threat. 
– Loss of identity, status and image. 
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– Decay of group cohesiveness, solidarity and attraction value. 
– Fragmentation of the group into smaller units, which may be too weak to 
survive. 
 
A strong group is the result of both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ – external pressure and 
internal cohesiveness working in the same direction. If there is no external 
pressure (or it becomes overwhelmingly strong), and the inner forces of soli-
darity disappear or are substituted by forces of disruption and discord, the 
group will disintegrate. 
Aging out 
Aging out is the most common process through which youths leave gang life 
and a criminal life style in general. Most gang members are only involved 
with gangs during a limited period of their teens. At some point of time, 
these youths will reach some of the natural crossroads of life where they will 
have to change schools, find jobs, or do their compulsory military service. 
Some get girlfriends or boyfriends and, eventually, children, or they start to 
consider their futures and options for education and jobs. Most gang mem-
bers will at some point realise that gang life is not compatible with the kind 
of life they would like to live. If a gang consists predominantly of members 
of the same age, they tend to reach these crossroads approximately at the 
same time. As a consequence, the gang is likely to fall apart. However, if the 
gang has a larger distribution in age and a certain recruitment of younger 
members, these crossroads of life are likely to come at different times, pro-
viding a continuity which makes it possible to maintain the gang even if in-
dividual members constantly disengage. 
Defeat 
Overwhelming external force may also crush gangs. In some cases this 
might be a rival gang or enemy, which drives them off the street. However, 
such counter-gangs may also give rise to feuds, which reinforce solidarity 
and mobilisation in both groups. More commonly, gangs and violent organi-
sations may collapse under the pressure from the state’s apparatus of power 
– the police and the system of justice. In most cases, this happens as a result 
of arrests and criminal prosecution – usually in the wake of serious crimes 
where the police has succeeded in arresting and convicting leaders and 
members. Some states may also have legal provisions for proscribing (mem-
bership in) organisations, which work through illegal means. 
Loss of external enemies or threats 
may paradoxically have some of the same consequences to a gang as if the 
group was defeated by an overpowering adversary. To a large extent, gangs 
emerge and are maintained as protection against other gangs perceived as 
threats. Some gangs may even require rival gangs to exist. Frequently, they 
develop into mirror images of each other. In some cases, there seems to be 
little else, which keeps the group together beyond the perceived threat from 
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the adversary, and the hatred and thirst for revenge caused by repeated 
clashes. If the counter-gang disappears and the threat comes to an end, this 
external pressure will cease as well. The group may then lose its raison 
d‘etre – unless it can be transformed to fulfil other needs to its members. 
Some gangs with an anti-racist image have, e.g., turned to profit-oriented 
crime when their racist opponent disappeared. Since conflicts and feelings of 
threat are driving forces both in the formation and maintenance of youth 
gangs, efforts to promote mediation and conflict resolution among youths 
may stand a chance to prevent some of these conflicts to turn into spirals of 
violence, and prevent rival groups from developing into full-fledged gangs. 
Obviously, this is easier to accomplish before the conflict has escalated and 
before the fronts have hardened, and before a gang identity has been firmly 
established. 
To the police and other agencies who have to act in relation to gangs, it is 
tricky to find the balance between measures which may serve to defeat 
gangs, and going into roles where one may provide gangs with ‘good ene-
mies’. There are many examples of how a too confrontational policy from 
the Police towards deviant or oppositional groups and subcultures has served 
to strengthen the milieus and violent tendencies one is trying to fight.48 As 
Klein (1995) and others have pointed out, the main sources of gang cohe-
siveness are external to the gangs, and the police will often perform that 
function. 
Loss of status, identity, and image 
Street gangs and violent subcultures are not based on formal organisation 
and hierarchies, but rather on status, reputation and image. Gangs and sub-
cultures provide their members with an identity, but this is something both 
the individual and the group must live up to in order to keep their standing 
and reputation. This is their main capital, so to speak. Thus, both the indi-
vidual members and the group are vulnerable to loss of reputation. Individu-
als, who lose their ‘honour’ and fall in standing, will either have to do some-
thing drastic to rebuild their reputation, or they are likely to drop out. The 
same may be a case on the group level: A gang which loses its reputation of 
being tough and of closing ranks when members are threatened, is likely to 
be ridiculed and challenged. If they do not stand up to the challenge, the 
gang is likely to fall apart or fade away (Bay 1989). When gang members do 
not back up each other, the gang can no longer serve as protection to its 
members. When this becomes known to former enemies, the gang members 
will be easy prey (Varang 1999). 
The importance of maintaining a tough collective reputation to the sur-
vival of gangs is demonstrated through the extreme measures some gangs are 
willing to take in order to defend their reputation. Gang members who desert 
their friends and fail to back up co-members in fights against enemies (or in 
other ways dishonour the group) may be subjected to harsh sanctions. They 
                                                     
48  For instance, Malcolm Klein (1995: 161–168) criticises harshly the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s so-called ‘gang sweeps’ – mass arrests where alleged gang members are 
apprehended and registered without necessarily any charges being filed against them for 
specific crimes. Klein argues that such harassing ‘sweeps’ generally serve to strengthen 
gang cohesiveness, without having any deterring or preventing effects. 
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will normally be excluded from the group, sometimes after being severely 
beaten up by their former friends (Wolf 1991:98–100; Næss 1999: 14). 
Ritual or physical challenges to a gang’s image or by rival gangs (e.g. 
crossing over gang graffiti or beating up a gang member) typically leads to 
revenge, spirals of violence and feuds. Failure to respond to such provoca-
tions will undermine the collective reputation of the gang. 
However, other forces may also threaten identities and images. Some 
youth subcultures with a provocative and violent image, such as the Punk 
movement, disintegrated when the fashion industry expropriated and com-
mercialised their style – thereby neutralising all the provocative power of 
their symbols and image. Ridicule of a gang’s or subculture’s style and sym-
bols by the entertainment industry may also undermine their image.  
Decay of internal group relations 
is a main cause when gangs fall apart. These processes of decay may under-
mine the group’s cohesiveness and solidarity to such an extent that the gang 
disintegrates. The decisive turning point is when gang members no longer 
back up each other if someone is beaten up or gets involved in conflicts with 
outsiders. The ‘one for all and all for one’ principle is no longer at work. For 
all practical purposes, the gang is then no longer a gang.  
A common factor when a gang decays is that the group has lost its attrac-
tion value to its members. This might be the outcome when leaders withdraw 
or lose their credibility. Another factor is strained and conflict-ridden rela-
tions between members, which leads to a deterioration of the sense of broth-
erhood. Sources of discontent may vary from disagreement about ideology 
or use of violence or drugs, to rivalry over leadership, charges of misuse of 
the group’s economic assets, or accusations of cowardice, disloyalty or of 
being an informer to the police. Failing group solidarity will not only in-
crease the number of members leaving the group – it makes it much more 
difficult to replenish lost members by attracting new recruits. Over time the 
group will not have the ‘critical mass’ it needs to function as a gang. Contin-
ued group membership is becoming a lonely activity – or even outright bor-
ing. Members may disengage through an active and sharp break, or they may 
gradually lose interest and seek friends and affiliation elsewhere. When the 
loss of members over time is larger than fresh recruitment, the group’s activ-
ity will gradually and inevitably come to an end. 
It would be most useful and interesting to know more about the actual 
‘turnover rates’ (or ‘disengagement rates’) with regard to violent youth 
groups and gangs in general. Although extremely difficult to ascertain, such 
rates could in principle be determined by following a cohort of new recruits, 
and checking who are still members after specified time periods, such as one 
month, six months, one year, three years, ten years, etc. Such studies have to 
some extent been carried out in relation to new religious movements 
(‘cults’). Defection rates in the range of 60–75 per cent over a two-year pe-
riod have been reported with regard to various religious groups.49 Due to the 
sensitive nature of the matter, very little reliable data or statistics have been 
available regarding the proportion of those joining e.g. the racist youth mi-
                                                     
49  Cf. E. Barker (1988), pp. 167–8; S. Wright (1987), p. 2. 
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lieu who are still part of the scene after a given period. I know there are 
some data on defection rates in youth gangs in some American longitudinal 
studies (e.g. Esbensen and Huizinga 1993). 
What seems to be clear, however, is that a considerable turnover of mem-
bers seems to be a normal feature of gangs and violent youth groups (as in 
all organisations!), with the rate varying much from group to group. The 
likelihood of dissociation is largest in the beginning, and declines with the 
length of time the person has been part of the group. 
One interesting case of a racist gang, which collapsed almost completely, 
is the Green Jackets of Studsgårdsgade in Copenhagen, a criminal gang of 
about 20 youths who with their racism and violence drew much attention to 
themselves during the mid and late 1980s. They became role models to a 
number of similar local youth gangs in Denmark.50 At the height of their 
career as the core group of this racist youth subculture around 1987–88, the 
original Green jacket gangs started to fall apart. By 1988, the group had 
shrunk to twelve. Only one of them considered himself a racist, the rest even 
claimed to be against racism. This reduction of the group and its racist core 
may be explained partly as a result of systematic efforts by youth workers (in 
close co-ordination with the police) to dissolve the group and help members 
to find jobs, partly because several leading members were put in jail by the 
police, and, perhaps most importantly, as a result of normal processes 
whereby young people establish families and leave behind juvenile delin-
quency. Some of the Green Jacket die-hards considered girlfriends and ba-
bies to be the greatest threats to the cohesion of the group, undermining the 
former loyalty among the boys. By the end of the 1980s, the Studsgårdsgade 
group and the Green Jacket movement as a whole had more or less disinte-
grated, and was no longer considered a problem in terms of racism or ex-
tremist politics. 
Gangs usually consists of a group of hard core members surrounded by 
circles of ordinary members, and fringe members, hang-around or wannabes 
who may serve as a recruitment base and as supporting troops in cases of 
larger confrontations with rival gangs. One important strategy for breaking 
up the group is to separate the hard core from the more marginal members. A 
way to accomplish this is by physically removing or isolating the hard core, 
e.g. through imprisonment or by providing education/jobs far away from the 
local community. Alternatively, the more marginal members may be di-
verted away from the influence of the hard core through alternative activities 
and possibilities, such as job training or exciting activities. 
Fragmentation  
of the group might result in one gang becoming two, which may continue to 
co-exist side by side or in conflict. Usually, one gang will continue under it 
old name while the split-off makes its appearance as a new gang with a 
somewhat different identity. The split may weaken both groups, and in many 
cases one or both gangs will disintegrate and vanish. In politically extreme 
milieus such processes of factionalism and fission seem to be the rule rather 
                                                     
50  The rise and fall of the Green Jackets is described in more detail in Bjørgo 1997, Chapter 
4. 
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than the exception. As a result, these politically extremist groups are weak-
ening themselves to such an extent that they rarely are able to muster enough 
strength to achieve any political influence, in elections or otherwise. Exter-
nal pressure in the form of legal or political restrictions may force the group 
to present itself to the public as more moderate than most members prefer – 
which will frequently cause splits between moderates and more radical activ-
ists (cf. Van Donselaar 1993a, 1993b; Bjørgo 1997, p. 55). Another common 
cause for factionalism is rivalry between competing leaders with personal 
ambitions. Many politically extreme fringe groups seem to consist of ‘more 
chiefs than Indians’. 
Final remarks 
As I have already stated, considerable turnover of members is a normal fea-
ture of most organisations – including gangs and violent youth groups. How-
ever, group cohesiveness and solidarity is vulnerable to a number of disinte-
grating factors and processes – and many of these can be reinforced by ex-
ternal actors such as the police, teachers, youth workers, parents and others. 
If gang cohesiveness is cracking, and many members begin to pull out, this 
process may reinforce itself. In such a situation it is much easier for individ-
ual members to follow others out of the gang without necessarily joining a 
new gang. When such groups collapse completely, there is a likelihood that 
many members will not only disengage from that group, but from the entire 
subculture or movement. Such situations of gang collapse seem to reduce the 
effects of the factors that would normally prevent members from defecting. 
When most of the positive aspects which in the past made it attractive to be-
long to the group are no longer present, and when threats of negative sanc-
tions against defectors are no longer credible, the probability of mass disen-
gagement will increase strongly. What might still keep members back in the 
group is that they are unable to see any alternative places to go outside the 
gang, and that they expect to be rejected by the community. This may to 
some extent explain the fact that when youth gangs fall apart, new gangs will 
often emerge with many of the same members. Splitting gangs is therefore 
not sufficient to ensure that the members will disengage from the gang sub-
culture altogether. It is also necessary to develop methods to integrate indi-
vidual gang members back into mainstream society. 
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4. What Do They Fight Over?  
A Multi-dimensional Approach to  
Racist Violence 
The surge of violent attacks against asylum seekers and labour migrants in 
many European countries, have given rise to widely different interpretations. 
Some see the violence as expressions of racism and xenophobia, orchestrated 
by far-right organisations. Others see the violence as a ‘natural response’ 
from locals who feel they are being swarmed by unwanted aliens, and that 
the violent outbursts indicate that the population’s ‘natural threshold’ for 
assimilating foreigners has been exceeded. Still others consider the violent 
incidents as ‘childish games and drunken pranks’,51 carried out by the usual 
local troublemakers. Common to most such interpretations is that they tend 
to be rather one-dimensional. I will try to provide an alternative multi-
dimensional interpretation of the violence against foreigners, showing both 
that the violent actors, the victims, and those who respond to the violence 
(anti-racists, the anti-immigration lobby, the police, local authorities, etc.) 
act on the basis of a mixture of motives and reasons. The following discus-
sion identifies and analyses six main ‘value complexes’ which the parties 
involved struggle over: ideology and immigration politics, identity, scarce 
resources, sexuality, territory, and security. 
 
Immigration politics and ideology. Many of the perpetrators of violence 
against immigrants and asylum-seekers claim to have committed the act be-
cause of opposition to current immigration policy, or simply assert that they 
‘don’t like foreigners’. Typically, they leave graffiti, symbols and slogans 
such as ‘Turks out!’, ‘Norway for Norwegians’, Keep Sweden Swedish, WP 
(White Power), swastikas, and the like. In other cases, racist or xenophobic 
messages are conveyed through the act itself, or at least interpreted as such 
by others. Only a minority among the perpetrators hold explicit ideological 
ideas or are members of racist groups, but more general xenophobic attitudes 
are common. However, in the context of police interrogation and court pro-
ceedings, such perpetrators often tend to deny or play down such racist or 
xenophobic motives since it might be used against them as an aggravating 
circumstance, resulting in a stiffer sentence. On the other hand, anti-
immigrant and racist organisations sometimes praise such young violent per-
petrators as good patriots and nationalists eager to defend their country and 
community against foreign intruders. However, these organisations usually 
express – at least officially – certain reservations about the form their ‘des-
perate’ actions take. 
                                                     
51  This expression has often been used by the police in the Scandinavian countries to de-
scribe such violence. 
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Antiracists generally interpret violent attacks against immigrants and asy-
lum-seekers as an expression of racism and neo-Nazism, and consider it their 
task to alarm the public of the threat of racism. The more militant variety of 
antiracists in particular tend to see the presence and actions of alleged racist 
and neo-Nazi groups as primarily a political threat ‘which must be fought in 
the same way as the forces of the radical left fought the Nazis in the streets 
during the 1930s’. More mainstream antiracists are usually more concerned 
about such attacks as transgressions of human rights rather than on ideologi-
cal politics in a narrow sense. 
The media also frequently emphasise the racist dimensions of violent acts 
against minorities. Especially when the police and other public institutions 
are slow to respond or when they play down xenophobic motives, some 
journalists see it as their role to make the public aware of the reality of racist 
violence, and put pressure on those whose responsibility it is to act against it. 
In this respect, they sometimes make important contributions to placing the 
problem onto the public agenda. However, journalists also sometimes tend to 
overdo the racism/Nazism dimension for a variety of reasons. Some appar-
ently prefer a simple and snappy explanation such as ‘Race War’ rather than 
a more complex analysis of conflicts between youth gangs. Extremism and 
racist violence are also potential hot news. It is sometimes obvious that sen-
sationalist first-page exposés of alleged Nazi terror groups are also a conven-
ient way to sell newspapers. 
However, although such acts of violence, and the responses to it, may be 
used to express ideological values regarding immigration politics and accep-
tance/rejection of ethnic pluralism, this is frequently only on the surface. 
Both racist and antiracist idioms may be used to express quite different val-
ues and interests. Often it is part of what may be called ‘identity politics’. 
Identity relates to how individuals and/or groups view and define them-
selves, and how viewed by others. Establishing and managing identities is an 
important concern for most people. To many perpetrators, their acts of vio-
lence against ‘foreigners’ are motivated more by a wish to impress their 
mates with a certain image of themselves than by any political or ideological 
values. Many of these youths have a strong feeling of not being appreciated 
– neither by parents (whose expectations they cannot live up to, or who sim-
ply do not care), by teachers and classmates, by a labour market, which does 
not need them, or by society in general. However, there are many ways to 
establish an identity or make others take notice. In certain types of youth 
gangs and cliques, being one who dares to do what others merely talk about 
may give status and serve to build one’s reputation and standing among 
one’s mates. Frequently, violent attacks are the outcome of drinking parties 
where young men try to outdo each other in expressing hostility towards for-
eigners and suggestions about what ought to be done to them. Afterwards, 
perpetrators are often aware that they had such motives for carrying out the 
violent act, sometimes claiming that they were carried away by the exchange 
of violent proposals and their beer-boosted courage. However, they some-
times also express surprise that their actions changed their status in relation 
to the community around them, and not necessarily in ways they themselves 
perceived as all negative. From being known as a gang of petty criminal los-
ers, they suddenly become somebody – dangerous Nazis and racists in the 
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eyes of some, brave patriots and daredevils in the eyes of others. To such 
young boys, donning a skinhead ‘uniform’ conveys an aggressive and ‘dan-
gerous’ image, and signals affiliation with a wider group of like-minded 
‘racists’ who might be mobilised if the need arises. This gives some youths a 
feeling of being respected, or at least feared. Especially for those who in the 
past were looked down upon or even bullied, it is a remarkable change to see 
that their old tormentors suddenly give way to them, and even show defer-
ence. Making media headlines, being courted by militant nationalist organi-
sations, causing the initiation of local action plans, or just to make things 
happen – all this may give marginalised young people a feeling of impor-
tance they have never experienced before. Finally they are somebody. 
The identity dimension is also of vital importance to the victims. Being 
victimised by violence may in itself be an extremely traumatic experience. 
Becoming a target for harassment and violence just because of what the per-
son is and cannot change – race, nationality and origin – may be even more 
devastating to one’s self-esteem and identity. 
Thus, violence and victimisation are closely related to the identity, self-
esteem and honour of both the direct perpetrators, the victims, and the peer 
groups to which they belong. For that reason, victimised groups do some-
times carry out acts of revenge. This may be intended as a way to restore 
their own feelings of humiliation and vulnerability, and to teach their adver-
saries a lesson. However, such retaliation may easily escalate into feuding 
and spirals of violence between native and immigrant youth gangs, or be-
tween ‘racists’ and ‘antiracists’. 
Racist violence also often affects the identities of the local community in 
which such events take place. Spectacular incidents of racist violence or 
manifestations of racist activities attract the attention of the national news 
media. Recurring negative focus on a particular community as a place of 
xenophobic activity and violence may over time stigmatise the entire com-
munity. Even individual inhabitants interacting with outsiders frequently 
experience the stigma of being associated with their home community, and 
may feel obliged to defend their integrity by stating that ‘Yes, I am from X, 
but I am certainly no racist!’ 
The almost instinctive tendency of mayors, the police and other locals to 
deny that a specific incident has any kinds of racist dimensions, or that there 
exists a problem of xenophobia in their community, is usually an attempt to 
avoid the stigmatisation. Their message is intended to prevent the event be-
ing blown out of proportions. However, the message received by external 
audiences is often that community representatives are denying and belittling 
a real problem of racial violence, which they rather ought to confront head-
on. What may stigmatise local communities most severely is not the simple 
fact that racist violence has occurred, but the general perception that the 
community is not willing to address the problem and do something decisive 
about it – and thereby in practice condoning what happened. On the other 
hand, local authorities do also sometimes try to pre-empt potential stigmati-
sation of the community by reacting promptly, strongly and publicly against 
local expressions of xenophobia and racism, especially if such incidents have 
been reported in the national news media. 
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Thus, identity management is also a concern for many of those who take 
an antiracist stance. Public display of antiracist attitudes, tolerance and sup-
port for immigrants and other minority groups, and contempt for groups and 
individuals, who are identified as ‘racists’, may also be a way of presenting 
oneself in a favourable light. To some groups of youths, ‘antiracism’ may 
even serve as a convenient legitimacy for their own violence and fights with 
rival gangs, or as a way to present themselves as superior to others.52 
This may also be part of the syndrome of what the Norwegian sociologist 
Ottar Brox calls ‘the moral elite’ and its struggle for ‘moral championship’. 
Actors may present themselves and their moral qualities through their liberal 
views on immigration and through condemnation of anything tasting of ra-
cism, and particularly in contrast to others.53 Just as members of xenophobic 
youth gangs sometimes try to outdo each other in expressing aggression 
against foreigners, the ‘moral elite’ has sometimes competed in doing the 
opposite, by expressing unreserved openness towards immigrants and asy-
lum-seekers. According to Brox, these discursive practices have the unfortu-
nate effect of polarising the debate on immigration politics, making the more 
constructive and realistic middle ground morally suspect. 
 
Scarce resources. A struggle for the access to and distribution of scarce re-
sources – money, jobs, housing, social services, leisure activities/facilities, 
etc. – lies behind much xenophobia and violence against immigrants and 
asylum-seekers. In the general public debate, one of the main arguments for 
a more restrictive immigration and asylum policy, presented by the anti-
immigration fringe and mainstream politicians alike, focus on the economic 
costs involved in taking care of and integrating large numbers of immigrants. 
This argument has had considerable credibility in times of economic crisis, 
and when high unemployment gives immigrants limited opportunity for 
achieving self-sufficiency. 
There is, for instance, no doubt that the more than 80,000 asylum-seekers 
arriving in economically depressed Sweden in 1992, or the 440,000 applying 
for asylum in Germany the same year, represented considerable financial 
burdens to these countries. Thus, it is therefore commonly argued that the 
resources spent on asylum-seekers would be better spent on ‘our own needy 
groups’. In addition, countless stories circulate – some true, many not – of 
how demanding foreigners are given easy access to all kinds of social ser-
vices, special grants, jobs, facilities, etc. Especially among relatively de-
prived and marginalised groups in society, such stories may easily evoke 
anger, bitterness, and jealousy. The claim that foreigners are given social 
goods they themselves have been denied has been a recurring theme in many 
of the explanations young perpetrators of violence and harassment have 
given to the police and the media. Some marginalised youth groups even use 
(the threat of) violence against immigrants as leverage against local authori-
ties to obtain goods they would not get otherwise. 
                                                     
52  Cf. Frøydis Eidheim, Hva har skjedd i Brumunddal: Lokalsamfunnet i møte med de frem-
mede og seg selv (Oslo: NIBR report, 1993, No. 20), pp. 49–95; and Yngve Carlsson, Ak-
sjonsplan Brumunddal – ga den resultater? Bekjempelse av fremmedfiendtlig vold i lokal-
samfunnet (Oslo: NIBR-rapport 1995:13), pp. 66–73. 
53  Ottar Brox, ‘Jeg er ikke rasist, men...’ Hvordan vi får våre meninger om innvandrere og 
innvandring (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1991), in particular pp. 44–88.  
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The economic dimensions of racist violence also affect other involved 
parties than perpetrators. Acts of arson or vandalism may have serious eco-
nomic effects on victims as well. In particular, immigrants who are in the 
process of establishing themselves with property and perhaps a small busi-
ness of their own are particularly vulnerable to vandalism. They are often 
underinsured. If the windowpanes of the shop or apartment are smashed sev-
eral times, they may be driven into bankruptcy – or even be driven out of 
town. 
The local community, especially the municipality and the business com-
munity, may also become affected by the economic consequences of racism 
and violence. The realisation that ‘racism is bad for business’ explain why in 
several cases the local business community have been among the first actors 
to respond to racist violence and demand firm action against it. There are 
several ways in which racism and xenophobia may have negative economic 
consequences for businesses. Some companies are dependent upon maintain-
ing good relationships with foreign customers and partners coming on busi-
ness visits. If they are harassed on town during their stay, contracts may be 
lost. Local companies may also have serious problems in recruiting highly 
qualified personnel to fill key positions. Such experts are in high demand, 
and are not likely to move with their families to a community where their 
children will grow up in what appears as a ‘hotbed for racism and violence’. 
The economic consequences of these tendencies may spread to other sectors 
of the stigmatised community, and set off a vicious circle. If the local com-
munity becomes so stigmatised that well-off families start to move away, the 
price of real estate may go down. In their place, lower-class families with 
social problems may be attracted to the community by cheap housing. As a 
result, the municipality may receive less income tax and acquire higher costs 
on social security. 
On the other hand, racist violence may also, paradoxically, have some 
positive effects in terms of improved access to scarce resources for some of 
the actors involved. If, for instance, an emerging problem of racism and vio-
lence is defined by local authorities as being the result of marginalisation or 
social deprivation, the youths in question will often be offered jobs, educa-
tion, leisure time activities or facilities in order to provide positive alterna-
tives to their present destructive lifestyles. Critics argue that young racists 
thereby make profit from their negative behaviour. Municipalities and local 
police departments may also receive extra funds from the state to implement 
measures to fight racism and violence in the community. 
However, in the struggle over scarce resources, there is one special form 
of ‘scarcity goods’, which is more precious and emotionally charged than 
any other: The struggle over girls, sexual favours, and the procreation of 
children.  
 
Sexuality. Both the racial ideologists and the nationalist anti-immigration 
lobby have placed a strong emphasis on controlling the sexual behaviour of 
women. To these movements, sexual relations between ‘our’ women and the 
‘strangers’ constitute the original sin: the pollution and dilution of race and 
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nation with foreign and inferior blood.54 This is also a core issue in classical 
racist ideology and practice. A main objective of both the ‘science’ of racial 
hygiene of the inter-war period, Nazi Germany’s Nuremberg Laws and the 
South African Apartheid system was to prevent racial mixing and preserve 
racial purity. Among the more modern versions of racial revolutionary ide-
ology, such as The Turner Diaries, women are seen as holding the keys to 
the demise or survival of the white race.55 The images of and rage against 
white women mating with non-white men are also prominent in the maga-
zines and music produced by contemporary neo-Nazi activists. 
Nationalist anti-immigration groups and activists have thus been highly 
concerned with women having sexual relations with ‘foreign’ men. In their 
propaganda, expressions like ‘asylum mattress’ and ‘whores’ are used to 
describe these women. At the same time, male immigrants were frequently 
described as HIV-infected, sex-crazed animals only out to rape local women. 
It is difficult to evaluate to what degree ideological propaganda produced 
by organised groups has made an impact on the general public. In some 
cases, it is obvious that the propaganda has had an effect on at least certain 
sections of the population. That notwithstanding relations between local girls 
and ‘foreign’ men are also – almost literally – an explosive issue at the local 
community level. A large proportion of the violent attacks, confrontations, 
and fights – sometimes even knifings, shootings, and large-scale riots – be-
gin as seemingly minor incidents involving jealousy and rivalry over girls. 
These incidents often take place at dance halls, bars, youth clubs or similar 
public arenas, and usually in connection with the consumption of alcohol. 
There are two main varieties of these triggering incidents: in the first type, a 
male ‘foreigner’ flirts with a girl who turns out to be a local man’s girlfriend. 
The boyfriend then often reacts violently, especially if he suspects that his 
girlfriend is attracted to this exotic, cool and often well-groomed male.56 The 
same may happen if the ‘intruder’ does not take the girl’s no for an answer. 
The second typical situation is that ‘foreign’ men are out with their local 
girlfriends, and some of the local men react with anger and aggression 
against the girls and/or the ‘foreign’ men who allegedly take the local girls 
away from them. Being passed over, local boys may feel humiliated, and 
their masculinity threatened, by the experience that these girls consider the 
‘niggers’ or the ‘Arabs’ more attractive, exciting and – possibly – sexually 
more potent than they are themselves. Insulting comments against the girl or 
against the foreign rival frequently provoke a physical (often, but not neces-
sarily, violent) response from the man who wants to defend her or his own 
honour and dignity. Then the fight is on. What distinguishes these incidents 
from ordinary rivalries over girls is that a similar quarrel between a local boy 
and someone from a neighbouring town does not usually have the same po-
                                                     
54  Some racist groups take this concept of original sin literally: the so-called Christian Iden-
tity Movement in North America considers the Jews to be the offspring of Eve’s illicit re-
lation with the Satanic snake. 
55  Cf. the harrowing vision of ‘the Day of the Rope’ in Andrew Macdonald, The Turner 
Diaries (Hillsboro: The National Vanguard Books, 1980), pp. 160–163. 
56  When the Danish ‘Green Jackets’ complained that ‘perkerne’ (the Turks) were stealing 
‘their’ girls, a youth worker pointed out to them that they would probably improve their 
chances in the competition for girls dramatically if they started to wash and wear clean 
clothes… (from the author’s interviews with youth worker René Johansen in 1991). 
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tential for escalation – at least not nowadays.57 In contrast, when the rivals 
are foreign men, a large number of local boys frequently join in to ‘teach the 
foreigners a lesson’, sometimes ending up in an outright riot.58 However, 
although such riots have racial dimensions, this does not mean that the par-
ticipants are able to formulate any kind of racial ideological views. What is 
involved is more the gut feelings that the ‘foreigners’ are winners and they 
are losers in the struggle over girls and sexual favours. This experience is 
felt as a threat to the masculinity of the local boys. And how can they better 
prove their masculinity than through a good fight? 
 
Territory. In the rhetoric of both the nationalist anti-immigration lobby and 
the racial revolutionaries, the territorial dimension is at the core of their ide-
ologies. The anti-immigration activists claim that the country is threatened 
by an on-going Muslim invasion. The arrival of thousands of labour mi-
grants, asylum-seekers and their families is in reality part of a conspiracy to 
conquer Europe for Islam, they claim. In a few decades from now they will 
have taken control of territory and the political system by means of a ‘demo-
graphic time bomb’, the argument goes.59 The racial revolutionaries see im-
migration as part of a Jewish scheme to bring non-whites into our lands in 
order to destroy the white race through racial mixing. In their conceptualisa-
tion, the Zionist Occupation Government is already in control through their 
agents. In both ideological versions, a ‘resistance struggle’ is needed to fight 
back the invasion/occupation, ultimately involving the use of violence 
against both ‘foreign invaders’ and ‘traitors’.60 
However, the territorial dimension is often highly important on the local 
level as well – without necessarily involving any ideology. When local youth 
gangs with xenophobic inclinations have carried out acts of violence against 
‘foreigners’, the immediate cause has often been that they felt threatened 
because they believed these others were trying to take over their territory. 
The disputed territories may involve entire towns or blocks, or merely spe-
cific street-corners, pubs, or youth clubs. For instance, in connection with 
what some Danish tabloids called the called ‘race war’ in Copenhagen in 
1982, local Danish youths claimed the media did not understand what their 
fight with some Turkish youths was all about. ‘It was only because they took 
our café’, they claimed.61 
                                                     
57  In a not very distant past (e.g. during the 1950s or some places even up to the present), 
quarrels over girls with men from neighbouring communities did in fact frequently cause 
large-scale fights and riots around dancing halls. In those days, when immigrants from 
abroad were an unknown phenomenon, xenophobia was often directed against people 
much closer to home. 
58  One typical case happened in the small Norwegian town Grimstad 1 September 1996. Six 
African men and three Norwegian girlfriends were at a discotheque when one of the Afri-
cans was pushed by a local man. When he asked why, he was hit in the face with a bottle. 
He hit back, and a fight followed, continuing on the street outside. Suddenly, almost 100 
local youths started to chase the Africans and their girlfriends, throwing stones and shou-
ting ‘Kill the niggers!’ and ‘Nigger whores!’. The police and the mayor nevertheless 
claimed that the incident was not racially motivated but only an ordinary gang fight over 
girls. Agderposten 2 and 3 Sept. 1996; Fedrelandsvennen 3 Sept. 1996. 
59  Cf. Nordmannen No. 3 (Sept. 1995), p. 8. 
60  I discuss these discourses in Bjørgo (1997), Chapter 8, and in T. Bjørgo, ‘Extreme Na-
tionalism and Violent Discourses in Scandinavia: ‘The Resistance’, ‘Traitors’, and ‘For-
eign Invaders’’, in T. Bjørgo (ed.), Terror from the Extreme Right (London: Frank Cass, 
1995). 
61  Cf. Lis Norup, Rasekrig? [Race War?] (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1982). 
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Interestingly, this territorial dimension is also a core issue for other actors 
involved – although they may not themselves always be aware of it. Radical 
antiracist activists, with their slogan ‘No Nazis in our streets!’ sometimes 
use violent means to prevent racist groups from establishing themselves in 
certain areas. This struggle often has close similarities to rivalries between 
gangs fighting over turf. Several municipalities have declared their commu-
nity as an ‘Antiracist Zone’. Increased patrolling from police and co-
operating groups of adults62 as a response to violent confrontations and 
gangs fighting over turf, may also be seen as civil society’s attempt to regain 
the territory from unruly youths. 
 
Security. To the immediate victims of racist violence, and the wider groups, 
which feel threatened, security from further violence and harassment is a 
primary concern. When a spectacular act of violence attracts the attention of 
the media, the police and the public, it is often only the climax in a long 
process of harassment and victimisation directed against individuals and 
groups. The most effective measure is of course to physically prevent the 
perpetrators from committing further attacks by arresting, prosecuting and 
jailing those responsible. However, other responses may also strengthen the 
victimised groups’ feeling of security. It is of great importance that 
neighbours, voluntary organisations and local authorities show a determina-
tion to include exposed minorities in the community and take responsibility 
for their safety and well-being. Even if the police are not able to identify and 
arrest the perpetrators, the attitude displayed by the police towards the vic-
tims and the crime may have a strong impact on the victims’ sense of secu-
rity. In cases where the police in public statements swiftly brush aside the 
possibility of any racist or xenophobic dimensions – even when it is obvious 
– or try to play down the gravity of the incident(s), it may increase the feel-
ing of insecurity among the victimised groups. If, on the contrary, the police 
display a willingness to explore possible racist dimensions and take the vic-
tims’ concerns seriously, it may even serve to subdue some of the negative 
effects of the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) experienced by many 
victims of violence. 
Even for perpetrators of violence with racist or xenophobic dimensions, 
their own feelings of fear and insecurity may have played an important role 
in the process leading up to their violent acts. Many of these perpetrators 
have in the past themselves been victims of threats and violence. Youths 
who have been bullied or violently attacked sometimes seek protection in 
gangs with a violent image. Racist skinhead gangs may offer the kind of col-
lective protection and intimidating image they crave for, even if their tor-
mentors are ‘native’. Individuals who have carried out extreme acts of vio-
lence against ‘foreigners’ have, in several cases, also personal histories of 
being victimised by violent immigrant youth gangs. In the two main cases of 
                                                     
62  Both the Swedish ‘Farsan på stan’ (‘Grand-Dad in Town’) and the Norwegian ‘Nat-
teravn’ (‘Night Raven’) projects are based on the observation that during weekend nights, 
urban streets are taken completely over by youths, often heavily intoxicated by alcohol. 
The idea is that an increased presence of sober adults may calm down the mood and pre-
vent events from getting out of hand. The task of the adults is not to intervene if violent 
situations occur, but to report emerging conflicts to the police as soon as possible, and try 
to serve as a calming influence through their mere presence. 
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killings with racist dimensions in Norway (one of which was a double-
murder), the perpetrators had, in both cases previously been attacked by 
dark-skinned immigrant gangs or individuals. These experiences had in-
stilled in them feelings of fear, anger and hatred, which were generalised 
towards dark-skinned young men as such. When a new and totally unrelated 
situation arose, their fear and hatred made them overreact in extreme ways, 
stabbing or gunning their victims to death. 
Fear of crime from immigrants and minority groups is widespread among 
considerable sections of the population, sometimes based on what people 
themselves or persons close to them may have experienced, or more often, 
on rumours and media accounts emphasising the ethnic origin of perpetrators 
of crimes.63 Criminality by immigrants – real or imagined – is in some cases 
cited as a legitimisation of violence against immigrants and asylum-seekers 
as a group. The generalisation of blame, guilt and punishment – from some 
specific ‘foreigners’ to ‘foreigners’ as such – is what gives this type of acts 
of violence a racist dimension. 
As the discussion above has demonstrated, what is commonly known as 
racist or xenophobic violence is highly complex phenomenon, which cannot 
be reduced merely to violence, carried out for specific ideological or politi-
cal motives. It is a characteristic of the phenomenon as such that the motiva-
tions are mixed, and that both the violent act and the responses to it involve 
several dimensions. At least six different clusters of values can be identified 
as being at stake in this interaction: ideology, identity, scarce resources, sex-
uality, territory, and security. Several, but not necessarily all of these dimen-
sions are usually involved in connection with specific incidents. Authorities 
and others who endeavour to prevent outbreaks of such violence, should take 
a broad perspective on the possible motives, issues and situations, which 
tend to give rise to incidents of violence. Several of these may provide prom-
ising avenues for intervention and prevention. 
                                                     
63  It is a fact that ‘foreigners’ or ethnic minorities constitute a disproportionate share of the 
prison population in many countries, including the Scandinavian ones. However, there is 
often great variety with regard to which categories of ‘foreigners’ are over-represented, 
and in which categories of crime. For some data on minorities and crime in Oslo, cf. Ro-
ger Andresen, ‘Innvandrere og kriminalitet i Oslo’ in Årbok 1995: Oslo Politikammer 
(Oslo: Oslo Police Headquarters, 1996). 

 
 
Part II: 
 
Interventions

5. The Exit Project:  
Promoting Disengagement from  
Violent and Racist Groups 
Background 
During the early and mid-1990s, several local communities in Norway had 
faced serious problems with xenophobic violence and racist youth groups. 
After a particularly nasty series of incidents in the town Brumunddal, central 
and local authorities eventually took the problem seriously and made heavy 
investments in research and development on how to handle this and similar 
situations. The three-year Action Plan Brumunddal, based on and followed 
up by substantial research,64 had a very positive outcome. The action plan 
included broad mobilisation of public agencies as well as civil society. Some 
of the interventions focused on reintegrating a group of young marginalised 
men who had directed their frustrations and anger against immigrants. Xeno-
phobic violence stopped, and the local racist youth scene dissolved. Al-
though all xenophobic tendencies were hardly eradicated completely from 
the community, Brumunddal had clearly become a much better place to live 
– for the remaining immigrants as well. Local agencies had learnt some valu-
able lessons on how to collaborate closely to handle such problems.  
The positive experiences and outcomes from Action Plan Brumunddal 
provided inspiration and promising methods to several other Norwegian 
communities with similar problems of violent and racist youth groups. In 
most cases, these communities managed to solve or at least reduce their pro-
blems. During the 1990s, local and central authorities in Norway were much 
more on the offensive compared to the typical response a few years earlier, 
when denial, belittling or moral panic were the usual responses to problems 
of xenophobic violence and racist youth groups. Experiences and knowledge 
gained from various local projects were also documented and accumulated 
systematically for later use.65 
One lasting lesson of the highly successful Action Plan Brumunddal was 
that problems of xenophobic violence should be considered a responsibility 
to the entire community. A second important lesson was that it was useful to 
involve external experts as advisors. As a consequence, the central govern-
ment decided to establish a permanent pool of experts, ‘The Interdisciplinary 
                                                     
64  In particular Frøydis Eidheim, Hva har skjedd i Brumunddal: Lokalsamfunnet i møte med 
de fremmede og seg selv. Oslo: NIBR rapport 1993:20; and Yngve Carlsson, Aksjonsplan 
Brumunddal – ga den resultater? Bekjempelse av fremmedfiendtlig vold i lokalsamfunnet. 
Oslo: NIBR-rapport 1995:13. Parallell to the Brumunddal studies, there were also two 
ongoing doctoral projects focusing on other racist youth scenes by Katrine Fangen and 
Tore Bjørgo, respectively. 
65  Cf. Carlsson, Y. & Lippe, H.v.d. (1997), Industribygda og rasismen: Utvikling og avvik-
ling av et fremmedfientlig ungdomsmiljø i Vennesla 1991–1996. Oslo: NIBR-rapport 
1997: 17; Carlsson, Y. og von der Lippe, H. (1999): Velstandsbydelen og rasismen. Oslo: 
NIBR-rapport 1999:9; Tore Bjørgo & Yngve Carlsson, Vold, rasisme og ungdoms-
gjenger: Forebygging og bekjempelse (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1999). 
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Advisory Service for Local Action against Racism and Xenophobia’, coordi-
nated by the Directorate of Immigration (UDI). This advisory service con-
sists of (at present) 17 researchers and practitioners, including police offi-
cers, social workers, pedagogues, conflict mediators, and others.66 Together, 
they provide complementary forms of expertise to municipalities and local 
agencies that have to deal with problems they do not locally have experience 
with how to handle. Usually a team of two advisors will assist local agencies 
in developing an adequate analysis of the problem, and give advise on what 
kinds of action might be effective. One important task is to determine the 
magnitude and nature of the problem, in order to avoid both belittling and 
overreaction. 
Another important useful function of the advisory service has been to ac-
cumulate experiences from many communities that have had to handle varie-
ties of the same types of problems. Rather than having to ‘reinvent the 
wheel’ every time a new local community gets a problem with xenophobic 
violence or racist youth groups, the advisory group is accumulating and sys-
tematising knowledge, methods, and practical experiences that might be of 
relevance to other communities with similar problems.  
The advisory service provided a framework within which several re-
searchers and practitioners started to work closely together to develop more 
effective methods. One of the outcomes of this process was the Exit project. 
Exit was gradually developed during the period 1995 to 1997, when it was 
formally established as a project. 
The emergence of the Exit project 
During 1995 and 1996, the police made several mass arrests and other inter-
ventions in the racist youth scene in Oslo and Kristiansand. The participants 
turned out to be young, sometimes 13 years of age or younger. Many parents 
were shocked about what their children had become involved with, and were 
desperate to get their children out of the racist scene. In close co-operation 
with the preventive police unit in a part of Oslo (Manglerud), some parents 
established parental network groups in 1995 to help each other and to pool 
their efforts. These parental groups turned out to be useful. Within a few 
months, almost all the children of these parents had withdrawn from the rac-
ist scene.  
As a researcher, I was at the time studying how young people join and 
leave racist groups. Parents with children in racist groups contacted me, ask-
ing for advice on what to do. Together with two officers at the Manglerud 
preventive police unit (both part of the Advisory Service), we started to de-
velop a more general project for parental network groups and other methods 
to get young people out of racist groups. Our first activities started in spring 
1996, but the project was formally established from mid-1997, funded as a 
three-year development project by the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of 
Children and Family, and the Directorate of Immigration. The NGO ‘Adults 
                                                     
66  These experts are involved with the advisory service on a freelance basis only, and get 
paid for each counselling job they do for a municipality. The central government sponsors 
the municipalities by covering the costs of one day of free counselling (for one or two ad-
visors) per case.  
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for Children’ hosted the project that eventually was named ‘Project Exit – 
Leaving Violent Youth Groups’. The Exit project had three main objectives: 
 
– aiding and supporting young people who want to disengage from racist or 
other violent groups,  
– supporting parents with children in racist or violent groups, establishing 
local networks for parents,  
– developing and disseminating knowledge and methods to professions 
working with youths associated with violent groups.  
 
The Norwegian Exit project decided to work through the local agencies by 
providing them with relevant know-how and methods, rather than building a 
separate Exit agency to take care of youths. Thus, it is the local youth work-
ers, child welfare officers, teachers, and police officers that work directly 
with the youths. The project has trained more than 700 practitioners from 
various agencies and professions in prevention and intervention in relation to 
racist and violent youth groups. An Exit handbook is now published (in Nor-
wegian).67 Below two of the main methods will be described in more detail – 
both focusing on early intervention by involving parents.  
The parental network group  
Parents are in a central position to influence on their children’s behaviour, 
although this influence will naturally decline as the child grows up. Parents 
with teenage children in racist or other violent groups may profit from col-
laborating with other parents in a similar situation. 
 
– These parents have a strong need for knowledge and information on what 
is going on in these groups. By sharing information between them, par-
ents can together build a better understanding about what is happening in 
the milieu in which their children are involved. This knowledge can be 
extended if the parental group brings in knowledgeable people from out-
side, such as police officers, researchers, or ex-members. 
 
– In such a forum, parents can discuss their dilemmas in connection with 
how strict restrictions they should put on their children and their behav-
iour, and how to avoid that their sanctions might result in pushing their 
children away from them. Parents may also reach agreements on common 
positions regarding what their children are allowed to take part in, or 
what will be accepted in terms of (Nazi-style) dress code. The network 
group can thereby strengthen the parents’ monitoring, control, and ability 
to provide care for their children.  
 
– Having children in neo-Nazi or criminal groups can be socially stigma-
tising for the entire family. Some parents and siblings have been excluded 
                                                     
67  Tore Bjørgo, Odd Arild Halhjem, and Taran Knudstad, EXIT – Ut av voldelige ungdoms-
grupper: Kunnskap, erfaringer og metoder i lokalt tverrfaglig og tverretatlig arbeid 
(Oslo: Voksne for Barn, juni 2001). The handbook is available on the web at 
 http://www.vfb.no/nedlasting/Haandbok.pdf  
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from former social networks. Most of these parents feel a strong need to 
talk with someone about their problems but do not dare to bring it up in 
their regular circles. A closed forum with others in a similar situation of-
fers such an opportunity. Single parents in particular need the support 
such a parental network can provide. Some parents have succeeded in 
getting their children out of the racist scene. Their experiences may be of 
use and an inspiration to others. 
 
– A parental network may also play an important role in disseminating in-
formation to parents regarding upcoming events. If the son or daughter 
tells the parents that they plan to go camping with friends in the weekend, 
it might be useful if the parents know from another source that the local 
racist group plans to attend a Nazi concert or a demonstration the same 
weekend. The parental network may also be informed by the police that a 
large confrontation between rival groups is coming up. This may enable 
parents to keep their children at home during the event, preventing them 
from becoming victims (or perpetrators) of violence, or arrested.  
 
There are great differences between various parental groups. Some groups 
have consisted of parents with strong personal resources. They have in some 
cases been able to run the network group mainly on their own. Several of 
these groups have been highly successful – getting all their children out of 
the racist scene within a few months. Other parental groups have consisted 
of parents with weak resources, lots of personal and family problems, and 
often holding attitudes that do not differ much from those of their children in 
the racist group. However, even these parents have often realised that their 
children are involved with something that will hurt their future. Groups con-
sisting of such parents will usually require that a professional or another re-
sourceful person come in from outside to organise the network group and 
keep it up and running over time. These external helpers have often func-
tioned as liaisons between parents and the police or social agencies.  
Not all parents are motivated to take part in such a network group. Some 
do not see anything problematic in their children’s involvement with a racist 
group – either because they are just happy that their child has finally got 
some friends, or because they hold views similar to those of their children. 
Some parents are racist or criminals themselves. Others do not realise – or 
do not want to realise – what their children are involved with. They are 
afraid of being branded as bad parents who have transferred dubious values 
to their children. Some parents get paralysed, apathetic, or just indifferent. 
And to some it is a completely unthinkable idea to take part in a network 
group where they have to talk with strangers about their problems. Thus, 
parental network groups are not for everyone. 
In spite of problems, results show that parental network groups have been 
successful. About 130 parents representing 100 youths/children have partici-
pated in such parental network groups in Norway between 1995 and mid-
2000. By the end of that period, only about 10 of these youths were still in-
volved with the racist scene. We do not claim that all those 90 quit the scene 
because of the parental groups – many left for other reasons – but we do 
know that this work made a decisive impact in many cases.  
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Parallel with the Norwegian experience but originating independently, 
parental network groups have also been tried out in the Swedish town Klip-
pan, and found to be a highly useful method. Some parents have been invol-
ved since the beginning of the group in 1997, some have quit when their 
children disengaged from the scene, whereas others continue in the parental 
group to help and inspire others. When parents started to organise them-
selves, it did sometimes escalate the conflicts they had with their children. 
But on the whole, the parents involved considered the network group to be 
an indispensable source of strength.  
One of the tasks of the parental group in Klippan is to operate a hot line 
that can be phoned by parents and others from all over Sweden, providing 
information about neo-Nazism, what to look for to detect if a child is in-
volved with the scene, and offering practical advice on how to respond and 
discuss the issue with the child. This type of information and advice is also 
distributed in a small booklet (in Swedish only), ‘On responding to racism 
and Nazism among youths’.68 
The Klippan group is now also involved in preventive work, collaborat-
ing with schools, the police, and other agencies and NGOs. The parental 
group in Klippan has worked closely with Exit in Sweden and other disen-
gagement projects, and also exchanged experiences and methods with Nor-
wegian partners.69  
The Empowerment Conversation 
A preventive police officer being one of the co-founders of the Exit project, 
Bjørn Øvrum, has developed another powerful method of early intervention 
with children involved with racist groups or other delinquent behaviour. 
‘The Empowerment Conversation’ can be applied when e.g. a police officer, 
a teacher, or a youth worker detects that a child or youth is involved in ac-
tivities that give reason to worry. The professional will then summon the 
young person together with the parents for a voluntary conversation, and will 
present the symptom that gave rise to that worry. This could be theft, drug 
use, tagging, or participation in a racist group or another type of gang. Child 
and parents will also be informed about the likely consequences of this be-
haviour if it continues. The purpose of the conversation is not to punish but 
to create the basis for reorientation and change in behaviour of the child or 
youth, as well as mobilising the parents’ own engagement and resources. 
The professional asks for the parents’ consent to share information with 
other relevant agencies to help the child through coordinated efforts. This 
helps to get around obstacles to collaboration often caused by the strict rules 
of confidentiality practiced by social agencies. The conversation session 
should be seen as the starting point in a process of reorientation where other 
agencies (school, social workers, etc.) will also get involved in the next 
stages. 
                                                     
68  Om att möta racism och nazism bland ungdomar (‘On responding to racism and Nazism 
among youths’), co-published by the Parental group in Klippan, and Save the Children 
Sweden (2001). 
69  The Klippan experience is described and analysed in a book by Berit Wigerfelt and An-
ders Wigerfelt, Rasismens yttringar: Exemplet Klippan (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2001). 
The parental network group is discussed on pp. 281–283 and 307.  
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The conversation is based on a structured procedure where the professio-
nal, the parents and the child together discuss the behaviour that gave rise to 
the meeting, and what they believe is explaining that behaviour (see figure 
on page 96). If, for instance, the young person is participating in a violent or 
extremist group, the youth is asked what he or she believes is causing 
him/her to get involved with such a scene. The youth will be presented with 
a set of alternatives (cf. figure): is it for example a need for protection, thrill 
seeking, friendship, or status? For each type of cause there is a card suggest-
ing possible corresponding options to be discussed with parents and child. If, 
for example, the probable cause of the problematic behaviour was thrill 
seeking, they can discuss what kinds of legal and socially acceptable alterna-
tives could be available, and how the young person can realise his or her 
wishes for an exciting leisure time. Together with the youth and the parents, 
the professional try to look forward, focusing on solutions in order to stimu-
late a process of reorientation and alteration of behaviour.  
Although the Empowerment Conversation model was originally devel-
oped during preventive police work with racist youth groups, it can be ap-
plied for many types of youth delinquency problems. The Norwegian police 
have recommended it for more general use. Youth workers, teachers, and 
other professionals are also being trained to apply it. Results so far are very 
promising. However, it probably makes a particularly strong impact when it 
is the police that call in parents and child for a conversation. 
These two methods have been effective as early interventions with young 
teen-agers who have got involved with racist youth groups. In several cases, 
recruitment to racist youth groups has been reduced to almost zero. Using 
these methods, local police, youth workers and other agencies are now 
equipped to act promptly once they notice that young people flirt with such 
groups.70 We believe that such early intervention is one of the main reasons 
why the neo-Nazi scene in Norway remains relatively small, young, and 
characterised by short careers and few ‘veterans’.  
When it comes to providing disengagement assistance to older and more 
established neo-Nazis activists, the Norwegian Exit project has been less 
successful. In this area, however, the Swedish offshoot of the Exit project 
has achieved impressive results. 
The proliferation of the Exit model 
Exit in Sweden 
Shortly after the Norwegian Exit programme started in autumn 1997, it got 
in contact with a former Swedish neo-Nazi, Kent Lindahl. He had broken 
with the Nazi scene in the early 1990s, and had more recently made a num-
ber of presentations at Swedish schools together with a Jewish Holocaust 
                                                     
70  In a local Exit project in the city Kristiansand, an inter-agency task force consisting of 
police officers, youth workers, social workers, teachers, and the Exit worker together used 
this approach in their work with 38 youths involved with the local racist scene during the 
period from 1996. By mid-2001, six of these individuals were still active in the Nazi sce-
ne, three were dead (by accidents or drug overdose), but the remaining 29 are living rela-
tively normal lives. By end of 2001, the project had worked with 60 youths, and 49 had 
left the racist scene. 
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survivor, warning pupils against involvement with the Nazi scene. He was a 
highly credible person with a powerful personal story. The Norwegian Exit 
challenged him to start up Exit in Sweden. He did so, with great success.  
Exit in Sweden was established in mid-1998. The goals of the Swedish 
project were similar to the Norwegian model, but it is implemented in a 
somewhat different way. The Swedish Exit projects works directly with the 
individuals who contact Exit. Staff members also make school visits to talk 
to students about neo-Nazism, and increasingly also train teachers, social 
workers, and police officers on the issue. Several members of the staff 
(which at present in mid-2001 counts a total of seven) have a background as 
former participants in the neo-Nazi movement (or the ‘White Power world’, 
as it is often termed in Sweden). This personal experience obviously pro-
vides a powerful credibility when they talk to young people. It also makes it 
easier to establish contact with individuals that consider disengaging from 
the Nazi movement. 
Exit in Sweden has developed a five-stage programme that describes the 
process individuals typically will go through when leaving the movement 
and re-establishing themselves into mainstream society, and what Exit can 
contribute to help them through this process:71 
 
The phase of motivation: The young person is still part of the White Power 
scene, but has started to have second thoughts about it, and questions his/her 
involvement. At this point the person contacts Exit and probes the possibili-
ties for disengagement and assistance. Exit answers questions, provides in-
formation, and offer a contact person ‘who has been where you are and 
knows how it is’. 
 
The phase of disengagement: The person has made the decision to leave the 
White Power scene. Some have already quit when they contact Exit, others 
need practical help and advice to do so. Exposed to threats from former 
friends, and left without a social network, this is a chaotic period. They need 
someone to talk to, and help from Exit (and sometimes the police) to assess 
the threat situation in a realistic way. In some cases they have to move to a 
different community, and may be in need of financial assistance and social 
services. The contact person from Exit is available by phone around the 
clock, and may serve as a guide and liaison to social agencies, the police or 
other resources. The personal support from the contact person, providing an 
opportunity to talk out on doubts, fears, problems and thoughts about the 
future is of great importance at this stage.  
 
The phase of establishment: The break is now completed. The young person 
has secured a place to live and subsistence (usually with parents or by assi-
stance from social services). Some have a job, others study or get job train-
ing, and some have still not found anything to do. But they have cut their ties 
to the White Power scene, as well as to their former friends there. They are 
                                                     
71  The following description is based on the evaluation report on Exit in Sweden by the 
Swedish Council for Crime Prevention, titled Exit för avhoppare: En uppföljning och 
utvärdering av verksamheten åren 1998–2001 (Stockholm: BRÅ-rapport 2001:8), pp. 20–
23.  
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usually in a social vacuum, with a very limited social network. They often 
feel empty and alone. And they fear to go out in the evenings. At this stage 
the contact person try to provide new links to ‘normal’ life, and help to ex-
pand their social networks. Exit organises some joint activities for persons 
who have disengaged from the White Power scene, bringing them together 
with other youths from different and more mainstream backgrounds. Group 
discussions are useful at this stage. 
 
The phase of reflection: At this stage the individuals start to realise what 
they have been involved with during their time in the Nazi movement, such 
as violence, crimes, extreme ideologies of hatred, and recruitment of others 
into similar activities. Some get problems with anxiety, depression, insom-
nia, or alcohol. Some also need professional help to deal with their violent 
impulses, traumas, or their lack of confidence. The Exit staff includes a 
therapist who is available for consultations. Many ex-activists need to reflect 
on why they got involved with the scene, where the hatred came from, and 
how to go on with a normal life. Most of the racist thoughts and impulses 
have disappeared during this process. Some leave their racist views behind 
when they break with the group; others need more time to change their 
worldview.  
 
The phase of stabilisation: at this stage, the young persons have got a ‘nor-
mal’ life with job, studies, and sometimes a family of their own. They have 
turned away from hatred, racism, crime, and alcohol abuse. However, they 
still fear that their past will ruin their future, and they feel guilt and shame 
for what they have been involved with. Exit no longer works actively with 
persons in this phase but many of them still keep in touch with their contact 
person.  
 
Exit’s period of active involvement usually lasts between six and 12 months. 
By April 2001, Exit was working actively with around 40 persons.  
The Swedish Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) has carried out an 
evaluation72 of the project on assignment from the Swedish government that 
funded Exit. The BRÅ evaluation was highly positive, concluding, ‘the work 
of the Exit project has been both relatively extensive as well as successful’.  
During the three years Exit in Sweden has operated, 133 persons turned 
to Exit for help, and 125 of these have left the White Power movement. The 
majority of the persons that contacted Exit were between 18 and 25 years of 
age, and most had been involved with the White Power movement between 
two and four years. Half of them had been convicted of criminal offences, 
and a further quarter reported to have committed such offences without hav-
ing been convicted. After they broke with the movement, they claimed to 
have ceased to commit criminal offences. 
BRÅ interviewed 17 ex-activists, eight parents, and 24 representatives of 
institutions that had cooperated with Exit. They generally expressed a very 
                                                     
72  Exit för avhoppare: En uppföljning och utvärdering av verksamheten åren 1998–2001 
(Stockholm: BRÅ-rapport 2001:8). The evaluation report is available (in Swedish with a 
four-page English summary at the end) in Acrobat format from the BRÅ web page 
 http://www.bra.se/web/material/  
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high level of satisfaction with Exit’s work and contribution. Several ex-
members and parents stated that they would not have been able to get 
through it alone, and that Exit’s help was invaluable. 
Although the evaluation report generally gave the project very high 
marks on its activities and results, it pointed on the negative side on organi-
sational problems that had led to a high turnover of staff. This has to do with 
typical traits of organisations established by committed enthusiasts, with all 
the strengths and weaknesses of many such organisations. The evaluation 
showed that having persons with that particular background and personal 
credibility had been decisive for the success of Exit in Sweden. However, 
there were also problems in the organisation. For the future operation of 
Exit, this strength of personal experience should be combined with a more 
professional leadership and improved ties with other agencies. 
Exit Deutschland and governmental Aussteigerprogramme in Germany 
From mid-2000 onwards, the notion of reducing right-wing extremism 
through promoting disengagement made a strong and rapid impact in Ger-
many. Directly inspired by Exit in Sweden, Exit Deutschland was estab-
lished in August 2000. The criminologist and former police officer Bernd 
Wagner and the ex-Nazi Ingo Hasselbach initiated the project, which was 
hosted by the NGO Zentrum Demokratische Kultur. The magazine Stern and 
its ‘Mut gegen rechte Gewalt’ campaign supported Exit Germany economi-
cally.73 
Exit in Germany offers assistance to persons who want to quit the right-
wing extremist scene. The initiative has to come from the person who wants 
to disengage. Exit provides help with assessing and handling threats to the 
personal security of these individuals, although to move to another city is 
only required for a few clients. Exit assists them through the process of dis-
engagement and resocialisation (cf. the Swedish five-stage model). It does 
not offer any economic support during reintegration. Exit Deutschland em-
phasises that these persons must take responsibility for their illegal actions 
and the consequences, but may help to arrange legal assistance. Focusing on 
reorientation, Exit also sends persons in crises to psychological counselling, 
but does not provide these services itself.  
After one year of activity, Exit Deutschland currently (Sept. 2001) works 
with 87 individuals who are at different stages in the disengagement process. 
Twenty-four of these cases are now finished in the sense that the persons 
have broken completely with their racist past and established themselves 
with a new life outside the movement. 
The clients are between the age of 15 and 55 but mostly between 17 and 
27. They are almost exclusively males who have been heavily involved with 
neo-Nazism for at least two years. Some have been leading figures, and most 
                                                     
73  The ‘Mut gegen rechte Gewalt’ campaign and the Exit approach are presented at 
http://www.stern.de/politik/spezial/index_mut.html. The Exit homepage is http://www. 
exit-deutschland.de/. Most of the information in this section is based on a presentation 
made by an Exit representative, Christina Hausmann, at a seminar on ‘Decreasing Racial 
Violence’, organised by The EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) 
in Vienna 2–3 July 2001. See also a full-page article in Die Zeit 10 Mai 2001 on Exit and 
the Aussteigerprogramme: http://www.zeit.de/2001/20/Politik/ 200 120 rechteaussteiger. 
html  
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have committed criminal acts. They often serve in prison, where it is diffi-
cult to shelter them from former comrades if they want to break with the 
group. In some cases, the solution is to apply for transfer to another prison. 
In the early stages of the project, the great majority of those who contacted 
Exit for assistance were from the western parts of Germany – very few were 
from the east. By mid-2001, this trend has reversed. The project now has an 
east–west ratio that roughly represents the population of East and West Ger-
many. One possible explanation is that Exit needed more time to be known 
in the East. Another factor might be that the structures there are more closely 
knit and activists need more time and effort to get out. Most of the clients 
have jobs, study, or are in vocational training. Only a few are unemployed or 
social cases. 
Exit Deutschland is part of Zentrum Demokratische Kultur in Berlin that 
also hosts several related project against right-wing extremism and racist 
violence. This includes support to victims of xenophobic violence, and mo-
bile counselling teams that work with communities where there are problems 
with racist violence and right-wing extremism. Exit is an important supple-
ment to these other activities. 
Partly due to all the publicity in the news media surrounding the estab-
lishment of Exit in Germany during autumn 2000, German authorities de-
cided to set up similar Aussteigerprograme. By mid-2001, such programmes 
had been established in 11 of the 16 states of the German federation. The 
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfass-
ungsschutz) runs a program targeting right-wing extremist activists all over 
Germany. At the state level, however, these programmes are run by different 
governmental agencies in the various German states. In Baden-Württemberg, 
for example, it is organised by the police (Landeskriminalamt); in 
Rheinland-Phalz and several other states the programme is under the State 
Office for Youth Affairs and Social Welfare; in Hamburg it is run by the 
Senate Administration for the Interior; and in other states by the State Office 
for the Protection of the Constitution (Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz).  
Due to their different institutional basis, these programmes will naturally 
also differ in focus and content, although they all generally seek to facilitate 
disengagement for persons involved with the right-wing extremist scene. 
Most of the programmes also operate hot-line telephones where persons wil-
ling to quit can make contact. The programme developed by the Ministry of 
Justice in Niedersachsen is mainly focusing on helping right-wing extremists 
in prison or on probation to break with the extremist group. Other program-
mes, e.g. one called Ausstiegshilfen Rechtextremismus74 run by the Criminal 
Police in Baden-Würrtemberg, focus on putting an end to right-wing extre-
mist ‘careers’ but also the prevention of further criminal offences as well as 
a sliding into the extremist mainstream by marginally involved persons and 
sympathisers. Another goal of this programme is to provide protection of 
threatened witnesses in order to ensure criminal prosecution. Offenders who 
are willing to cooperate with the public prosecutor may also be offered some 
                                                     
74  The description of the programme Ausstiegshilfen Rechtextremismus is based on the paper 
‘Programme ‘Assistance to Exit Right-Wing Extremism’’, presented by Karl-Heinz 
Ortenreiter of the Office for Criminal Affairs Baden-Wurttemberg during the EUMC 
seminar on ‘Decreasing Racial Violence’ in Vienna 2–3 July 2001, and personal conver-
sations with Mr. Ortenreiter. 
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legal advantages. Such persons should then be separated from the right-wing 
scene. Being operated by the Criminal Police, this programme has certain 
criminal justice flair to it. Nevertheless, there are also several elements in the 
programme that focus more on preventive work. These parts emphasise such 
means as education, discussion, care, intervention with youth welfare, and 
cooperation with teachers and parents to prevent a further sliding into right-
wing extremism. This requires that the police collaborate closely with other 
public bodies and institutions, such as social services, youth workers, 
schools and employment services, and that these agencies coordinate their 
efforts in a common prevention and intervention strategy. Such cooperation 
has often been a problem between various agencies in Germany, in particular 
between youth workers and the police. 
The Aussteigerprogramm für Rechtsextremisten run by the Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz will be described in some more detail.75 The programme 
has two main objectives consisting of an ‘active’ and a ‘passive’ part. The 
first is to ‘separate out’ leading figures and activists, in particular by contact-
ing those who show signs of wanting to break away from the scene, e.g. if 
they appear to be burnt out, discouraged, or that they have realised the futil-
ity of their political struggle. The ultimate aim of this part of the programme 
is to weaken and disconcert the right-wing extremist scene by causing the 
defection of such influential figures, which in its turn might influence others 
to quit as well. Although the BfV claims to have modest expectations regard-
ing how many leading activist they could turn through this approach, the 
reactions from the right-wing extremist scene could at least be interpreted as 
an indication that this part of the programme had disconcerted leading fig-
ures considerably.  
The second part of the Aussteigerprogramm is to persuade sympathisers 
who are not yet that deeply involved in the right-wing scene to leave, 
thereby preventing them from drifting further into the violence-prone extre-
mist circles. The main tool is the operation of a telephone hot line, open at 
all hours to persons considering leaving the scene. Here, they will receive 
advice and support from staff members who have been specially trained for 
this task. They may provide advice on such matters as whether it is neces-
sary in that particular case to move to a different social environment, assi-
stance when looking for employment, or help to find a new apartment – all 
with the aim of providing help to self-help.  
When the programme was made public, news media in Germany and all 
over Europe published stories saying that the programme would make pay-
ments of allowances amounting to 100,000 DM for right-wing extremists 
willing to leave the scene. The BfV strongly denies that this is the case. Al-
though financial aid may be granted in certain individual cases (e.g. if the 
situation requires urgent measures to be taken for the individual to move to a 
safer locality), the BfV claims to be very cautions in paying economic allow-
                                                     
75  The description is based on the paper ‘Concept, response and perspectives of the BfV-
Aussteigerprogramm to encourage right-wing extremists to leave the scene’, presented by 
Bodo W. Becker at the EUMC seminar on ‘Decreasing Racial Violence’ in Vienna 2–3 
July 2001, and by personal conversation with Mr Becker. It should be noted that the Offi-
ce for the Protection of the Constitution is a security service, not a police force, and it 
does not have the obligation to initiate criminal prosecution if it gets knowledge of illegal 
offences. 
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ances. Right-wing extremists who are willing to leave the scene, will, for 
example, only be refunded part of their travel expenses when they go to have 
a meeting with a contact person in the programme. As could be expected, the 
flawed news stories on the programme regarding alleged payments led to a 
number of phone calls from individuals claiming to be right-wing extremists 
eager to start a new and better life! One of the first tasks of the hot line ope-
rators when someone calls therefore became to start the process of checking 
out whether the person in question was actually known to the Verfassungs-
schutz as a participant of the right-wing extremist scene. A number of callers 
turned out never to have been heard of in these circles. These persons were 
obviously motivated by the alleged payments. 
For this and other reasons, the BfV expects persons calling the hot line 
and expressing willingness to leave the scene, to provide their real name and 
agree to a personal interview with the BfV in Cologne or Berlin. This is to 
test how seriously they intend to leave the scene.  
The BfV-Aussteiger hot line has been operative from mid-April 2001. By 
the end of August, more than 680 calls had been received. However, this 
figure includes journalists, information requests, and non-genuine inquiries. 
The number of right-wing activists who were considered to be potentially 
willing to leave the scene amounted to about 140 individuals. As expected, 
the majority of the callers were from the various neo-Nazi comradeships and 
from the right-wing skinhead scene and similar violence-prone groups.76 
These are circles where group pressure is stronger and the difficulties in-
volved with quitting are greater than in other parts of the right-wing extre-
mist scenes. During the first four months of the programme period, 35 such 
persons have had their initial meetings with BfV staff, and some more meet-
ings were fixed. Another ten persons who were in the process of leaving the 
scene on their own have also been provided with advice or assistance on the 
phone.  
The high number of serious responses to the hot line part of the Aus-
steiger programme clearly exceeded what the BfV had expected initially. On 
the other hand, the active part of the programme – approaching leading fig-
ures to encourage them to disengage – has turned out to be a difficult task, 
although it was expected to be so. However, if successful, the potential ef-
fects and repercussions of ‘separating out’ some of the leaders could be con-
siderable. 
Exit in Finland and Switzerland 
A group of researchers (headed by Dr Vesa Puuronen) at the University of 
Joensuu started a local Exit project in Joensuu in 1998, inspired by the Nor-
wegian Exit project.77 This city had got a bad reputation in Finland for a 
large number of racist attacks and other xenophobic and criminal activities 
                                                     
76  The neo-Nazi comradeship scene is considered by the BfV to consist of some 2200 per-
sons in 2000, whereas the number of right-wing extremist skinheads and other violence-
prone individuals number are counted to 9700. 
77  The description of Exit in Finland is based on a paper presented by Vesa Puuronen and 
Jarkko Riikonen at the EUMC seminar on ‘Decreasing Racial Violence’ in Vienna 2–3 
July 2001, and personal information from Puuronen and other researchers involved with 
the project since the onset. 
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committed by a relatively large group of Nazi-oriented skinheads. This racist 
youth scene had emerged and grown during the 1990s on the background of 
economic recession in the city. A growing number of immigrants and refu-
gees arriving during the same period became convenient scapegoats.78 
Xenophobic attitudes were widespread among young people as well as 
among some adults who condoned the activities of the skinheads. 
The Exit project in Joensuu was based on cooperation between Exit pro-
ject workers, youth workers, social workers, teachers, police officers and 
researchers. This multi-professional composition of the project group was a 
source of strength but also caused some difficulties due to different profes-
sional cultures, approaches, and interpretations of the problem at hand, and 
different ideas regarding how these problems should be solved. Neverthe-
less, the participants gradually managed to reach a more common under-
standing and coordinate their efforts better. 
During its first two–three years, the Exit project in Joensuu focused its 
main effort on prevention and early intervention to reduce recruitment. Ad-
dressing xenophobic attitudes among youths had high priority. One method 
was to provide social arenas based on tolerance to provide areas where local 
and immigrant youths could mingle. A municipal youth house within the 
framework of the Exit project was an important part of this, providing excit-
ing and meaningful activities. This seems to have contributed to a reduction 
of tension among different youth groups in the area.  
A method of early intervention has been to get into dialogue with racist 
or skinhead pupils at school. When pupils in general violate school rules, a 
common reaction is hold back the pupil at school at the end of the day, 
where they have to sit quietly in the classroom for an hour or two as a form 
of detention. In cases where pupils known as participants of the racist or 
skinhead scene violate rules at schools, they are offered to speak with an 
Exit worker during their ‘detention’. Most of these youths are eager to par-
ticipate in such a conversation because they normally do not have the oppor-
tunity to discuss their life situation and problems with adults. This situation 
also provides the Exit worker with a good opportunity to get to know the 
children or youths in question, and to develop confidential relations with 
them. This may in its turn be a starting point for a process of change for the 
young person. These discussions are also excellent sources of information 
regarding what is going on in the racist youth scene.  
During its first two–three years of operation, the Exit project in Joensuu 
has not succeeded in reaching the older and more established skinheads in 
order to start processes of rehabilitation with them. This is an effort planned 
to be intensified during 2001 and 2002. 
One characteristic of this project is the strong link between youth work 
and research. As mentioned above, researchers initiated the local project, and 
researchers have also been directly involved in the activities of Exit as part 
of an action research project.  
                                                     
78  The combination of these two factors is a common background for the emergence of racist 
youth groups. The cases Joensuu and the Norwegian town Brumunddal were remarkably 
similar in this respect. Cf. Bjørgo (1997:87–93) for a comparative analysis on the co-
occurrence of racist violence, youth unemployment, and increased numbers of asylum-
seekers in the Scandinavian countries. 
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More recently, there has also some been some interest in Switzerland to 
adopt elements from the Exit approach as part of governmental action plans 
against neo-Nazism.79 The public in Switzerland realised in 2000 that it had 
a growing neo-Nazi skinhead scene and that something had to be done about 
it. The Federal Commission against Racism is working actively to set up a 
network of low-level counselling centres throughout the country that eventu-
ally will be linked through a single telephone hot line. This hot line will also 
offer assistance to parents of Nazi skins as well as to active participants in 
the Nazi scene who seriously consider disengaging. 
Some comparative comments and conclusions 
It is important to emphasise that the Exit approach does not intend to offer a 
complete strategy against racism and xenophobia. It should be seen as one 
element within a broader framework. Such a comprehensive strategy should 
provide support to victims of racism; improve awareness towards tendencies 
of xenophobia and intolerance among ‘ordinary people’; influence popular 
attitudes and public policies that legitimise xenophobia; reinforce and imple-
ment legal measures to suppress racism, discrimination and xenophobic vio-
lence and harassment; and address more structural causes of the emergence 
of racism, xenophobia, and violent youth groups. Reducing the size and ac-
tivities of racist groups by stopping recruitment and promoting disengage-
ment from racist groups should nevertheless play an important role within 
such a broader framework of fighting racism and xenophobia. 
Since the first Exit project was initiated in Norway in 1996/97, similar 
projects have been implemented in Sweden, Germany, and Finland by mid-
2001, with several other countries expressing interest in adopting the ap-
proach as well. Although building on past experiences and well-established 
methods as well as some more innovative means, Exit’s main contribution 
has been to put together these elements into more systematic strategies for 
reducing recruitment and reinforcing disengagement from racist youth 
groups. In addition, it has also been instrumental in getting the issue of dis-
engagement from racist groups on the policy agendas in these countries.  
Although closely related in approach and goals, there is some interesting 
diversity among the various Exit projects in these four European countries. 
The first difference is that dissimilar types of organisations implement the 
projects in rather different ways, depending on the primary purpose of the 
organisation. Exit in Norway, Sweden, and Germany (Berlin) are basically 
non-governmental organisations (or parts of larger NGOs), although largely 
funded by the government.80 The local Exit projects in Joensuu (Finland) 
and Kristiansand (Norway), on the other hand, are integrated in inter-agency 
projects at the municipal level. In contrast, the various Aussteigerprogramme 
that were established in Germany during 2001 were run by different govern-
mental agencies at the federal or state level. Obviously, the primary tasks as 
                                                     
79  This paragraph is based on information provided by Michele Galizia of the Swiss Federal 
Commission against Racism during a presentation at the EUMC seminar on ‘Decreasing 
Racial Violence’ in Vienna 2–3 July 2001, and discussions on several other occasions. 
The Swiss action plan puts strong emphasis on victim support and holds a somewhat criti-
cal position towards the Exit approach due to its lack of focus on the victims of racism.  
80  The exception is Exit Deutschland, which is mainly funded by Stern Magazine.  
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institutions vary considerably between e.g. the Office for the Protection of 
the Constitution, the Criminal Police, and the Youth and Social Services. It 
is hardly surprising that this will also influence the character and emphasis 
of the projects these various agencies organise. Thus, when the Criminal Po-
lice of Baden-Württemberg as part of its Ausstiegshilfen Rechtsextremismus 
project is offering selected ex-Nazis a witness protection programme, such 
an element would hardly be included in the toolbox of Exit programmes run 
by NGOs.81 The NGOs hosting Exit projects do also differ between them-
selves in ways that make their imprints on the character of the programmes. 
Thus, the Norwegian organisation Adults for Children is a social policy 
NGO, whereas Exit Deutschland is hosted by Zentrum für Demokratische 
Kultur that runs several anti-racist and pro-democracy initiatives. As a con-
sequence, the latter Exit project has a more explicit anti-racist orientation, 
emphasising ideological conversion somewhat stronger than is the case with 
the Norwegian Exit project (which is of course also anti-racist in its values 
and goals). 
Of greater importance is the impact institutional affiliation will have on 
the willingness of potential quitters to contact the project in question. To 
some (former) activists who for years have considered the security service or 
the police as representing the Enemy,82 it may be easier to contact an NGO. 
Many of those considering disengaging are very concerned not to be consid-
ered as someone betraying former friends. The Verfassungsschutz and the 
criminal police to some extent provide that role by offering witness protec-
tion programs in certain cases. The NGO programmes try to avoid placing 
their clients in such problematic ‘traitor’ roles.83 Several Exit workers have 
emphasised the advantage they have in being considered relatively neutral 
actors who are not part of the government. On the other hand, state agencies 
do of course have several advantages compared with NGOs. Secure funding 
and large resources make operations much easier and sometimes also more 
effective. NGO projects are frequently hampered with having to spend so 
much of their effort on fund-raising. 
The other main difference between the various projects relates to what 
stage in the process of recruitment and disengagement they focus their ef-
forts towards, which their main target groups are, and which methods these 
projects employ as their main tools. As stated earlier, it is possible to reduce 
the size of an extremist group (or change the ‘population balance’) both by 
reducing recruitment and by reinforcing disengagement – although a combi-
nation of the two will obviously give the strongest reduction.  
Several projects (e.g. some of the German state-level projects and to 
some extent also the Swedish and German Exit projects) are primarily based 
on operating a telephone hot line and waiting for persons to call when they 
                                                     
81  However, (preventive) police units have also been heavily involved in the Exit projects in 
Norway and Finland, although as partners rather than as main organisers of the project. 
82  Paradoxically, some neo-Nazis and right-wing extremists also view the police and secur-
ity service with a certain respect and even awe. However, this depends much on the ideo-
logical direction of the group in question – some are anti-state, others are in favour of a 
strong state. 
83  It is worth noting that the German word Aussteiger and the Norwegian/Swedish avhopper 
are morally neutral terms, meaning someone who leaves something or breaks out, whereas 
the English term defector/defecting has a negative connotation of someone who switches 
sides and starts to collaborate with the enemy. Disengagement is a more neutral term in 
English. 
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have more or less decided that they want to quit. Depending on the response 
(some publicity work is obviously needed), this ‘passive approach’ may get 
a rather high success rate, as almost all those calling are motivated to quit 
and succeed to do so.  
The Finnish and Norwegian Exit projects, on the other hand, have fo-
cused their efforts more on prevention and early intervention with the aim of 
reducing recruitment or promoting early disengagement – before they young 
person has become too much entangled into the scene. Unlike Exit in Swe-
den, these two Exit projects have not succeeded in reaching long-term and 
hard-core activists. The Norwegian Exit project has had its main successes in 
early intervention with new recruits and teen-agers who are flirting with the 
Nazi scene, in particular through close collaboration between public agen-
cies and parents. Working with youths who (at least initially) are often not 
motivated to quit is a hard task, and the success rate is not as high as work-
ing with those who take the initiative themselves of asking for help to dis-
engage. In principle, prevention is always preferable to trying to cure the 
‘disease’ at a later stage, and the sooner a new recruit quits the scene, the 
better. On the other hand, many prevention programmes tend to become 
rather general and unfocused, spending resources on youths who never get in 
trouble anyhow. Interventions targeted on those who have started to flirt 
with the scene may be more cost-effective. 
However, several of the projects try to combine active and passive ap-
proaches. Exit in Sweden has visited schools where there are problems with 
racist groups, telling their personal stories about how they got involved with 
neo-Nazism and how they got out of it. These presentations have made great 
impact on many schools and pupils, and established contacts and dialogues 
with a number of young Nazis who later contacted Exit for assistance to quit. 
Another variety of the combined approach is that of the Office for the Pro-
tection of the Constitution, which has had great response on it ‘passive’ hot 
line, but is also actively approaching leading activists in order to persuade 
them to disengage. It is too early to assess whether the latter approach will 
succeed or fail, but the hot line seems to be a clear success. 
In spite of differences in organisation and focus, these programmes do 
share a common goal – decreasing the racist and neo-Nazi scene by reducing 
recruitment and reinforcing disengagement. It is encouraging to observe that 
this approach is spreading to more and more European countries, and that 
results seem to be highly promising – in particular in countries like Sweden 
and Germany where problems with neo-Nazism are most severe. It is almost 
self-evident that reducing recruitment and facilitating disengagement are 
simple and sensible approaches that could and should be adopted by diffe-
rent agencies and organisations with a stake in the struggle against racism 
and violence. It resembles similar prevention and intervention efforts to such 
problems as drugs or alcohol abuse. Different public, private, or religious 
institutions that put their different imprint on the activities also run such pro-
grammes. 
It is now time to establish closer international collaboration between the 
various national Exit and disengagement projects – governmental as well as 
NGOs – to exchange know-how, methods and experiences. Separately, such 
initiatives are likely to succeed in some areas and fail in others. They need to 
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learn from each other – about failures as well as mistakes – to improve and 
be more effective in reducing recruitment and helping people to disengage 
from the far-right scene – thereby changing the population balance of these 
racist groups in ways that will reduce their numbers and undermine the abil-
ity of these groups to spread hatred, intolerance and fear among the popu-
lation. There is also a need for more research on the causes and processes 
that facilitate the emergence of racism and xenophobia in society, as well as 
research and evaluation of successful and unsuccessful attempts to counter 
these negative processes. 

6. Knowledge based Action against 
Racist Violence: The Advisory Service 
for Local Work Against Xenophobic 
Violence  
Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to argue for the importance of diffusing knowl-
edge from both researchers and experienced practitioners on how to handle 
racist or neo-nazi violence to politicians and professionals in communities 
confronted with this kind of problem. Such a transfer of competence and 
knowledge is especially important because this is a very complicated prob-
lem to solve, and because an enormous media attention pushes forward irra-
tional responses. I present a Norwegian model for giving knowledge to 
communities that experience problems with racist or neo-nazi groups – The 
Interdisciplinary Advisory Service for Local Action against Racism and 
Xenophobia. I then go on to specify what kind of knowledge is needed – 
both general knowledge on racism, neo-nazism and violence, but also 
knowledge on how to make a good local diagnosis where one combines gen-
eral knowledge with information of the local situation. I present three ways 
of making a local diagnosis, and specify which questions and issues one 
should collect local information on. In the end some examples are given of 
what kind of concrete measures local actors should bear in mind when trying 
to solve this kind of problem.  
Knowledge based and rational action 
To base action against problems and challenges on knowledge – both scien-
tific and experienced based – is of course not a new or an exceptional mes-
sage. We all live in societies where most professionals learn to base their 
work on different sources of knowledge. Professionals also learn to assess 
and analyse a situation, select the best means for tackling the challenge or 
the problem, then they are engaged in the implementation process, before 
they evaluate the results – through a new assessment and analysis, which in 
turn is put into practice. And so it goes. The key word is rational problem-
solving – which is an important tool in the tool-bag of most professionals.  
In organisational development (Harrison 1987), community-work (Twel-
vetrees 1991), health-preventive community work (Bracht and Kingsbury 
1990), crime prevention (Communities that Care-program) and gang-
intervention (Spergel et al 1994) the same procedure is recommended. I have 
no other alternatives to offer than this model. This is an important profes-
sional tool to solve complex problems in whatever geographical or organisa-
tional unit.  
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When it comes to racist or neo-nazi violence – the conditions for going 
through a rational local problem solving process are not the best. There are 
other forces and rationalities that counter our wish to deal with it in a sensi-
ble way. Local actors – both local politicians and professionals – are often 
confronted by a number of considerations and interests, and what is rational 
in relation to one challenge, can be irrational in relation to another challenge. 
So when local actors seem to act irrationally this does not always mean that 
they are irrational, but that they choose one objective, which is in conflict 
with other objectives. Concerning racist or neo-nazi violence; the media at-
tention which neo-nazi or racist activity or violence gets, might push to the 
front goals that might be in conflict with a rational problem-solving proce-
dure.  
But seemingly irrational action can also have a lot to do with lack of 
knowledge of the problem at hand, which I will return at the end of this pa-
per. 
Media-attention and seemingly irrational responses 
Let us first take the probable consequences of the huge media attention. The 
media coverage will normally stigmatise the affected community, especially 
in countries where racist violence and neo-nazism is not common or wide-
spread.84 To be labelled a nazi-town is of course stigmatising, and the jour-
nalists often explain the nazi-phenomenon with reference to negative com-
munity characteristics. Such a stigma normally will have negative conse-
quences for the town or the city’s ability to attract both new investors and 
the well-educated taxpayers, and for most of the local inhabitants such an 
image will be unpleasant. The political rationality in cases like this will be to 
wash off the stigma. And the most common whitewashing responses will not 
necessarily solve the problem. 
The first is to deny the problem, to say that it is very exaggerated, that it 
is not worse here than in other places, that the event happened by coinci-
dence, or to stress that the involved actors probably came from outside the 
community. To engage in a time consuming rational problem-solving proc-
ess would then be to admit that one has a problem, and is thus irrational from 
this point of view. I am the first to admit that such a belittling strategy in 
some cases might be successful to reduce the racist violence. Some racist 
groups want media attention, and to belittle or deny the problem can reduce 
the media-interest and thereby reduce the extremists’ willingness to show a 
local profile. But I think the opposite danger is even bigger. In the shadow of 
such a belittling strategy – the problem can grow. And what probably will 
have the greatest stigmatising effect on a village, town or city is to have such 
a problem, and not doing anything to get rid of it. Denial can be a very risky 
strategy. 
The opposite reaction when confronted with violent racism and neo-
nazism, and the subsequent media-attention, is panic-action. It will be urgent 
to wash off the moral stigma – as soon as possible – by doing anything that 
can symbolise a willingness to deal with the problem. Such quick action will 
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cism or neo-nazism has been that common that the media does not care any longer. 
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often be based upon the media’s analysis of the situation and the measures 
proposed by the media, which of course can be very superficial. Or – one 
seeks in the tool-bag for tools that can show the general public that one acts 
strong and forcefully. Such measures will often be suppressive and hard, 
symbolising that one is against the evil, and is often advocated by the con-
servative political side. Such measures can under certain circumstances esca-
late the conflict and problem, and they do not deal with the underlying forces 
creating it. But the responses, especially in the context of the welfare state, 
can also be ‘soft’ preventive measures – for example youth club, new leisure 
facilities or a campaign against racism. In the last case the message is rea-
son. ‘It is better to prevent than to repair’ – is the well-known argument from 
the liberal or social-democratic side. The consequences of such quick-
implemented ‘soft’ measures can be that the available resources will be spent 
on useless measures, excluding more effective measures later on. 
There are of course also communities that wish to meet the existence of a 
violent racist group in a more sensible way. Their problem is that violent 
racist or neo-nazi groups are a new phenomenon – for most communities it 
is. The result of inexperience and lack of knowledge can be that one is puz-
zled or paralysed.  
One challenge in dealing with racist or neo-nazi violence on the local 
level is to have good intervening strategies when the problem is small and 
possible to solve, when the local group still has not reached the critical mass, 
which will enable it to grow firmer and more permanent. Then we need a 
strategy that can counter the wish to belittle the problem, to act in panic or to 
be paralysed. 
It should be a state responsibility that actors on a municipal level do not 
fall into one of these pits when confronted with violent and racist youth 
groups.  
A simple measure against a complicated problem 
The Interdisciplinary Advisory Service for Local Action against Racism and 
Xenophobia represents such a strategy. This advisory service consists of (at 
present) 17 researchers and experienced practitioners, including police offi-
cers, social workers, pedagogues, conflict mediators, and others. Together, 
they provide complementary forms of expertise to municipalities and local 
agencies that have to deal with problems they do not locally have experience 
with how to handle. Usually at team of two advisors will assist local agen-
cies in developing an adequate analysis of the problem, and give advise on 
what kinds of action might be effective. One important task is to assist the 
local communities to determine the magnitude and nature of the problem. 
This service is organised by The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration 
and is a service for communities or municipalities with problems in this 
field. The Directorate also pays the first consultation, normally from one day 
to one weeks work. On some occasions both the Directorate of Immigration 
and the Ministry for Children and Families have financed more long-lasting 
and comprehensive interventions. During the last five years almost all vil-
lages, towns and cities having experienced this kind of problem have been 
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offered such knowledge-assistance in Norway, and most of them have used 
the service.85 
It is also important to state that violent racist or neo-nazi youth groups 
have not been a major problem in Norway, so that the places having received 
this kind of assistance is no more than roughly 20–25 in five years. In the 
smaller European countries, or where racist or neo-nazi violence is limited, 
one does not need many members in such a consultation network. Less than 
ten people would do. In the greater European states, or where this problem 
has taken bigger and more serious proportions, one will probably need more 
– and perhaps also on a full-time basis. Such a service can be organised 
along different lines. What is important is that communities in trouble should 
have quick and easy access to relevant knowledge.  
Quick assistance to avoid ‘silly’ action 
A major objective for the Advisory Service is to give quick assistance after 
violent episodes – to prevent the aforementioned dysfunctional responses – 
sometimes even within a week or two. Municipal governments using the 
service shortly after a media-focused violent incidence can of course present 
the use of the service as being in accordance with important political values. 
The message to the general public that: ‘we will immediately use the nations 
leading expertise on the issue’, will symbolise both vigour and rationality. If 
one can couple the intervening strategy with other important political ob-
jects, the strategy will have a greater chance to succeed. Such a quick assis-
tance does not mean that one has to act immediately after a short consulta-
tion. It is a way of putting the local authorities on a track where they will use 
a more rational problem-solving process that leads them outside the afore-
mentioned pitfalls. The problem-solving process itself can take both weeks 
and months and the implementation process might take years.  
Such a service can of course also be offered to villages, towns or cities 
with a more chronic problem with racist or neo-nazi group activity and vio-
lence. But here a quick consultation will probably not do. What is needed is 
a more thorough way of addressing the problem.  
What kind of knowledge and assistance? 
We think that successful intervention will rest on three different sources of 
knowledge. The first is what we can call phenomenon-knowledge. This con-
tains general knowledge on what cause racist or neo-nazi violence? Why do 
young people join violent racist groups? Why do they wish to stay in such 
groups, and what causes people to leave? What do we know about efficient 
strategies and means to prevent young people from joining such groups, and 
                                                     
85  Some of the municipalities have asked for assistance themselves. In other instances the 
regional offices of the Directorate of Immigration have discovered municipalities having 
problems with racist groups (through their contacts with local refugee workers or the 
readings of local newspapers) – and they have thereby offered the municipality such assis-
tance. We know of two municipalities that first were reluctant having this kind of as-
sistance, but this reluctance had to do with old conflicts between the directorate and the 
municipalities. Since the advisors from the service did not represent the directorate – but 
only the institution were they normally are employed, it was fairly easy to get the confi-
dence of these municipalities.  
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what will probably dissolve such groups. What works and what probably 
will not work? Such ‘phenomenon-knowledge’ also includes definitions of 
the concepts of immediate importance – such as racism, neo-nazism – to 
avoid misunderstandings. And it includes an experience in assessing such 
problems to determine the magnitude and nature of it. 
In some municipalities they might have such knowledge, but our experi-
ence from Norway is that most professionals have restricted competence on 
this issue. And even if some professionals should have such competence it 
can often be difficult to get recognition for it by other professionals and poli-
ticians in the local municipality. It depends very much on your position in 
the local authority system. Young and well-informed professionals below in 
the hierarchy are often not properly listened to. So in most municipalities 
with violent racist groups or violent activity they will probably find such 
phenomenon-knowledge-assistance useful. 
The other source in a rational problem-solving process is local informa-
tion. That is knowledge on what happens in the community, who the perpe-
trators are, how many they are, what kind of structure do they have and so 
on. Who are the victims? When and where do violent acts happen? What 
have been done in previous years in the community to prevent or combat 
such groups? What seemed to work in the local context and what did not? 
The answer to such and other questions presupposes knowledge on the local 
situation – which the local actors normally will possess. Each single local 
actor will not have satisfactory information of the local situation, but if we 
put together bits and pieces of relevant information that different local actors 
might have, it should be possible to make a more comprehensive local pic-
ture and diagnosis. This is of course very crucial information in a rational 
problem solving-process. It is the coupling of this local knowledge with the 
knowledge of the phenomenon – that can lead us to strategies and measures 
that will have a chance to work effectively on a community level. 
But this coupling of local information and general knowledge of the ac-
tual problem can be difficult. One need additional knowledge and experience 
on how to run the process from a diagnosing of the local situation to making 
an action plan. This is what we can call process-knowledge. Some munici-
palities themselves, have experienced professionals or leaders to in run a 
problem-solving process, others do not. And those who do not, should get it. 
The Advisory Service in Norway also offers advisors with such process-
knowledge, who cooperate with advisors with phenomenon knowledge. A 
two-person team where one possesses the ‘phenomenon skills’ and the other 
the ‘process skills’ should be a good combination.  
Making a local diagnosis and analysis 
One critical element in the problem-solving process is making a proper local 
diagnosis. Before the different agencies and organisations can act in mean-
ingful and effective ways, the local problem must be recognised and under-
stood, and preferably, the agencies involved should try to reach a common 
understanding. From our experience in Norway, we have seen that the causes 
for the emergence of such gangs, and the ways these problems manifest 
themselves, may be very different in different communities. It is therefore 
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important in each community to describe the magnitude and seriousness of 
the problem, and also to try to identify both the manifest and the underlying 
factors that have caused the problem. Those agencies that have some kind of 
responsibility to do something with the problem, should take part in the 
process of describing and analysing, as well as proposing solutions.  
One obstacle to inter-agency collaboration is that police officers, teach-
ers, youth workers and e.g. victimised minority groups tend to have highly 
different understandings of the problem, and divergent approaches to what 
should be done with it. However, these differences may be turned into an 
advantage rather than a problem. Different perspectives provide different 
insights and possibilities for intervention. Racist violence is a multi-caused 
problem, and should therefore be addressed from different angles.  
Depending of the model of mapping, participants in this process should 
include the police, relevant departments in the municipality, school, volun-
tary organisations, and representatives from the youth population. In special 
cases it might be possible to bring in representatives from victimised groups, 
and even from youth close to the groups involved in conflicts as well.  
One challenge when making the local diagnosis is that the municipality, 
local schools and the police, are hierarchical organisations with long chan-
nels of information. There are many information filters between the street 
level workers who in detail know some sides of the problem – to the admin-
istrative leaders and politicians who make important decisions on behalf of 
the system. In bureaucratic systems there will always be a danger that impor-
tant information will disappear in the information-filters or that such infor-
mation is distorted. This might in turn lead to the wrong diagnosis and the 
wrong responses to the challenge. One important role of the process consult-
ant is therefore to secure that relevant information on the issue comes 
through these filters. This can be done in insisting on who should participate 
in making the local diagnosis. And if one uses the diagnosis or mapping 
seminar presented below, this can be done in actively addressing those who 
normally will have first hand knowledge of the problem.  
In Norway we have seen three different models for diagnosing, analysing 
and assessing the local problem. 
A diagnosis seminar (one or preferably two days) with 20–50 partici-
pants, representing different agencies and perspectives, including some local 
politicians. The seminar goes systematically through a lot of questions con-
cerning the magnitude, nature and the causes of the problem. It is useful to 
bring in a process consultant who is experienced in running such processes 
together with an expert with the relevant phenomenon knowledge. This is a 
quick method, but may be ‘good enough’ to provide a basis for action – es-
pecially when the problem still seems fairly modest. Such a mapping semi-
nar can end up with some propositions on concrete preventive and interven-
tion measures, which seems logical from the local analysis. Or – it can end 
up proposing a further process that should result in a concrete action plan 
built on this diagnosis. One of the strengths of this diagnosis-seminar is that 
its collective nature creates optimism and motivation, and that it commits the 
actors to act – in front of the rest of the participants. Besides it is fairly cheap 
and not very time-consuming. The weakness is that it might be superficial, 
and that it can be dominated by some of the participants. To collect the rele-
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vant information the process consultant should in a gentle way try to curb 
those who normally talk a lot (often powerful people with only second hand 
information), who tend to ‘steal the show’ and thereby tend to curb the other 
participants. The police sometimes present a dramatic picture which may 
overwhelm the other informants and which may lead them to think that their 
information is of little interest which in turn results in a withholding of valu-
able information.86 A simple advice for such a diagnosis meeting with par-
ticipants from different agencies and positions is on each issue or question to 
address the representatives for the youth population first, then the other 
agencies and the police in the end. One way of counteracting the shallowness 
of the method is to suggest deeper follow-up investigations on those aspects 
of the problem that was not satisfactory covered by the diagnosis-seminar.  
An inter-agency working group with knowledgeable representatives (5–
12 persons) from relevant agencies, working together to collect information, 
analyse, and produce a report or action plan. This method resembles re-
search, but is done by professionals from the local administrations and/or 
local police authorities. I guess that in most countries within EU you will 
find professionals on the local level trained in research methods. The advan-
tage using such a local working group is that the participants already know a 
lot of what is happening. They know violent incidents, the local groups, 
leadership structure and so on. They often know the involved actors and 
have their confidence – which will easily give access to further information. 
Such a diagnosis can be much deeper than the diagnosis done in a one or 
two-day diagnosis-seminar. One disadvantage is that the local professionals 
often do not have the capacity to do a proper diagnosis – because they are so 
bound by their ordinary tasks. The whole process may be time-consuming 
too, and when the diagnosis is ready the problem might have grown or 
changed. 
Both these methods, which rely on the analysis done by the local actors, 
have another disadvantage: The local actors might have ‘gone native’. They 
are standing so near the local situation that they have problems understand-
ing what is going on. Through their earlier involvement in the local proc-
esses they might have been predisposed or biased. One objective for offering 
the assistance of an external expert with phenomenon knowledge in both 
kind of diagnosis is to broaden up the analytical perspective and reduce the 
danger of a ‘gone native perspective’. The probably best way to reduce this 
superficiality and shallowness is to launch …… 
A research project by external researchers with expertise in the field, 
providing description and analysis of the problem from a different perspec-
tive than the local agencies, but is incorporating their knowledge. This is 
now being done in Kristiansand (Bjorgo, Carlsson and Haaland, report in 
autumn 2001). Such research may provide solid basis for action, but is ex-
pensive and time-consuming. Another research role is action research where 
the researcher continuously collects and analyses data and feed it back to 
                                                     
86  We have not experienced this everywhere we have participated as advisors. In some in-
stances the police have been very careful in sharing their information to others. But in 
other instances the police has presented a picture that has been very dramatic and over-
whelming. This is partly due to the fact that the police are involved in the most dramatic 
situation, that they have access to a lot of information channels that ordinary people do 
not have, but also to the fact that some police officers have a tendency to dramatise.  
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those actors responsible for action. Such a research role where tried out in 
Brumunddal in the mid 1990’ties (Carlsson 1995) and will be carried out in 
Kristiansand from now and until April 2004. 
Some key questions for the local diagnosis 
In the following, I will give an overview of questions that are important to 
answer before considering interventions or developing an action plan. This is 
not a complete list – the local situation should determine which questions are 
relevant to ask.  
 
1. What are the characteristics of events and actions? 
What kinds of actions are considered problematic in the local commu-
nity? Are there acts of violence? What kinds of violence? Threats? Vandal-
ism? Other forms of insults or harassment? How many such incidents are 
known to have taken place? Who are targeted? What are the consequences to 
the victims? How do these misdeeds affect other people than the immediate 
victims – those that are not directly hit but might feel vulnerable to similar 
attacks? Do they restrict their normal activities or their freedom of expres-
sion due to a perceived threat? 
 
2. Relations between perpetrator(s) and victim(s). Motivations? 
Before we categorise incidents of violence, vandalism or harassment involv-
ing immigrants or minority groups as expressions of racism or xenophobia, 
we should consider whether this is actually a probable motivation. Are the 
same persons repeatedly targeted by violence, threats or vandalism every 
time, or do such incident happen randomly? Are there other more likely is-
sues or circumstances that might throw light on the incident? 
 
3. Where and when do incidents take place? 
Do they happen at particular times (e.g. Friday and Saturday nights, or just 
after school)? Where do these incidents take place? At a public place 
(streets, shopping malls etc.) or near or at the home of the victim(s)? Or on 
the phone in the form of threats? Such ‘when and where’ questions are im-
portant when planning situational preventive action and protective measures 
in relation to potential victims. If you want to increase police patrolling or 
reinforce the presence of teachers in the schoolyards, what you do should be 
determined by the answers.  
 
4. Characteristics of scenes / gangs / organisations?  
What do we know about those perpetrating acts of xenophobic violence or 
other crimes? How many are they? Is it a ‘lone wolf’ or several persons act-
ing together? Are they part of a group of friends, a gang, a subculture, a po-
litical pressure group, or a political party? How ideologically conscious are 
participant is the group? What characterise their ideology? Do they have a 
specific dress code, style or uniform? What does it look like? Do they use 
specific symbols? Are they armed, or do they have access to weapons? If so, 
what kinds of weapons? Does their group have a form of membership? Does 
the group have distinct leaders or a core of activists? How many belong to 
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the core? How many belong to the outer circle? How many can be mobilised 
in case of conflict or crisis?  
 
5. Group dynamics.  Motives for joining and leaving the group? 
How are new individuals recruited into the group? At what age? What at-
tracts them into the scene? Do they agree with the political views of the 
group? Easy access to alcohol? Excitement? Action? Weapons and uni-
forms? Does the group offer protection against perceived threats (e.g. bul-
lies, gangs or other youth groups)? Does the group offer social community, 
acceptance and friendship? Are there sanctions against members leaving the 
group? What kinds? These questions are important to address in order to de-
velop measures to prevent youths from joining, and to help members to dis-
engage, and if necessary offer protection to those who want to leave but do 
not dare to do so.  
 
6. Characteristics of actors / participants 
What types of youths are represented in the racist or xenophobic group in 
question? Helmut Willems (1993: 200–207; 1995:168–174, see also Bjørgo 
1997: 48–51) describes four main types: a) The ideologically motivated 
right-wing extremist; b) the xenophobe or ethnocentrist; c) the criminal and 
marginalized youth; and d) the fellow-traveller (Mitlaufer). Sometimes 
groups may consist of different mixtures of such groups.  
Are there any ideologically motivated leaders among them? What charac-
terise them (age, education, work, etc.)? How do they carry out their role as 
agitators or instigators? Do they take part in violence themselves? Do they 
instigate others to carry out acts of violence? Or do they represent forces of 
moderation?  
Are there youths in the group that are xenophobic without having a con-
scious ideology? What is their age, education, and connection with the la-
bour market? What kinds of action do they carry out?  
Are there criminal and marginalized youths in the group? Age, education, 
connection with labour market, and criminal records? What kind of acts do 
they carry out? How many of these youths have a particularly problematic 
family background, and are in need of special assistance and intervention? 
Do any of them have handicaps like ADHD or dyslexia, in need of special 
treatment? Are they followed up by relevant agencies for these problems? 
How many in the group fit the profile of ‘followers’? Age, education, ties to 
labour market, family, friends… Are the just passive members of the group, 
or do they actively carry out violence to be accepted into the group? Do any 
of these have particular psychosocial problems that hinder their acceptance 
into more positive youth milieus? 
 
7. Local connections and external links 
Do we know where the ‘hard core’ and the followers live? Do they live in 
the local community where the negative incidents have taken place, or do 
they come from other communities? What links do the persons and groups in 
question have with other extremist or criminal groups in other parts of the 
country or internationally? What kind of relations? What is exchanged be-
tween these groups? Ideology, cultural expressions (e.g. music), weapons, 
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actors willing to perform serious crimes or take part in actions and manifes-
tations of strength?  
 
8. Relations with rival groups / gangs 
Are there any opposing or rival groups or gangs present in the community or 
coming in from outside (e.g. militant antiracists or minority youth gangs)? 
What roles do these rival groups play, and what methods do they use? Do 
they rely on acceptable political means, or do they use violence? Does this 
opposing milieu contribute to prevent or slow down the development of rac-
ist or rightwing groups in the community, or do they rather ‘carry wood to 
the fire’? 
 
9. Responses from the local community and the social surroundings 
How has the local population – other youths, adults, parents, labour unions, 
the business community, voluntary organisations, the local media, etc. – re-
sponded to the problematic acts carried out by the groups in question? By 
support, passive acceptance, indifference, or disgust? Do violent offenders, 
gang members or extremist activists receive support that is important to them 
(e.g. legitimacy, money, weapons, a club house or other place to come to-
gether, etc.)? Or were the responses from the environment so strong and 
negative that the extremist group might have encapsulated themselves even 
more in a negative identity? 
 
10. Responses from public agencies – municipality and the police 
How has the extremist / violent group in the community been handled by the 
authorities in the past? Has this been recognised as a problem at an earlier 
stage, or have the authorities become aware of the problems only recently? 
Was there an attempt to ‘play down’ the problem in order to avoid giving the 
group too much publicity? Or was the problem belittled to avoid stigmatisa-
tion of the community? Or have there been over-reactions and ‘moral 
panic’? Have there been any specific interventions? What were the effects of 
interventions – or lack of intervention? Negative consequences? Positive 
consequences? Is it likely that local agencies have treated immigrant and 
minority groups in ways that might have contributed to foster frustration, 
jealousy, or aggression among marginalized local youths, e.g. by offering 
real or imagined) advantages to specific minorities. Or have local agencies 
treated minorities in such negative ways that local youths might have felt 
that they might also act negatively against unpopular minorities – with im-
punity? 
 
11. Structural characteristics with the community that might influence what 
is happening 
Does the structure of the local labour market and the level of education in 
the population create marginalisation and exclusion of significant parts of 
the youth population? Is there a mismatch between the types of qualifica-
tions among young people, and the demands of the local labour market? Are 
there strong divisions among the local population based on class and/or cul-
tural differences? How are these differences expressed? Are there in the lo-
cal community groups that are socially excluded? Are there any local tradi-
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tions of how ‘strangers’ coming to the community has been received – with 
openness and positive curiosity, or with suspicion and hostility? Is fighting 
and violence against foreigners (whether they have a different skin colour, or 
coming from the neighbouring village) been a common phenomenon, or 
rather exceptional? 
 
12. The situation of the victims  
To what extent have the same persons or groups been targeted for violence, 
threats or harassment time after time? If so, what can explain that that these 
people are targeted? What have the police done to protect these individuals 
or groups against repeat victimisation? Is there a need for physical security 
measures, increased police patrolling, or help from neighbours? What is 
done to help victims to handle their mental traumas caused by such experi-
ences? Who are in charge of following up victims of violence, and attend 
their needs? 
What to do? 
The whole idea of doing such a local mapping and analysis is to improve the 
accuracy of interventions by focussing where they are most likely to have an 
effect. That will reduce the risk of wasting resources for prevention and in-
tervention. Some examples: We have seen in some communities that a good 
medicine against racist and criminal youth groups is to provide employment 
to these young people. However, success cannot necessarily be transferred to 
another community – it is only useful if the relevant youths there are actually 
unemployed! Campaigns to change attitudes towards racism and violence 
among the pupils in a secondary school may miss the target if recruitment to 
racist groups mainly takes place among younger pupils, or among youths 
who have dropped out of school. Campaigns to educate young people about 
Nazism and the Holocaust may also miss the point if the main reason for 
young people joining a xenophobic youth gang is that they have been beaten 
up by immigrant gangs and seek protection. It is also necessary with quite 
other forms of prevention and intervention if the local Nazi scene consists of 
100 youths rather than if only three-four activists are involved.  
Logical and effective action will not only follow from a good diagnosis. 
Our experience is that local actors also will need broad information of what 
can be done under certain circumstances. In Norway and probably in the 
other Nordic countries as well, both professionals and politicians have long 
traditions of thinking of long-term social prevention, which is of course an 
attitude we appreciate. Local professionals and politicians are unfortunately 
not used to think of situational preventive measures in the same way, and 
should be informed of the applicability of such measures against racist vio-
lence. Situational preventive measures are directed to what trigger off an 
illegal act. The intention is to make it more difficult to carry out the illegal 
act, to increase the possibilities that the perpetrators will be discovered by 
increased formal or informal control, and to reduce the rewards from the act 
(including social rewards). The results from such measures will probably be 
that the actor will abstain from carry out the act.  
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Situational prevention have been strongly criticised for not attacking the 
causes of criminal behaviour and that such measures are only suitable to pro-
tect property crime. The advocates for situational prevention will probably 
reply that situational prevention is especially important to prevent repeated 
victimisation. One often cannot wait until the social prevention strategies 
will have the desired effect – often after many years. And we know that 
refugees or immigrants that have been harassed and injured once often will 
be victims twice or more. It is therefore of great important for the local ac-
tors to have some ideas of what situational measures they can use to prevent 
repeated victimisation. Such situational measures might be informal 
neighbourhood protection of refugees, but also the use of personal alarms, 
cameras or the use of automatic strong light when intruders approach a refu-
gee dwelling which earlier has been exposed to attacks from racist or neo-
Nazi groups. A strong local manifestation against racism and racist violence 
can also be important to show the perpetrators that they do not have local 
support, and to show the refugees that they have. In villages, towns or cities 
where local racist or neo-Nazi groups have occupied their own territory, 
such a territory can be won back through organised action from ordinary 
citizens taking the territory in use – often assisted by police action. The po-
lice, the municipal welfare bureaucracy and the civil society play an impor-
tant role in putting into effect situational preventive measures.  
A very important piece of advice to the municipal administrations is that 
they must not forget helping the victims for violence and intimidation. 
Within the Nordic welfare bureaucracy the focus have too much been put on 
the perpetrators, and the victims have in many cases nearly been forgotten. 
The local politicians and professionals should be reminded over and over 
again to give support to the victims of violence and terror – both medical, 
psychological, social and political support.  
Conclusion 
We think that this transference of knowledge from experienced researchers 
or practitioners to the local communities is an important part of a strategy to 
handle racist or neo-nazi violence in a rational way. In Norway we have cre-
ated a very simple institutional structure. The Advisory service which is a list 
of competent people that have obliged themselves to give affected communi-
ties quick assistance, and where the first two to three days of consultation is 
paid for by the Directorate of Immigration. Such a unit can of course be or-
ganised in different ways. What matters is that the local professionals and 
politicians have easy access to both ‘phenomenon knowledge’ and ‘process 
knowledge’ so that they can deal with this complicated issue in a sensible 
way. This should be easy to organise, it is not expensive and the cost-
effectiveness of such a measure should be very satisfactory – especially 
when considered what values that are at stake. 
A condition for such a strategy of diffusing competence is that the nation 
has researchers and competent practitioners on the issue. The next condition 
is that they are willing to go into such work. It can especially be difficult to 
find researchers willing to go into such advisory work because it does pay 
off academically. Researchers should have a moral obligation to do so!  
7. Preventive Police Work in Practice: 
The Empowerment Conversation 
A preventive police officer being one of the co-founders of the Exit project, 
Bjørn Øvrum, has developed another powerful method of early intervention 
with children involved with racist groups or other delinquent behaviour. 
‘The Empowerment Conversation’ can be applied when e.g. a police officer, 
a teacher, or a youth worker detects that a child or youth is involved in ac-
tivities that give reason to worry. The professional will then summon the 
young person together with the parents for a voluntary conversation, and will 
present the symptom that gave rise to that worry. This could be theft, drug 
use, tagging, or participation in a racist group or another type of gang. Child 
and parents will also be informed about the likely consequences of this be-
haviour if it continues. The purpose of the conversation is not to punish but 
to create the basis for reorientation and change in behaviour of the child or 
youth, as well as mobilising the parents’ own engagement and resources. 
The professional asks for the parents’ consent to share information with 
other relevant agencies to help the child through coordinated efforts. This 
helps to get around obstacles to collaboration often caused by the strict rules 
of confidentiality practiced by social agencies. The conversation session 
should be seen as the starting point in a process of reorientation where other 
agencies (school, social workers, etc.) will also get involved in the next 
stages. 
The conversation is based on a structured procedure where the professio-
nal, the parents and the child together discuss the behaviour that gave rise to 
the meeting, and what they believe is explaining that behaviour. If, for in-
stance, the young person is participating in a violent or extremist group, the 
youth is asked what he or she believes is causing him/her to get involved 
with such a scene. The youth will be presented with a set of alternatives (cf. 
figure): is it for example a need for protection, thrill seeking, friendship, or 
status? For each type of cause there is a card suggesting possible correspond-
ing options to be discussed with parents and child. If, for example, the prob-
able cause of the problematic behaviour was thrill seeking, they can discuss 
what kinds of legal and socially acceptable alternatives could be available, 
and how the young person can realise his or her wishes for an exciting lei-
sure time. Together with the youth and the parents, the professional try to 
look forward, focusing on solutions in order to stimulate a process of reori-
entation and alteration of behaviour.  
Although the Empowerment Conversation model was originally devel-
oped during preventive police work with racist youth groups, it can be ap-
plied for many types of youth delinquency problems. The Norwegian police 
have recommended it for more general use. Youth workers, teachers, and 
other professionals are also being trained to apply it. Results so far are very 
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promising. However, it probably makes a particularly strong impact when it 
is the police that call in parents and child for a conversation. 
These two methods have been effective as early interventions with young 
teenagers who have got involved with racist youth groups. In several cases, 
recruitment to racist youth groups has been reduced to almost zero. Using 
these methods, local police, youth workers and other agencies are now 
equipped to act promptly once they notice that young people flirt with such 
groups.87 We believe that such early intervention is one of the main reasons 
why the neo-Nazi scene in Norway remains relatively small, young, and 
characterised by short careers and few ‘veterans’. 
 
                                                     
87  In a local Exit project in the city Kristiansand, an inter-agency task force consisting of 
police officers, youth workers, social workers, teachers, and the Exit worker together used 
this approach in their work with 38 youths involved with the local racist scene during the 
period from 1996. By mid-2001, six of these individuals were still active in the Nazi 
scene, three were dead (by accidents or drug overdose), but the remaining 29 are living 
relatively normal lives. By the end of 2001, the project had worked with 60 youths, and 
49 had left the racist scene. 
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Although the Empowerment Conversation model was originally developed 
during preventive police work with racist youth groups, it can be applied for 
many types of youth delinquency problems. The Norwegian police have rec-
ommended it for more general use. Youth workers, teachers, and other pro-
fessionals are also being trained to apply it. Results so far are very promis-
ing. However, it probably makes a particularly strong impact when it is the 
police that call in parents and child for a conversation. 
 These two methods have been effective as early interventions with 
young teenagers who have got involved with racist youth groups. In several 
cases, recruitment to racist youth groups has been reduced to almost zero. 
Using these methods, local police, youth workers and other agencies are now 
equipped to act promptly once they notice that young people flirt with such 
groups.88 We believe that such early intervention is one of the main reasons 
why the neo-Nazi scene in Norway remains relatively small, young, and 
characterised by short careers and few ‘veterans’. 
 
 
 
                                                     
88  In a local Exit project in the city Kristiansand, an inter-agency task force consisting of 
police officers, youth workers, social workers, teachers, and the Exit worker together used 
this approach in their work with 38 youths involved with the local racist scene during the 
period from 1996. By mid-2001, six of these individuals were still active in the Nazi sce-
ne, three were dead (by accidents or drug overdose), but the remaining 29 are living rela-
tively normal lives. By the end of 2001, the project had worked with 60 youths, and 49 
had left the racist scene. 

8. Violent Youth Groups: Strategies 
for Prevention and Intervention within 
the Scandinavian Welfare State 
The question of violent groups, gangs or ‘bands’ is an extremely complex 
one. There are big controversies over the definition of such ‘structures’. 
What is a gang or ‘bande’ in relation to a violent group, sub-culture, network 
or organised crime? We can discuss this – not only for hours, for weeks, and 
we would probably not reach a common understanding of the word. The 
controversies over the gang-concept do not make the definition of gang-
prevention any easier. Should ‘gang-prevention’ include all kinds of preven-
tive efforts that are aimed at reducing delinquency in general? Should it also 
include social policies on both national and local level to prevent poverty, 
unemployment and social marginalisation – which of course is important 
forces leading to delinquency? Should it cover both national and local poli-
cies to integrate new immigrant into the society –since many of the ‘gang-
members’ obviously belong to immigrant groups living at the margins of the 
society? Should it include measures to prevent or ameliorate family-
problems, child neglect or lack of parental control over their children? 
Should it include strategies to cope with individual problems – ranging from 
the treatment of ADHD to learning problems? We could have continued to 
ask about the use of treatment in institutions, the use of prisons and so on 
and so on. 
Or should ‘gang-prevention’ be confined to deal with just those factors 
that make young people forming a special structure – a gang structure –from 
which they commit criminal acts?  
In most or nearly all cases – we believe – gang-prevention cannot be 
separated from the wide body of strategies to prevent violence and delin-
quency in general on the macro, messo and micro-level. We agree with 
James Howell in an overview article on gang-prevention stating that…  
 
Because separate causal pathways to gang participation versus non-gang serious 
and violent offending have not been identified, programs found to be effective or 
promising for preventing and reducing serious and violent delinquency in gen-
eral may hold promise in combating gang delinquency and violence. (Howell 
1998:302). 
 
Crime-prevention is a superior concept covering gang-preventive strategies 
and measures. But within the wide body of crime-preventive strategies – 
there may be some measures that will be more useful in preventing the for-
mation of gangs or violent youth groups, to reduce the entry of youth into 
existing gangs and to support exit from gangs. Intervention is more concur-
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rent with tertiary prevention, and includes measures directed towards exist-
ing gangs and their participants.  
Our point of departure is therefore that:  
 
What prevent delinquency in general also prevent the formation of crimi-
nal youth gangs, but within the great body of prevention and intervention 
strategies, programs and measures, there may be some that might be par-
ticularly useful in preventing gang-formation and promote gang-
dissolution.  
The connection between concept and action 
Before we turn to the local strategies and policies – we must make a com-
ment on the gang concept used in Norway and Sweden and the ‘bande’-
concept used in Denmark. What you call and define a problem will of course 
influence which actions you take.  
There are two pit-falls in the local response-process – one is denial, the 
other is moral panic (Curry and Decker 1998, Bjorgo and Carlsson 1999).  
A real problem can of course be denied because lack of information and 
knowledge about what is going on in the dark corners of the community. It 
can also be denied because of lack of concepts to grasp a local phenomenon. 
Sometimes the problem is both apparent and the local actors have concepts 
to grasp it, but the problem is denied because one does not wish to stigmatise 
a specific geographic or ethnic community, or a specific youth group. To 
intervene would mean an official recognition of the problem. By denying an 
apparent problem one can hope that the problem will disappear by itself. In 
some cases this may be a successful strategy because a violent group or even 
gang after a while often fall apart by itself. The risk of denying is that a gang 
can develop their violence, and strengthen their gang-structure, to extreme 
levels before it is officially recognised. The only strategy left when the prob-
lem is officially recognised, will then often be hard and suppressive police 
measures.  
The opposite pit-fall is moral panic. Using the label gang or bande to em-
phasise a gang-response, when gangs do not constitute a problem, might lead 
to such a panic. If such labelling is followed up by increased surveillance, 
police patrolling, and incarceration, this may increase the group solidarity 
and cohesion and virtually make the group into a gang. And if the gang or 
bande is named and presented in the media, this can make the participants 
important, give them prestige and honour, and in this way meet one impor-
tant need which the youth cannot satisfy on legitimate arenas. It gives them 
an identity as ‘someone’. This is the essence of labelling theory.  
The response heavily depends on the concepts being used. And we 
strongly believe that the concepts used have different meanings – especially 
in Norway and Danmark. 
The Norwegian and Danish share the same written language – to 99 per-
cent. One important difference is the word gang, which is used in Norway, 
and bande, which is used in Denmark.  
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I will assert that the Norwegian word gang can give associations leading 
to a belittling or denial of the problem. The Danish word ‘bande’ can push in 
the moral-panic direction. 
The Norwegian Gang-concept 
This concept can give two different associations. For some – especially for 
well-educated police officers, youth workers or field workers having read 
criminology – the word gang calls forth the picture of the well-organised 
American gang, often with hundreds of members, and which have existed for 
decades. The concept has been so strict that they have not grasped what in-
deed have been gangs. The result is denial of gangs. 
In its everyday Norwegian use, gang is synonymous with group. The 
word gang has gone into the ordinary Norwegian vocabulary as a cohesive 
group. We often say – we are a gang of friends meeting once a month and 
drink some beers. The Norwegian prime minister Bondevik two years ago 
referred to his cabinet as ‘a nice gang’. Sometimes people talk of criminal 
gangs – but then synonymous with petty criminal groups. Even if one de-
fines gangs –as a group engaged in criminal activity, where such activity is 
accepted and encouraged, having a common identity (name, symbols), hav-
ing been in operation for at least half a year or so – (which we think is a 
reasonable definition) this sounds familiar to many Norwegians: ‘Oh yeah, 
we have had gangs here for more than fifty years. In the 1960’ies they often 
met on the icy river fighting each other. But that is not a big problem. Boys 
are just like this’ – a lot of people would say. The word gang gives associa-
tions that may lead to deny or belittle a serious gang problem. 
The Danish bande-concept 
In Denmark the situation is different. As far as we understand the word 
‘gade-bande’ is a fearly new word in Denmark – introduced by the police 
some years ago. The Rikspolitisjef in Denmark have defined ‘gade-
bande’/street-gang as ‘a group of children and youth who in the streets 
commits crime or other kinds of troublesome or aggressive behaviour, and 
who by the surroundings and themselves are considered as a group’. This is 
a definition that emphasise criminal acts and aggressive behaviour, and that 
they are a group, but it does not include the duration-criterion. The duration 
criterion is important in American gang research (Klein 2001: 249), and the 
duration is often followed by a more fixed structure. Rikspolitisjefens defini-
tion includes most violent youth groups, both permanent and transitory in the 
gang concept.  
In many respect this may be a useful definition – but it is no gang defini-
tion. The problem with some words is that they are immune against official 
definitions. Gadebande is not only a groups of wild youth that are loose in 
the streets, the concept is also ‘ loose in the streets’ and it gives practitioners 
in the municipalities, the local politicians and the general public a lot of as-
sociations, images and sentiments. The problem with the bande-concept in 
Denmark is that it gives associations to organised and planned crime, while 
the defined concept (by the Rikspolitisjef) is widely used on groups not hav-
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ing such characteristics. The Danish prime minister would not label his cabi-
net as a bande (may be his opponents would). Using this label on petty-
criminal groups, on ad-hoc-groups who have been engaged in a fight, or on a 
group of adolescents making problem on the last night-bus or train – there is 
a considerable risk to make them more serious, organised and evil than they 
really are. This may in turn lead to action that may be counterproductive. 
And the labelling may virtually make them into a gang – especially if this 
labelling is followed up by heavy media-coverage and public stigmatisation.  
I will not deny that ‘gade bande’ – when used synonymous to the Ameri-
can gang concept – in some cases in Copenhagen and may be in Odense will 
be a useful concept, as will be the case in Oslo. But we doubt that this will 
be the case in many of the other middle-size Danish towns.  
There is of course a chance that this concept in its everyday use over the 
years will be inflated, and will have the same meaning as the Norwegian 
word gang. But up till now, the use of the concept probably have pushed in 
the moral panic direction. we have of course registered how important the 
issue of ‘gadebander’ has been on the national political agenda in Denmark. 
It has been a major issue in the last election campaign in Denmark. A couple 
of years ago (2000) it was a major issue in the prime-ministers (Nyrup-
Rasmussen) speech to the Danish national assembly when he presented the 
governments program and the state-budget for the next year (the presentation 
of ‘finansloven’). In Norway and Sweden this speech will solely be a presen-
tation of the economic policy, the care for the elderly, health service, im-
provements in schools and so on. In Denmark the issue of street-gangs has 
been pushed to the top of the political agenda for a long period of time.  
I guess that this focus may contribute to xenophobia, it stigmatises whole 
categories of youth with an immigrant background and contributes to social 
exclusion – strengthening the forces that give rise to gangs. The moral panic 
may make this into a huge and nearly insoluble problem. Since this problem 
has attained such a prominent position on the political agenda, it is reason-
able to expect that the preventive strategies to a large degree will be political 
decided – and not that much based on the judgement from experienced re-
searchers and practitioners on neither the state nor local level.  
I hereby stop the whipping of the Danish use of the label Gadebande, and 
the current political climate here. This is because there are many reasons to 
be worried concerning the use of youth violence committed in a group or a 
network context. There are of course serious problems with violent youth 
groups on Nørrebro, Ishøj, Høje Tåstrup and Vollsmose, and probably in the 
medium sized towns in Denmark as Haderslev and Randers. Such problems 
must and should be managed one way or another, and this must mainly be 
done at the local level.  
Local strategies within the welfare state 
The Scandinavian Welfare state is built on a solid local pillar. To a large ex-
tent the welfare state is a ‘welfare municipality’. The legitimacy of this wel-
fare system is based on giving people social security and social services – 
and that it solves defined problems. If the welfare state – and municipality – 
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does not solve problems that the citizens define as real, the citizens’ support 
will vanish and probably turn in a politically populist direction.  
The great challenge for this system is that problems defined as a public 
responsibility to prevent or solve, are steadily growing. New problems are 
steadily defined by both the social and medical sciences. The threshold of 
acceptance of old and known problems is getting lower. The problem solv-
ing ambition has grown immensely, and the problem-solving capacity has 
grown due to economic wealth, and because of a more professional work-
force. The citizens themselves, both individually and from interest-
organisations, often put a pressure on the authorities to solve their problems. 
In addition the media act as a Supreme Court or a grill, where the politicians 
have to answer why problems remains unresolved, particularly after a dra-
matic incident.  
There is hardly any problem or human suffering that is not made a public 
obligation, and the demand for public prevention and intervention becomes 
bigger. Such problems include all kinds of criminal activity, especially all 
kinds of violence and bullying, but also loneliness, hyperactivity among 
children, social incompetence, learning-difficulties and dyslexia, over-
weight, anorexia and bulimia, forced marriages, racism, female circumci-
sion, passive smoking, parents that do not stimulate their children and so on 
and so on.  
What we define as problems have been extended, and the threshold for 
defining a problem as a major and serious one, has in many cases been 
heavily reduced. In most respects we think this is a positive quality with the 
welfare state.  
Worrying and concern  
The welfare-state thinking includes a lot of worrying and concern. To be 
worried is a part of the preventive thinking that has characterised especially 
the social-democratic parties in these countries. If one is not worried or con-
cerned, what is then the reason for prevention? 
Turning back to our issue – youth violence – there are of course many 
reasons for being concerned. Some types of youth violence are rather new 
and frightening, others are old but have increased, still others have not in-
creased, but the threshold for worrying and concern have decreased. People 
are also worried because of the fear that the situation might get worse. 
The kind of action giving rise to worrying and concern is: 
 
– Drive-by-shootings 
– Homicides89 
– Assaults 
– ‘Children robbing children’ 
– Use of knives and other weapons in fights  
                                                     
89  These two most extreme violent acts are of course not common. In Oslo there were two 
gang-related (and perhaps motivated) murders last year. Last week there was probably a 
gang-related (or motivated) murder in Stockholm. The chance of getting hit is far 
greater than being eaten by a wolf – and there is a great concern for wolves in 
part of Eastern Norway. 
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– Practicing the ‘musketeer -principle’ within groups – individual conflicts 
easily escalates to conflicts between groups. 
– Mobilising of huge networks for a fight – where the participants’ loyalty 
is attached to the person who mobilised him or her. Often they do not 
know why there is a battle. Such battles may involve hundreds of people. 
– Revenge is directed towards members of the opponents group or cate-
gory, even family-members 
– Sexual offences – sometimes committed by a group  
– Fights between girls (with groups of boys as ‘back-ups’) 
– Victim intimidation, and sometimes also the victims family or friends 
– Assaults and treats on public servants (teachers, youth-club-workers) 
– Unlawful entry on private parties (which resulted in a murder a month 
ago in Oslo) 
– Unlawful entry into schoolyards and school-buildings to commit vio-
lence, take revenge etc.  
 
Since a great part of these types of violence happens in a group or collective 
context, it is of course important to look at the group, gang or network – 
when considering strategies towards such violence.  
To select preventive measures from the huge prevention 
cafeteria 
Social problems in general and particularly delinquency and violence are 
met by several strategies. A media focused problem very often results in an 
action plan and some state financed local projects. After the racist murder on 
Benjamin in Oslo in January last year – a lot of Norwegian Municipalities 
started to make an action-plan against racism, and a lot of local projects got 
financial support from the state. A lot of such ‘action-planning’ is obviously 
symbolic – where the goal is to symbolise action and to get political support. 
But such action-plans may in some cases result in action that produces re-
sults. 
The most important strategy in the longer run has been to organise a new 
agency or office with a defined expertise, either within the municipal ad-
ministration, or within the civil sector with public financial support, or to 
extend the scope and capacity within existing agencies.  
Such an expansion is often motivated by a deep concern for those af-
fected by the problem, and for a deep worrying for the consequences if noth-
ing is done. 
The municipal capacity for preventing youth problems and individual 
maladjustment has been extended during the last 20 years, especially in 
Norway and Denmark. The Swedes have for a long time had a more devel-
oped municipal sector, but due to the economic recession in Sweden in the 
early nineties, we believe that the capacity now is fairly even. 
The preventive policies within the municipalities one generation ago 
were not driven by strong theoretical ambitions. The municipalities had 
rather few preventive instruments in their toolbox. To establish a youth 
house or youth club became the social democratic answer and a universal 
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medicine to most youth problems.90 During the last 15–20 years the situation 
has changed fundamentally. 
Today we have got a huge market for preventive programs and packages. 
The internet plays a major role in diffusing information on preventive pro-
grams. There are international humanitarian organisations like the Red Cross 
and Lions promoting their own programs. And there are a lot of research-
groups, University Institutes and consulting firms that have developed pro-
grams, often evaluated by themselves – and afterwards selling them on the 
international market. Preventive programs have been big business.  
As pointed to at the beginning of this lecture, most programs aimed at 
preventing youth violence can also be used as gang programs. In his list of 
promising gang programs Howell (1998) mentions among others manhood 
development, employment training, education and counselling, conflict reso-
lution and peer mediation in tandem, equipping peers to help one another, 
community policing, community mobilisation, aggression replacement train-
ing, multi-systemic therapy – and of course police suppression.  
The Scandinavian municipalities, and increasingly local schools, enjoy a 
great freedom to choose measures and strategies to prevent violence or 
whatever problems. Different schools within one municipality may choose 
different programs to prevent problems. One school may choose the Olweus 
anti-bullying program, which stresses tight social control by the adults and 
their interference in conflicts. The near-by school may choose a mediation 
program, which stresses that the pupils themselves should solve the conflicts 
through mediation. And sometimes – the same school may choose one pro-
gram one year and the competing program the next. 
Also within the police there are different directions. The New York ‘zero-
tolerance model’ is one example. And a lot of police officers have been there 
on study-trips, and nearly every conservative or populist politician in Scan-
dinavia is familiar with the model. Today this model is used as an example 
on how to handle delinquency in small towns and small fishing villages in 
Scandinavia. This New York model is by-the way competing with the San-
Diego-model with its intense focus on situational prevention. A number of 
Norwegian police officers have lately been in San Diego, following some 
Swedes that were there some years earlier. 
Malcolm Klein (1995) asserts that youth gangs are characterised by a 
cafeteria style of criminal behaviour. They are versatile in their criminal be-
haviour and do a little bit of this and a little bit of that. The Scandinavian 
Preventive Strategies have the same characteristics – a cafeteria style of pre-
vention.  
The cafeteria offers of course well-known national dishes – as youth club 
or youth house, and the traditional dishes from the health service, the social 
service, the schools and kindergartens. This is still the basis of the welfare 
state diet, but there is a constantly growing number of international dishes –
most of them abbreviation with 3–5 letters. You find ‘individual dishes’ – as 
aggression replacement programs, ‘family dishes’ as Marte Meo, PMT and 
MST, ‘school-dishes’ as the Olweus-program, and different ‘community’ 
dishes like Communities that Cares (CTC). 
                                                     
90  Jerzy Sarnecki knows more about this, since he wrote his academic dissertation on youth-
houses in St ockholm. (Sarnecki 1978).  
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In addition one will find foreign spice to put an international flavour on 
the local and traditional dishes. There is a lot of mobilization models – ‘the 
future workshop, search-conference, SOFT-analysis. But also hot spice like 
metal-detectors and electronic foot-chains.  
In the Norwegian prevention Cafeteria you will find many Danish dishes. 
The most famous Danish dish in Norway is the SSP-model – the coordina-
tion model, which is rather traditional and rational and very much looks like 
a Swedish ‘samverkansmodell’. On the other hand you have the ‘the Front-
runners’and the ‘Caos-pilots’ – using culture as a means of qualification for 
youth at risk. (In Kristiansand you will find an adoption of this – the ‘street 
academy’). You have the Bifrost-school, which is promoted in Norway by a 
small municipality (Eidskog), which have got the exclusive right as a Nor-
wegian agency. You have the use of youth contracts, which recently has 
been launched as a program for a dozen municipalities.  
The headlines of an article in Berlinske Tidende 21/10–01 illustrates the 
business part of this new industry:  
 
Youth project an export-success. The article is about the project Ny Start (New 
Start) – an aggression-control program. ‘The program has obtained international 
interest. The Netherlands and the Baltic countries have shown interest for it, and 
Iceland has already bought it.’ 91 
 
From Sweden we have got night-walkers – ‘farsan på stan’, a lot of ‘samver-
kan’ – coordination, and a lot of stuff from Ørebro – a city that has the ambi-
tion to be the first to make or test out new dishes in Sweden. And you have 
got the Värmland police model – which is a Swedish adoption of the San-
Diago-model – which recently has been promoted to Drammen in Norway. 
We should have had the crime-prevention model from Tyresö in our cafete-
ria, but it is not there yet.  
The Norwegian contribution to our neighbouring countries is not big. The 
Olweus-method is of course prominent. Tore has developed the EXIT-
program, which has been diffused to Sweden and a lot of German 
‘Bundesstaten’. A new and interesting dish is the ‘worrying-conversation’ – 
a ‘zero-tolerance-model’, which is ‘soft’ and helpful, and not brutal. It is de-
veloped by the preventive police in Oslo-South, and it should be much more 
digestive to Scandinavians than the New York model.  
You have by no hopefully caught the point. Both local politicians and 
practitioners are today just a double click from an overwhelming menu of 
preventive practices, models and programs. We hereby stop using this cafe-
teria metaphor. 
The Scandinavian welfare municipality use a shotgun strategy towards 
complex problems– through its variety of agencies and services, programs 
and projects. The shotgun is probably not a good metaphor since some of the 
bullets go in opposite directions. Some countervene each other – partly be-
cause they pursue different goals and partly because they are grounded in 
opposing theories. One good example of this is that schools may concentrate 
pupils with behavioural problems in a special class, to prevent them from 
disturbing other pupils, but also to give these children a more adapted teach-
                                                     
91  According to the article the program has had considerable success in Voldsmose. 
8. Violent Youth Groups: Strategies for Prevention and Intervention  
nupi july 05 
107 
ing. Others are sent to institutions for individual treatment. The MST pro-
gram, on the other hand, tries to get the delinquents out of such institutional 
settings and special classes to reduce peer-group anti-social influences, and 
try to integrate them in pro-social groups within their own community.92  
The Scandinavian municipalities do a lot to prevent what is sad and evil 
such as psychological problems, racism, drug-abuse, violence and so on. 
Even though there is a lot of symbolic action, and a measures and programs 
that are not properly implemented, there is still produced a lot of preventive 
work from the municipal institutions, private sector-organisations and the 
police. To combine measures is a rational crime-preventive strategy, and one 
that is recommended by leading criminologists; complex problems must be 
met by complexity in action. There is no magic bullet, or no single dish with 
all the necessary preventive ingredients. The problem for the research-
business is that complex action makes evaluation extremely complicated and 
may be even impossible. It becomes impossible to find the active ingredients 
that can explain the outcome. (Hawkins 1996, Ringman 1997).  
This is the Prevention paradox: The more we do, the less we know. 
This means that Crime Prevention to a large degree is to handle uncer-
tainty in a rational way.  
What do we know about gang-prevention and intervention in Scandina-
via? And what should we do? 
Our knowledge is to a large extent limited to what we know about what pre-
vents delinquency and violence in general. There is no body of Scandinavian 
gang literature – and gang evaluations. This would have been surprising 
since there is no accepted definition of youth gang-concept. The knowledge 
we have in our Norwegian research-group on prevention and intervention on 
gangs or gang-like groups, is therefore very fragmented, and much based on 
anecdotal evidence from municipalities, schools and police departments, and 
through descriptive research-reports (Bjorgo and Carlsson 1999, Bjørgo, 
Carlsson and Haaland 2001).  
We will return to some measures and methods that we find promising – 
especially in intervening into existing gangs or gang-like groups. Our most 
important recommendation is procedural: to do a proper local assessment 
and analyses – preferably in cooperation between researchers and practitio-
ners. Local authorities are often very puzzled when confronting violent 
gang-like groups. They often need help. 
The most important point is to make a proper mapping, assessment and 
analysis of the local situation. One has to answer questions like: What is a 
gang? Do we see gangs in our community? (If not – what kind of groups do 
we see?) ? How many participants? Age? Ethnic background? Leadership? 
                                                     
92  The welfare state of course also implements policies that may well have a very negative 
effect on juvenile delinquency and violent youth groups. One is to promote competition 
between schools (both secondary school and upper secondary school), where the most 
important success-criterion is the average mark/grade-level. Breaking with the old system 
of community based schools – by letting pupils choose whatever school they (and their 
parents) prefer, the best pupils will probably seek the most successful schools. The wea-
kest pupils, often with a pile of risk factors, will end up in the schools with the poorest re-
sults – making this into a vicious circle. This may indeed be a gang-spawning policy. 
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Do they have a turf? Their social situation? Gang-structure? Conflicting 
enemies? etc., etc. Such an analysis should be the departure for action.  
The action part is often difficult because there may be differences be-
tween professions, sometimes also within professions, and there may be po-
litical differences. Crime prevention is a highly politicised field, and local 
politicians have a legitimate right to interfere. Such divisions and disagree-
ment make both prevention and intervention difficult, which has been shown 
in a comprehensive crime-preventive work in a suburb of Stockholm (Fisk-
sätra) (Ringman 1997:99).  
If the local analysis shows that the community has a real gang-problem or 
a lot of ‘vilde unge’ (wild youth) acting violently, one way to reduce local 
political and professional conflicts that might paralyse the local work, is to 
start with some goals that seems simple and logical. And – that most re-
searchers, practitioners and politicians probably would agree on.  
The means to attain these goals will sometimes be disputed. One solution 
is then to find out what one agrees upon, and try out these measures first. On 
measures where there is much disagreement, one can try to explore and dis-
cuss the strategy further, and try to reach an agreement through an open dis-
cussion. If this does not succeed, and this may often be the case, one simply 
have to live with some disagreement – and that one is implementing opposite 
strategies. Some conflict and disagreement may also be productive, since it 
probably stimulates a local discussion. 
These goals are: 
 
1. Limit recruitment 
If the recruitment is lower than exit, the group or gang will dissolve. How to 
prevent recruitment – involves the whole stock of well-known preventive 
strategies. We will not go into them here. 
 
2. Avoid public labelling of violent groups 
To put a label publicly on a violent youth group very often will stimulate the 
cohesion of the group, and make the group more attractive for potential new 
participants. 
 
3. Neutralise leadership  
This is especially important when the group is rather small, have a loose or-
ganisation structure – or if the group is built up around a powerful leader. A 
leader can be the glue in some groups. The removal strategies can be sup-
pressive through the use of heavy surveillance on individuals, quick prosecu-
tions and placement in prisons or prison-like institutions. Often this will not 
have any crime-preventive effect on this individual, but it may have an effect 
on the gang he is leaving. This is a major point on intervention that Jerzy 
Sarnecki (2001) makes in his last book. One can also use more ‘positive’ 
measures to take key persons out of a structure. Some gang-leaders or key 
persons are tired of fighting and not having a chance to live a normal life, 
but they are strongly restricted by the role they have to play. They may an-
swer positively to such an invitation for education or a job, preferably far 
away from the gang.  
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If the group is either big or heavily organised, to remove the leader, may 
be of little help. But some gangs are fairly small, and by neutralising the 
leaders by ‘force’ or by using the ‘carrot’, the gang may be dismantled.  
 
4. Stimulate and support exit from the gang  
Common gang participants can also be helped out of the gang with positive 
methods, by being offered job, education or military service. The problem of 
breaking the ties to a gang is that one breaks the ties to old friends. There is a 
risk of pushing individuals into social isolation. Those who leave such 
groups should be offered alternative social networks. One such alternative is 
building networks of defectors who can give each other social support. Tore 
and We have been somewhat critical to the MST-model working to get indi-
viduals out of a gang or criminal network. If one just take a single individual 
out, there will be a risk of social isolation – and that one virtually returns to 
the gang after the five or six month of treatment. One alternative is to work 
with dyades or may be triades. 
 
5. Limit inter-group conflict 
Scandinavian gangs may as American gangs 75 years ago, be born in strife 
and nourished by conflict (to quote Thrasher) – as we have shown in our re-
port from Kristiansand. To have one local gang can be problematic, but to 
have two gangs constantly in conflict increases gang cohesion. It creates 
need for protection by individuals being near the conflict, and thereby in-
crease the recruitment into the gang. Such a conflict will easily have fatal 
consequences, as we have seen in Oslo – and by the way also in Kristian-
sand. Taking the law into one's own hands is a dynamic element in a process 
of retaliation. We have seen from Kristiansand that the youth within the 
fighting groups have no confidence in the police. They claim that they have 
tried, but that they have not been taken seriously.  
We know that it is extremely difficult for the police to build up confi-
dence with groups like this. But we do not think it is impossible. The police 
here are confronted with a difficult and interesting development work on 
how to approach such groups both in acute violent conflicts and how to deal 
with their complaints on each other. We have experienced both in Oslo and 
Kristiansand that they may have confidence in specific police officers – es-
pecially within the preventive police. There is something to build on. 
 
6. Limit the wearing and use of weapons and knives 
Strong inter-group conflict stimulates the youth to take precautions. One 
precaution is wearing a knife – and to small degree also guns. In conflicts 
such weapons easily will be used. The involved youth in Kristiansand claims 
that the zero-tolerance from the police on wearing of knives combined with 
huge fines have had a preventive effect. But we know from Oslo that the 
steady police searching for knives is very annoying, and contribute to hostil-
ity especially among those youth with an immigrant background who do not 
wear knives. The police in smaller cities – like Kristiansand – have an ad-
vantage that they can search for knives on a justified suspicion because they 
often will know who is capable of wearing and using such a weapon. Some 
of the boys we interviewed gave verbal support to this zero-tolerance prac-
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tice. It prevented them wearing and using a knife – and they knew that when 
using a knife in a fight they have no self-control – and that they virtually can 
kill someone. They do not want that. 
 
7. Make children conscious of what honour and respect is 
A hallmark with many violent youth groups today is that they constantly are 
claiming respect by provocative action, and that those who do not pay them 
respect are beaten up. What we see in some youth groups is not only a cul-
ture of honour, but a culture of ‘hype-honour’. The culture of honour is well 
known among delinquent working class youth as described by Willis (1977), 
among neo-nazi gangs (Bjørgo 1997), and especially among immigrant 
youth groups. The type of honour being expressed by immigrant youth 
groups is different of that of their parents – though there are of course many 
similarities. The ‘hype-honour’ also reflects their underclass position, and 
exclusion from alternative arenas for more legitimate honour, and it reflects 
that they have seen a lot of American gangster movies diffusing such values. 
But whatever the reason – this is a very problematic type of action some-
times leading to severe violence, to a lot of irritation and probably racism 
among children and youth having been exposed to such provocations, but 
also by teachers, youth workers and staff in local shops and petrol stations. 
In the same way as the schools put racism on the agenda, they should also 
put the concepts of honour and respect on the agenda. And may be one also 
should involve the parents in such discussions.  
 
8. Offer alternative arenas for getting honour 
Children and youth are contextual beings. A change in social context often 
will lead to a change in values, attitudes and in behaviour (Emler and Rei-
cher 1995, Fangen 2001). The identity of a youth is flexible and changeable. 
To offer youth at risk alternative arenas for success is of course a well-
known strategy, but is still an important one. And a change in activities that 
give new friends, often will lead to a change in behaviour. We believe that 
these are goals that it is possible to agree on. We shall not go into further 
detail on what to do.  
Involving local politicians 
Since there is considerable doubt about which strategies, programs and 
measures being effective, the scope for political discretion increases. The 
policies for integrating refugees and immigrants, social- policy, and crime-
prevention policies are not only dependant on what is effective, but also on 
what seems reasonable or just – from the point of view of the ordinary citi-
zens. One important objective for having a local political system is that lay 
people, politicians, shall bring these considerations on what is reasonable 
and just into decisions.  
Another reason for having local politicians is to make decisions at all. 
The politicians play an important role making decisions when the profes-
sionals do not agree, or when there is no clear advice from the professional 
administration. 
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Crime prevention is a very complex business. Without open discussion 
where the politicians meet the arguments from the practitioners and vice 
versa- there is a risk that the solutions can be very simple. In a period where 
populist parties – especially in Norway and Denmark, are getting consider-
able influence, such a meeting and confrontation between professional and 
political points of views may reduce the danger of returning into simple and 
suppressive strategies. Without such discussions a populist policy might pre-
vail. 
I doubt that there in the near future will be possible to give the munici-
palities a clear research-based answer on how to solve gang-problems or 
problems with violent youth-groups. There is far too much professional dis-
agreement, the cafeteria has already too many dishes, and it is difficult to be 
continuously updated. One answer is to organise good local processes – both 
in describing, assessing and analysing local problems. Strategies and meas-
ures should be chosen after such an analysis, integrating the local politicians 
into this process. A clarification of the gang- or bande concept is important 
in this respect. A loose group of immigrant kids, where some of them may 
be wild and violent, shall not be dealt with as an organised gang. 
Towards more control? 
If we shall sum up Norwegian work against youth violence (after having fol-
lowed a governmental program on the issue) – our conclusion is that there 
has been a shift towards more control strategies. We do not believe that there 
are replacing more ‘soft’ and inclusive strategies, but there is more emphasis 
on ‘grensesetting’ and a ‘konsekvenspedagogikk’.  
 
– MST is a mainly a social control measure, teaching and supporting the 
parents to control children with serious behaviour problems. You have 
nearly a MST-team in all of the 19 Norwegian counties.  
– The Olweus-program is now available for all Norwegian schools. This is 
also a ‘control program’ teaching the teachers on how to exercise their 
control functions. 
– The worrying conversation warns parents that their children are in a risk 
position, and offers help to the parents. But the following up of this con-
versation may include a lot of helping measures. 
– The parent groups established in the EXIT support the control of the par-
ents.  
– You have the firm ‘control regime’ in a famous Oslo-school. The school 
use personal contracts with the parents to attend to meeting at school. 
They use teachers and staff with the same ethnic background as the pu-
pils, and meetings with the parents are held in their mother tongue. They 
have strict reactions on swearing and calling names. After three bookings 
for calling ‘bad names’ the parents are called to the school where the 
child has to tell their parents what they have called other pupils – which 
bring shame to them and their parents. But this ‘control-regime’ is cou-
pled with a lot of positive activities – culture, sport, and leisure. We be-
lieve that within the leisure-sector the same firm strategy is used at Kvis-
ten Youth Center at Nørrebro. 
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– The employment in schools of ‘social intelligent male gorillas’ – with 
physical strength and determination. They take care of aggressive chil-
dren at school, and they help to keep intruders out of the schoolyard – 
coming for an act of revenge.  
 
The Olweus project is evaluated by Olweus and his team at the University of 
Bergen and has shown good results. The MST program has shown good re-
sults in the USA, is now under evaluation by a research team at the Univer-
sity of Oslo. There is only anecdotic evidence that other measures have re-
duced the problems within the school. But the messages from the schools are 
quite clear – we have gained control and we are managing our pupils. There 
is less conflict, less fear and better learning possibilities. But if this will have 
a positive long-term preventive effect, we do not know. 
Reasons for worrying for the future 
I started this chapter by whipping the Danes for the moral panic on this is-
sue. There is no reason for moral panic, but there is reason for worrying. The 
Scandinavian Society is changing towards greater inequality. We have got a 
new underclass of immigrants and refugees, living close together with Scan-
dinavians with a heavy burden of social problems. Many of the children 
from both these categories are already lagging behind when starting school. 
They will have difficulties in succeeding in a society where economic suc-
cess is becoming the most important measure stick. Criminal activity will for 
some be an alternative. This situation is gang spawning. We are pessimistic 
about our political ability and willingness to do something with these gang-
spawning conditions. This means that we must be better in both local 
prevention and intervention. And to be better, we need more knowledge so 
that we can choose between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ dishes in the cafeteria. 
 
 
